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Abstract
Sociological studies of the lottery have largely underplayed both the rich history
of lotteries in the UK and the richness of meaning that it bears today for its
players. ¿ey prefer, instead, to limit themselves to issues of pathological and
deviant gambling, and to issues of class and regressive taxation.
Historically, the growth to maturity in the eighteenth century of UK state
lotteries was co-extensive with the establishment and institutionalization of
rational capitalism. ¿eir banning in 1826 reected the separation of legitimate
nancial speculation from gambling.
Sociological theories of gambling have found in it a similar tense anity with
the values of rational capitalism. Gambling is largely conceived, in one way
or another, as a safety-valve allowing release from an irresolvable tension in
capitalism between prudence and risk-taking.
¿e current UK National Lottery, however, creates diculties for these the-
ories. In this thesis I show that the ‘invisibility’ of the lottery – its privatization
and its peculiar embeddedness in everyday life – renders problematic a central
assumption of theories of gambling: that the release aorded is derived from its
providing an exciting focus of economic irrationality.
¿e charitable aspect of the Lottery seems to be in contrast to the Lottery as
gambling because the altruistic impulse seems to be fundamentally opposed
to the acquisitive spirit of gambling. I show how the Lottery is, by its nature
and by its use, able to arbitrate between these apparently contradictory pulls.
¿us, in the case of the Lottery, one may add to Devereux’s list of ways in which
gambling is able to serve as a mediator between irreconcilable value strains
in capitalism a capacity to oer either a release or, indeed, a rapprochement
between those values.
¿e contribution of the thesis is three-fold: a critical theoretical appraisal
and development of theories of gambling, new empirical data (31 unstructured
in-depth interviews) in an under-researched eld, and an historical analysis of
the relationship between lotteries and aspects of the development of capitalism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It was only an ’opeless fancy,
It passed like an Ipril dye,
But a look an’ a word an’ the dreams they
stirred
¿ey ’ave stolen my ’eart awye!
—George Orwell, 1984
1.1 Background
In 1994, just a er the rst prize draw, one could overhear talk about the Lottery
everywhere one went. I remember in particular a train journey where I listened
in as two people discussed in ne detail such subjects as what their numbers
were and what they were going to do with the jackpot that they were inevitably
going to win. It began as the train le the station, and ended an hour or so later,
when the two reached their destination. ¿e nal comment that I heard was:
“Oh well, we probably won’t win anyway”.
¿ese sorts of casual interactions seem, in retrospect, to be a sort of ‘everyday
adventure’ for their participants. Like Simmel’s adventure, they were moments
of a “dropping out of the continuity of life” [205, p. 187], but dened by a “decisive
boundedness” [p. 189], by the context from which they departed and to which
they would necessarily return; for the escape from everyday life that such
conversations allows is, like going on a holiday, only meaningful if one knows
that one has to return to everyday life.
Several years later, when I began research for this thesis, I was struck by a
similar quality in the unstructured interviews that I conducted: a certain sort
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of a pleasure, not only for the interviewees, but also for the interviewer, that
was somehow dierent from the usual pleasure that people derive from being
asked their views and from being part of some research.
In 1984, George Orwell hasWinston Smith overhear a group of proles arguing
heatedly about what numbers have come up in the lottery:
—Can’t you bleeding well listen to what I say? I tell you no number ending
in seven ain’t won for over fourteen months!
—Yes, it ’as, then!
—No, it ’as not! Back ’ome I got the ’ole lot of ’em for over two years wrote
down on a piece of paper. I takes ’em down reg’lar as the clock. An’ I tell
you, no number ending in seven–
—Yes, a seven ’as won! I could pretty near tell you the bleeding num-
ber. Four oh seven, it ended in. It were in February — second week in
February.
—February your grandmother! I got it all down in black and white. An’ I
tell you, no number–
—Oh, pack it in!’ said the third man.
¿ey were talking about the Lottery. Winston looked back when he
had gone thirty metres. ¿ey were still arguing, with vivid, passionate
faces. ¿eLottery, with its weekly pay-out of enormous prizes, was the one
public event to which the proles paid serious attention. It was probable
that there were some millions of proles for whom the Lottery was the
principal if not the only reason for remaining alive. It was their delight,
their folly, their anodyne, their intellectual stimulant.
Winston Smith found hope in the proles because they had a freedom to exper-
ience passions that were forbidden to others. ¿ese passions were, however,
evoked by trivialities; deliberately so, for they were devised by Big Brother as
an adventure of the ‘bread and circuses’ kind to keep the proles reasonably
contented and in their place. In chapter 7, he is excited to hear what he hopes
and believes is the beginning of a riot that might presage a revolution, but it
turns out to be a woman who is angry that she has missed out on buying a
cheap and shoddy tin saucepan. Later on in the novel, he experiences a sort of
9
epiphany when he hears a woman singing a popular song: “¿e birds sang, the
proles sang. the Party did not sing”. One sees something similar in the “vivid
passion” with which the proles argue about the numbers that have come up in
the Lottery, the “staggering feats of memory” that these illiterate people display,
and their eager consumption of “systems, forecasts, and lucky amulets”. With
the Oceania Lottery, these passions are for something not merely trivial, but, as
Winston knows because of his position in the Party, something entirely futile:
the Lottery of Oceania is xed; there are no real winners.
¿e real Lottery is, of course, not xed. It does not resemble Orwell’s lottery
in many other respects, although some may be disposed to think of it in this
way.
Unlike those of the proles, the kinds of conversations one might overhear are
almost never heated. ¿ey are, in fact, marked by a pleasant sociability. Indeed,
there are few other topics that seem to foster such geniality between conversants.
¿e Lottery just seems to be an ideal subject for talk, as I discovered when I
conducted the interviews for this thesis, some of which went far beyond the
single hour, almost all of which went far beyond the range of subjects that I
had envisaged to be related to playing the Lottery and to gambling. ¿e real
Lottery is, it would seem, far richer in people’s imaginations thanOrwell’s lottery.
¿e passions it evokes are less potent, less “vivid” perhaps, but they are more
congenial than the anger of the proles, and they have a deeper hinterland than
the meagre referents of tin saucepans, vapid popular songs, and the numbers in
the draw.
¿e fertility of lotteries in the imagination nds a parallel in culture and liter-
ature. Not so very far back in its philology, the lot as the element of a gambling
device converges with the notion, providential or otherwise, of one’s station or
fate in life (one’s lot, one’s allotted span) and with the distribution of resources
(allotment). Lotteries also lend themselves well to metaphor and simile. Journ-
alists and politicians, for example, speak of “postcode lotteries”, particularly for
the provision of health-care.1 Cecil Rhodes famously said “Remember that you
1. See, for example, Postcode lottery in GP services, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
health/2116336.stm.
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are an Englishman, and have consequently won rst prize in the lottery of life”.
Moral philosophers speak of the ‘natural lottery’: “morally arbitrary natural or
social advantages or disadvantages: innate talents or handicaps, advantageous
or disadvantageous family situations” [120, p. 7]. In literature, lotteries have
been used as a gure for false hopes, as in 1984 and, at a more intimate scale,
Chekhov’s short story¿e Lottery, where the momentary belief that they have
won the lottery opens up a broad terrain of hopes and dissatisfactions for a
married couple. Other novelists have used the lottery to explore themes of fate,
chance, luck, and arbitrariness, most notably in Borges’s¿e Lottery of Babylon,
where every aspect of life is determined by a lottery run by the mysterious
Company; it begins “Like all men in Babylon, I have been a proconsul; like all,
a slave. I have also known omnipotence, opprobrium, imprisonment”. Another
piece of ction worthy of note is Shirley Jackson’s short story¿e Lottery, where
a lottery is used to show the arbitrariness of social scapegoating: it is used to
select a member of the village in which it is set to be stoned to death. And there
is also Je Noon’s Nymphomation, where a new mathematical theory allows
numbers to ‘breed’ until they take over the city of Manchester, dominating it
with a sort of living lottery; a mathematics professor and his students seek to
beat the numbers and destroy the game.
¿e obvious material attractions of playing the Lottery, its power to excite
the imagination, and the depth and fecundity of lottery tropes and gures go
some way to explain something else that I found curious and intriguing about
the Lottery at the time: it seemed to have always been here. Rather like the
vegetation that appears in a desert a er rainfall, all of the practices, idioms,
and beliefs about lotteries seemed to have been lying dormant waiting for the
right conditions for a vigorous and luxuriant eorescence. One part of the
explanation for this is, perhaps, that while individual actors may have done so,
culture has not forgotten the long and rich history of lotteries in the UK. No one
whom I interviewed had any idea that lotteries had been employed from the
seventeenth century onwards, nor had I until I began to look at the subject. ¿ere
are some striking similarities between the lottery culture then and the lottery
culture now. What appears to be a sort of ‘culturalmemory’ of playing the lottery
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may, however, be explained rather better by nding anities between the two
historical periods, both of which witnessed extraordinary changes in economy
and society: for the one, it was the formation of the major institutions of
capitalism; for the other, it was the collapse of the post-war Keynesian consensus,
the globalizing of economies, and, particularly relevant for this thesis, the return
to laisser-faire policies and privatized political economies. It is in these changes
that the major dierences between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries’
lottery players may be found.
A good example of this is class. In both periods, lottery players came from
all classes, but there was an important dierence in how they played. In the
eighteenth century, lottery tickets were relatively expensive – between £5.00
and £10.00 – the initial purchasers would either sell shares in tickets to poorer
players or devise insurance schemes by which poorer players could speculate
upon the draw without actually taking part in it themselves.1 In the current
Lottery, on the other hand, lottery play seems to cut across all classes.2¿us,
while all classes participate, they do so in dierent ways now than they did then.
¿is seems to confound to some degree many class-based understandings of
the lottery. But there is one respect in which an initial exploration of the Lottery
did seem to involve class: I, along with one or two of my interviewees and many
of my acquaintances and some of my interviewees, have no inclination at all to
play the lottery, while others, ostensibly from the same social and economic
groups, are extremely enthusiastic players. It was, in fact, an initial exploration
of this matter that led me to the Lottery as a thesis subject: why was it that I
knew that I would never have a conversation similar to the one that I heard on
that train?
Another non-player, one ofmy interviewees [interview: Nick M], who seemed
to take pleasure in surprising me with the information that he did not play the
Lottery, said that he had always been “immune” to the attractions of gambling,
“not on a moral grounds, but I’ve. . .when I was at school, some children, boys,
played the horses, or played pinball machines, and. . . I just thought it was throw-
1. See chapter 2 for more details.
2. 2004 data from the Henley Centre, cited in Camelot’s Social Report [33, p. 6].
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ing money away really”. He did join the work syndicate, but this was because
he was the manager and wanted to “show willing” with his employees and he
withdrew soon a erwards. He said that he was uneasy about making any moral
judgements about Lottery players. At his workplace, there were a few who had
opposed setting up a syndicate on moral or political grounds, but he said that
was not his view. Playing the Lottery was simply something that did not interest
him, except for the occasional annoyance of the queues at the shops when he
was trying to buy cigars, when he might “curse” the scratchcard buyers and the
Lottery itself. In some degree, such views may be understood merely as aspects
of personality: his use of the word “immune” is felicitous here. And they may,
to another and greater degree, be explained by social class: a manager with
an established career might be less interested in changing his or her life than
someone with no immediate prospects; but this does not sit well with the data
that playing the Lottery is well-represented in all classes.
It was interesting that non-players are generally more reticent about their
reasons for not playing than players are about the problems that winning the
jackpot might cause. For some, they imagined it would aect their careers, that
it might “derail everything. . . throw it into confusion” [interview: Peter F] as
one put it. ¿ese people, typically from the middle classes, were people who had
a clear career narrative to follow, for whom the interruption brought about by a
jackpot win would throw their carefully constructed and hard-earned plans into
disarray. On the other hand, some players, typically from working-class back-
grounds, were more concerned about its eects upon their sense of community.
¿e best example of this from the interview data is [interview: Douglas K], a
retired merchant seaman, who said
Betty andDouglasKDouglas: You couldn’t stay here. . . Imean. . . everyone
would know. Even if you tried to stay the same. When I went down
the pub everyonewould know. You’d have tomove to CanfordClis
[a well-to-do area of Bournemouth] or somewhere, and when you
were there, who’d want to know you?
¿is is how someone imagines a win would aect their life, but I also had
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the opportunity to interview some jackpot winners: a group of workers in
Manchester whose twelve-strong syndicate had won a jackpot of £1.88 million.
Many of thewinnerswere unwilling to be interviewed, and twowished to remain
entirely anonymous, to the extent that they did not even tell me their names.
¿e winnings, when divided up, came to £157,000 each, a large amount but not
one that would be expected to be life-changing. However, the two anonymous
interviewees were clearly traumatized by the money. One, in fact said that she
regretted having been part of the syndicate, and that she felt trapped by the win:
she could not pass over the opportunity, but she did not know what to do with it.
Both had become suspicious of the motives of others, having felt that relatives
were surreptitiously approaching them for gi s and loans. On the other hand,
the interviewee with whom I made the initial contact [interview: Jackie D] was
very condent about her ability to deal with the win, saying that her husband, a
stockbroker, knew how to handle money, unlike her colleagues.
It is dicult to determine what will make one person play the Lottery, and
another not do so; it was reported recently that Prince Harry plays regularly,
for example [178]. For non-players who choose not to do so for ethical or
religious reasons, there is little depth to their decision not to play: it is simply
the following of an imperative. But it is clear that those people who do play have
a richer and more detailed imagination about it than do those who do not about
their non-playing. ¿ere is something about playing the Lottery that allows
people scope for thinking about their position in society, their relationships
with others, and their attitudes to money in ways that are not available for
non-players. ¿is observation is central to my method of selecting interviewees,
as I will discuss later in this introduction.
1.2 Gambling and Lotteries in The Social Sciences
¿e UK National Lottery has enjoyed remarkable success since its rst draw on
19 November 1994. Currently, around 70% of adults play the lottery regularly,
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and some 94% of those eligible to do so have played at one time or another [35].1
Over the seven years of the rst licence Camelot raised £10.6 billion for the
Good Causes [34].
In 1997, the average expenditure on the Lottery per household was £3.70 per
week [2, p. 4]; Camelot reports that the average spend on the Lottery in 2006 is
£3.00. ¿is represents approximately 1% of household expenditure, a similar
amount to that spent on biscuits and cakes. ¿e pleasure people gain from the
Lottery has been calculated by the Institute for Fiscal Studies at 71p per week
per adult, in total £1.8 billion per annum [85]. ¿is is the equivalent of a 1p
reduction in the rate of income tax. Although its macro-economic impact is
“modest”, the use of hypothecation – the directing of its revenue into specic
“good causes” – has meant that it has become a signicant source of income for
many organizations. Further, the eects of the Lottery income multiply and
“ripple” outwards; capital projects have received a huge boost from such funding.
Cambridge Econometrics calculate that an extra £1 billion per annum has been
generated by the increase in construction demand as a result of millennium
projects associated with the Lottery, some 5% of all construction output in the
country (cited [2, p. 8]).
¿ere has also been a huge growth in other forms of gambling. ¿e most
recent large-scale study of gambling in the UK, the 1999 British Gambling Preval-
ence Survey [209] found that 90% of those interviewed had gambled in the the
last year, 50% in the week before they were interviewed, with an average weekly
expenditure of £3.50. In the UK, the gambling industry has been estimated to
be growing at the rate of 3% per annum [151]. Most notably, gambling on the
Internet has become big business; companies such as PartyGaming, 888, and
SportingBet have seen 50% growth on earnings per share since 2005.
Alongside the commercial growth of gambling in recent years, there has been
a corresponding growth in social-scientic literature and research on the subject.
1. ¿ere had been a drop in consumption in the early part of the twenty-rst century, but
this seems to have been reversed recently. Lotteries are notorious for the need to keep fuelling
the res of consumption (creating “thunder” in marketing parlance) [50], [49], [114]. Camelot
seems to have achieved this recently with a proliferation of new games and new ways of playing
using media such as the Internet and text-messaging.
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¿is has tended to to concentrate on problematic gambling, notably compulsive
gambling, and addiction. ¿e plot in gure 1.1 demonstrates this growth.1 In
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Figure 1.1: Yearly proportion of gambling articles whose subject is pathological
gambling (data from ibss).
2004, almost one-third of all articles about gambling were concerned with
pathological forms. ¿e proportion of such articles would be all the higher were
it not for the preponderance of publications from economics, where gambling is
very frequently used in analyses, particularly within game-theoretical models.
Several commentators have noted that the approaches taken by gambling
research are heavily inuenced by the ideology of the researcher. McGowan, for
example, notes that the USA National Commission on the Impact of Gambling
classies its members according to whether they are in support of or against
gambling [155, p. 279]; research sponsored by anti-gambling bodies tends to
stress the eects of gambling and the risk of addiction, while that sponsored
by pro-gambling bodies stresses its revenue-generation capability [p. 284]. ¿e
eect of this, he suggests, is that the costs and benets of gambling tend to be
1. Derived from an analysis of data from a search for all gambling articles up to 2004 in the
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences on-line bibliography (http://www.lse.ac.
uk/collections/IBSS/Default.htm). Records were classied using all subject description
keywords related to pathological gambling.
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over-estimated, since the position of the researcher (or of the research) tends
to underplay the one or the other [p. 285].
McMillen takes this point further, suggesting that theories of gambling are
shaped by normative and ‘culturally specic” theories of liberal social science.
She suggests, in particular, that “there has been too much of an emphasis
on individual behaviour rather than a broader understanding of the changing
gambling phenomenon” [157, p. 8], and calls for a probing of the “complex social
relations lying beneath the surface data of legal gambling”. ¿e “individualism”
against which she sets her store is that kind of sociology which concentrates on
what gambling means for its participants; gambling, she says, “is as much an
expression of capital-state relations and political-legal decisions as of individual
behaviour” [p. 9]. While agreeing with the sentiment that gambling should
be understood politically as well as individually, I would contend that, at least
with respect to lotteries, there is little evidence of such an individualistic bias in
sociological research. Outside of studies of addiction and compulsive gambling,
most research, in fact, pays little if any attention to the meanings attached
to gambling. And within studies of addiction and compulsive gambling, the
“meaning” is always sought with respect to the question of how individuals
become compulsive gamblers.
¿ere is, in fact, very little research that even approaches an attempt to
understand the meaning of lottery playing for its players in any sociologically
interesting way. Devereux’s Gambling and the Social Structure [60], discussed
in chapter 3 of this thesis, is one work on gambling that does so. As a structural-
functional analysis of gambling, and one which takes lotteries as one of its
principal topics, it is, by denition, concerned with the culture and hence the
“meaning” of gambling. But, as such it is, of course, also concerned with the
complex social relations underlying those meanings, and especially with their
social function. ¿e canonical charge against this sort of view is that meaning
here is taken to be a bearer of structure for the norms and values of society
itself.
It is sensible to take note of McMillen’s assertion that meaning is always to
be studied in relation to historical and political forces. And it is also sensible to
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heed the problems of reading characteristics of gambling as functional elements
serving a hypostatized conception of society. ¿ankfully, gambling has much
to oer as a sociological subject within these parameters.
Texts from Devereux’s 1949 text onwards have drawn attention to the paucity
of sociologically rigorous attempts to understand gambling activities. ¿e
1976 US Commission on the Review of the National Policy on Gambling [46]
discovered less than one page’s worth of references to gambling related research
in social sciences literature [88, p. 108]. A similar situation holds in the UK. In
its nal report the 1978 Royal Commission on Gambling [189]1, whose support
for a “national lottery for good causes” led eventually to the introduction of
the National Lottery, recommended strongly that a body be set up to conduct
research into the social and psychological eects of gambling since little was
known about its eects, and hence of any new responsibilities that the state
would gain with its further involvement in gambling. ¿e practical measure
it called for was the setting up of a gambling research centre which would
monitor the actions of gambling bodies and conduct research into the eects
of gambling on its participants. ¿is call has been echoed by the medical and
psychological professions [83, p.8], [156]. So far this has not been realized. ¿e
National Lottery Commission, the Lottery monitoring ‘watchdog’ only fulls
one half of this role and many critics have claimed that it has even failed to live
up to this more restricted mandate. Furthermore, the next and most recent
Select Committee report on gambling, published in 2001, remarks that
As with the Rothschild Commission, more than two decades ago,
we were struck by how little is known about either normal or prob-
lem gambling. We had very little in the way of hard evidence to
guide our discussions.[92, §1.30]
In the following section, it goes on to recommend that “research be carried out
to understand the nature of normal, responsible, gambling behaviour and to
understand the development of, and risk factors for, problem gambling”. ¿is
neglect of gambling research is of a piece with the historical ambivalence of
1. ¿e Rothschild Report.
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the state in matters of gambling and its predominantly piecemeal attempts to
get to grips with it. ¿ere is clearly a recognition that allowing the setting up
of state-run public lotteries is potentially problematic in as much as the state
becomes implicated in moral issues of encouraging activities that many hold to
be more or less deviant, and in the consequences of its encouraging people to do
so. On the other hand, the attractions of lotteries – extra revenue and, perhaps,
‘bread and circuses’ for the masses – seem to carry greater force.
¿is emphasis on the ‘positive’ aspects of gambling in the state’s policies for
the Lottery has its mirror image in the key texts of the sociology of gambling:
they are by and large centred around the deviant aspects of gambling (with the
exception of Goman and Geertz), under-emphasizing or even ignoring its
everyday normal aspects. Andwhere gambling is examined from the standpoint
of normalness, it is o en understood privatively, as something that is distin-
guished by the absence of some quality or property; this becomes especially
problematic when one looks to the roots of conceptions of gambling in con-
ceptions of play, as I show in each chapter of this thesis, for the understanding
of gambling and play as the negative space of normal aspects of life, such as
work, always carries with it an implied separation of “normal” gambling from
normality itself.
¿e development of sociological theories and research into gambling would
be of much use if the calls for better understanding were ever taken seriously
and at times other than the occasional moral panic about the addictiveness
of scratchcards, but there are more sociologically homely justications for its
study as Frey points out:
If we know anything at all about gambling, we know that its pop-
ularity cuts across all class, racial, and ethnic lines; and that in
many cases a greater proportion of any society are gamblers than
non-gamblers. ¿us gambling behavior is a perfect example of
what sociologists seek to study: it is a persistent and institutional-
ized form of behavior. To make it even more attractive, it is o en
classied as deviant behavior –more specically, a victimless crime,
long a stronghold of sociological attention [88, p.108].
19
Although it is true, as he claims, that gambling is universal, widespread and
persistent, this is not in and of itself an adequate claim for its importance. What
needs to be shown is that it is socially and historically embedded in signicant
and non-trivial ways. Only in certain kinds of strongly religious societies,
such as those governed by the Muslim Shar’ia law which explicitly forbids
it, is gambling both formally and informally, de jure and de facto, absolutely
forbidden rather than either morally deprecated but grudgingly accepted or
wholeheartedly embraced. In most societies, and especially capitalist western
ones, it occupies a liminal space somewhere between ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ ¿is
ambivalence, bundled up together with its persistence and the entwinement of
the strong threads of its history with those of the development of capitalism, of
secularization, and of leisure is what makes for its richness as a topic.
1.3 Research Style and Methods
¿e extreme ends of lottery play may attract the sociological eye most readily:
the jackpot winners and the scratchcard addicts. But, I suggest, the real meaning
of the Lottery is to be found in its “ordinary” players: those who play regularly
with little return on their expenditure. ¿is is not because of their relative
strength in numbers, but because it is within them that aspects of the Lottery
are the most densely textured. For a jackpot winner, questions of playing
the Lottery are resolved into questions of how to spend the money; for the
scratchcard addict, the main meaning of the Lottery is how to get the next “x”.
For the ordinary player, on the other hand, these sorts of questions remain
unresolved: the questions “what would I do with the jackpot?” and “why do I
play when I stand little chance of winning?” have greater degrees of freedom
of response than “what shall I do with all this money?” and “where can I get
my next hand-full of scratchcards?”. Because of this, it is possible to think of
the Lottery within its everyday world and amongst its ordinary players as a
sort of interface between the ordinary and the extraordinary. It sits at once
in the world of fantastic escape from the burdens of everyday life and in the
everyday world of budgeting, shopping, and casual conversation. Furthermore,
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the Lottery may allow its players access to what Simmel, in¿e Adventurer
calls “the great forms in which we shape the substance of life”, namely “the
syntheses, antagonisms, or compromises between chance and necessity” [205,
p. 191]. Gambling, which takes for its substance the relation between chance
and necessity, is a good place to seek out the articulations of such forms in
contemporary society. Rather like Simmel’s handle, it may be seen as a kind
of “mediating bridge” [203, p. 271] between the life of the individual and large
scale social processes. And, what Simmel notes of the handle is also true of
the “ordinary” lottery play: “precisely because of its superciality, it reveals the
range of the category to the fullest” [p. 274].
In order to satisfy McMillen’s assertion that gambling is as much about polit-
ical, economic, and social processes as it is about “meaning” for individuals,
this thesis aims not merely to be a report on the data, but to balance the three
dimensions of the research: empirical, historical, and theoretical. It seeks to
come to an understanding of the Lottery as an unusual, and indeed possibly
unique, “bridge” between the concrete business of playing week a er week and
historical tendencies, social processes, and fundamental forms that govern our
lives.
¿e empirical work consisted of 31 unstructured interviews1, mostly with
players of the Lottery who had not won anything more than small amounts,
but including some with people who had won signicant amounts. ¿ere were
no especial issues of sampling for these, since the aim was not to establish
representativeness. ¿e interviews were conducted in London, Bournemouth,
Manchester, and Bury. For some interviews, I made the initial contact using
posters in the workplaces of friends and relatives, others were introductions
sought from the initial interviews, and a few were opportunistic: I came across
the Manchester jackpot winners, for example, through a friend who worked in
the same department.
¿e historical work involved a systematic examination of literature on lot-
teries from Gataker’s 1627 Of¿e Nature and Use of Lots: A Treatise Historical
and¿eological [93] onwards. Ashton’s 1893 A History of English Lotteries [4]
1. See appendix A for the topic guide and a sample interview.
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and Ewen’s Lotteries and Sweepstakes: An Historical, Legal, and Ethical Survey
of their Introduction, Suppression, and Re-establishment in the British Isles [84]
are mainstays of introductions to texts on lotteries, but neither of these texts
may be taken as a reliable historical record. Hence, for the historical dimension
of this thesis I returned to the primary texts, with a particular emphasis on
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Furthermore, lotteries share their
history with the histories of insurance, nancial markets, and probability theory,
and while this is o en remarked upon, there is no analysis that brings them
together in quite the way that I do in chapter 2, and in chapter 3, where I show
the historical links between these and the development of rational capitalism,
their connexions to sociological theories of gambling and their relevance to
contemporary lottery play.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2: History I examine the uses to which lotteries and the idea of
lotteries have been put, from biblical times to today. In particular, I look at two
periods of state lotteries: the eighteenth century and the late twentieth and early
twenty-rst century. I describe how the history of lotteries is bound up with,
among others, the histories of the institutions of capitalism (nancial markets
and insurance), of charitable giving, of mathematics, and of jurisprudence.
More generally, I nd in the history of lotteries anities between their uses,
social meanings, and technologies and the development of what Max Weber
styled rational ascetic capitalism.
Chapter 3: Theories of Gambling A review of sociological theories
of gambling: following on from the historical work of the previous chapter, this
one concentrates on those theories that are specied in terms of the relation of
gambling to modernity: the relationship between rational calculativeness and
pleasure-seeking, the relationship between self-interest and the interests of the
collective, and the relationship between an ethic of acquisition and an ethic of
welfare. ¿us, I principally examine:
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• ¿orstein Veblen’s analysis of gambling in¿e¿eory of the Leisure Class:
An Economic Study of Institutions, in which he nds in gambling an atav-
istic nostalgia for the pre-capitalistic period, one which is inappropriate
for modern society.
• Edward Devereux’s Gambling and the Social Structure: A Sociological
Study of Lotteries and Horse Racing in Contemporary America, in which,
unlike Veblen, he nds in gambling something that is capable of satisfying
the value tension of modern societies between prudence and risk-taking.
¿e moral ambivalence ascribed to gambling leads him to his conclusion
that gambling is well-placed to relieve this tension because of the peculiar
way that it straddles economic activity and leisure. Gambling is stigmat-
ized because it runs counter to the ethic of working hard to earn one’s
living; gambling is accepted because it allows a playful release of tensions
unresolvable by other means; hence, gambling occupies a sort of moral
‘grey area’: it is a covertly tolerated “institutionalized deviant pattern”.
• Cliord Geertz’s work on gambling in Deep Play: A Description of the
Balinese Cockght, a critique of both utilitarianism and functionalism, he
claims to nd in gambling an interpretative “meta-social commentary”
on the structure of society. I note some problems with this theory, but
draw from it the, in my view, more interesting point, that gambling is
able to account for the stratication of society because it is a form of play:
something happens in the Balinese cock-ght precisely because nothing
much really happens at all.
Chapter 4: Play ¿e theories of gambling discussed in chapter 3 all
attempt to understand gambling in terms of its broad macro-sociological sig-
nicance. What they all nd in gambling that is central to its special rôle or
function is that gambling is a form of play, and that as such it can temporarily
suspend the usual norms and values, replacing them with the ‘rules of the game’.
But none of these theorists go very far in distinguishing what it is about play that
allows this to happen. ¿is problem is of particular relevance for the Lottery,
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since it is dicult to determine a context for it that is in a clear sense “separate”
from everyday life.
In this chapter, I critically examine the concept of play in order to develop
a means of understanding this peculiar quality of the Lottery. ¿e main pur-
pose of the chapter is to probe the concept of “separateness”, an idea that is
central to Huizinga’s and Caillois’s theories of play, and Goman’s idea of the
“focused gathering”. A central problem with these theories is the problem of
framing. Play seems to be dened by its boundaries with work and with other
non-playful activities, but these boundaries provoke uncomfortable paradoxes.
Using Simmel’s concept of sociability, and Vaihinger’s As-If, I nd in the Lottery
a particular form of play bounded not by its own form, but by the forms of
interaction within which it takes place.
Chapter 5: Time, Narrative, and the Lottery One important
aspect of the Lottery’s confounding of conceptions of gambling and play is its
unusual relationshipwith time. In this chapter I explore some of the implications
of the relationship of gambling to time. I draw upon Walter Benjamin’s Arcades
Project and FrancoMoretti’s analysis of the anity between the formof gambling
and new forms of narrativizing ofmodernmetropolitan experience. ¿e Lottery
has some similarities with the characteristics of gambling that give it this special
relationship, but in some important respects it manages to supply something
entirely dierent: the absence of any real chance of reversal of fortune in the
Lottery, and its disappearance from and displacement into everyday life allow
it, perhaps paradoxically, a greater range of narrative possibilities than do other
forms of gambling.
Chapter 6: The Lottery and Charity ¿is chapter deals with the
charitable aspect of the Lottery, which seems to be in contrast to the Lottery as
gambling because the altruistic impulse seems to be fundamentally opposed
to the acquisitive spirit of gambling. I show how the Lottery is, by its nature
and by its use, able to arbitrate between these apparently contradictory pulls.
¿us, in the case of the Lottery, one may add to Devereux’s list of ways in which
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gambling is able to serve as a mediator between irreconcilable value strains
in capitalism a capacity to oer either a release or, indeed, a rapprochement
between those values.
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Chapter 2
History
A Lottery is a Taxation Upon all the Fools
in Creation
And Heaven be prais’d It is easily raised,
Credulity’s always in Fashion:
For Folly’s a Fund, Will never lose
ground,
While fools are so rife in the Nation.
—Henry Fielding,¿e Lottery [86]
Among those interviewed for this research, there was very little knowledge
of the depth of history of lotteries in the United Kingdom. Nor are today’s
players encouraged by the National Lottery’s marketing to be aware of it, per-
haps for fear of drawing attention to lotteries’ chequered pasts. One inter-
viewee, for example, said of the Lottery that it was “very much of its time. . . very
1990s” [interview: Peter N]. If there was any awareness of the Lottery’s history
or interest in it, it was the immediate history of the National Lottery itself that
was mentioned: controversies over the selection of Camelot, Richard Branson’s
not-for-prot bid, fat cat directors, and historical similarities and dierences
between the Lottery, football pools, and premium bonds.
Nevertheless, many of the attitudes and beliefs expressed about the Lottery
carry traces of its past. To understand the Lottery of today requires a general
sociological and historical understanding of changes such as the development
of mature capitalism, and a sociological theory of gambling. But it also requires
an exploration of the history of the lottery as an idea: what it came to mean
at dierent times in history. ¿e basis of this idea may be found in the early
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history of uses of the lottery; its crystallization into a form more recognizable
today took place during the rst wave of state lotteries in the eighteenth century,
when the history of lotteries was bound up with the emerging dierentiation
of the institutions and classes of capitalism; it was re-formed in the period
when lotteries were banned; it lost some of its moral edges during the twentieth
century, and those that remained were recongured as secular, psychological,
and medical issues.
2.1 Early History
In their earliest forms, lotteries had very little to do with gambling. ¿e Bible,
for example, contains some 70 references to lots, excluding references to Lot
and his children. Many of these refer to the allocation of resources; in the Old
Testament stories of the tribes of Israel they are largely for the allocation of land:
And ye shall divide the land by lot for an inheritance among your
families: and to the more ye shall give the more inheritance, and to
the fewer ye shall give the less inheritance: every man’s inheritance
shall be in the place where his lot falleth; according to the tribes of
your fathers ye shall inherit. [Numbers, 33:54]
And lots were also used for other kinds of selection. One of the Apostles was,
in fact, chosen by lot: “And they gave forth their lots; and the lot fell upon
Matthias; and he was numbered with the eleven apostles” [Acts, 1:26]. ¿e book
of Joshua contains a description of what amounts to a lottery draw with land as
the prizes:
And the second lot came forth for Simeon. . .And the third lot came
up for the children of Zebulun. . .And the fourth lot came out to
Issacha,. . . , etc.. [Joshua, 18:11]
¿e word ‘lot’ is also extended metonymically such that it comes to mean the
allocated resource itself:
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¿is then was the lot of the tribe of the children of Judah by their
families; even to the border of Edom the wilderness of Zin south-
ward was the uttermost part of the south coast. [Joshua, 15:1]
And this sense, in turn, becomes a metonym for fate:
¿is is thy lot, the portion of thy measures from me, saith the
lord; because thou hast forgotten me, and trusted in falsehood
[Jeremiah, 13:25]
Passages such as these express what may be called the providential view of the
use of lots: that the lot is a sign, not of randomness1, but of the will of God. It is
interesting to note that the metonym has as its basis the allocation of resources.
¿is relationship between gure and ground is a hint that the use of lots carries
both a material and a transcendent signicance; this theme carries through
much of this chapter and the rest of the thesis.
Some have suggested that it was the ancient Romans who invented the lottery
as we know it [117, p. 1530]. Because, perhaps, of their complicated cosmology,
the Romans were enthusiastic users and ingenious inventors of all kinds of
providential decision-making devices. If such writers as Livy, Tacitus, and
Suetonius are to be believed, almost every major event in Roman history was
given a prior imprimatur by some augury.2 Indeed, in some cases, a prophet-
ically determined set of necessary prior conditions – events that had to occur
before a favourable outcome was a sure thing – were brought about by ‘brute
force’, Burnham-Wood style. Livy, for example, says that during their long wars
with the Veii, the Romans consulted the Delphic Oracle, which said that they
would never gain victory until the Alban lake was dry. A er some setbacks,
and a er the election of Camillus as Dictator, the lake was drained, and the
victory was won [144, §5.15–19, p. 123]. ¿us, the sign of a favourable outcome,
something for which one would expect to have to wait, was actually produced
by the recipients of the providence themselves.
1. For, as Lorraine Daston notes, randomness as an idea did not and could not exist in
pre-Enlightenment societies [55, p. 10]. Probability, in its earliest usage of the term, meant “an
opinion warranted by authority” [99, p. 6].
2. And if they are not to be believed, some similar conclusions may be drawn about the
world-views they express at the time of their writing.
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With the Romans it seems that the casting of lots was not used predomin-
antly as a divinatory tool. ¿e most direct appeals to the gods were by other
means, usually involving examining the disposition of the viscera of a sacriced
animal, or studying the ight pattern of ocks of birds.1 Cicero’sDe Divinatione
discusses in much detail the use of such auguries. He concludes that it is a
superstition that should be “torn up by the roots”. Or, at least, that it should
be retained only for “reasons of political expediency, and in order that we may
have a state religion” [42, §xii, p. 28]. And later, he says:
Out of respect for the opinion of themasses and because of the great
service to the State we maintain the augural practices, discipline,
religious rites and laws, as well as the authority of the augural
college. [42, §xxxiii, p. 70].
Lots, however, were used for allocative purposes. ¿ey were used extensively
for sortition, the selection of ocers of the city by randommeans. But they also
had other uses, both political and frivolous. In his 1826 Every Day Book [117],
Hone remarks that the lotteries ofAugustuswere “mere bagatelles”, those ofNero
costly2, and those of the (much later) emperor Heliogabalus plainly ridiculous.
Little is known of this last emperor but for his lotteries, whose tickets were
handed around in vases, and whose prizes included both gi s and hazards, as
¿omas Gataker reports:
. . . a pound of beef, or a dead dog, or ten beares, or ten camels, or
so many pounds of leade, or as many pounds of silver, or gold, &c.
And others againe were to receive the like, as their lot came: which
made many rich that were before, and others as poor that were rich
before. [93, p. 117]
To the Romans is also credited the invention of the lottery ticket. As a means of
distribution of favours (called congiaria), small tokens were distributed, each
1. ¿is was how the struggle between Remus and Romulus was decided: Remus on the
Aventine saw six vultures, Romulus, on the Palatine, saw twelve, so Rome was his [144,
§1.6, p. 24].
2. Suetonius says that Nero’s lotteries had slaves and villas as prizes.
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with an inscription naming a gi . Initially, these tesserae were handed out in
a more or less orderly fashion, but later they were simply thrown to crowds,
introducing an element of luck into the proceedings, and later still they were
drawn out of vessels, much as lotteries are conducted today.
Ewen suggests that the earliest lotteries expressly for gambling were those of
Venetian andGenoesemerchants. ¿esewere, however, not primarily for raising
money, but for the dispersal of stale or unwanted goods [84, p. 30]. ¿e rst
recorded lotteries whose purpose was to raise money for public projects took
place in the Netherlands in the  eenth century, when the Duke of Burgundy
allowed municipal lotteries in cities within his ducal control: Bruges, Ghent,
and Utrecht; the rst of these was in 1444 [84, p. 25]. In Bruges, a lottery was
held in 1446 to raise money to improve the city’s fortications. In the same year
and the same place, a lottery was held by the widow of the painter Jan Van Eyck,
for which there are records in the town archives [4, p. 4].
From then onwards, one can trace a gradually ascending gradient of lotteries.
In 1521, a lottery was held in Osnaburg; in 1595 one was held in Amsterdam to
raise money for a new church steeple; and another was held in Del in 1595; in
1592 in France lotteries were permitted under taxation by Francis I.
¿is steady growth of lotteries across Europe is also a story of their conver-
gence around a particular form. Early lotteries had many dierent kinds of
prize. In 1572, for example, a lottery was established by Louis de Gonzague,
Duc de Paris, “for the purpose of giving marriage portions to poor virtuous
young women on his estates” [117, p. 1531]. ¿e prize tickets were inscribed
“Dieu vous a élue” or “Dieu vous console”, the former, inscribed on a winning
ticket, insured to the young woman who drew it 500 francs on her wedding
day, the latter, inscribed on the blanks, extended the hope of better fortune
the following year. Hone notes that “no lottery was ever drawn with so much
ceremony and parade”. Indeed, Pope Sextus V promised those who promoted it
remission of their sins, and a special mass was said at the beginning of the draw.
Other lotteries oered as prizes “marvellous rich and beautifull armor” [117,
p. 1411] and books (the rst prize of one consisting of an Imperial Bible, all of
Virgil, Homer’s Illiad and Odyssey, and Aesop’s Fables) [117, p. 1418].
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¿e lotteries of the time were not based on the selection of numbers. ¿e
‘number lotteries’ that are popular today were rst introduced in 1623 in Genoa
[84, p. 30]; it is, however, only in the late twentieth century that this form of
lottery has become prevalent. ¿e earlier lotteries were closer in form to a rae,
but a very elaborate one. ¿e 1771¿e Lottery Display’d [147], an “adventurer’s
guide” to lottery speculation, describes the organization of such lotteries in
great detail. For every number in the draw, there was a ticket for the buyer,
one reserved for the draw, and one that was held in safe-keeping to resolve any
claims of fraud or error. When all the tickets had been sold, another set of two
tickets was drawn up. One set of these, again, was held in a safe place, the other
set were the prize tickets. One ticket in both sets was allocated for each prize,
the value of which was inscribed on the ticket itself. For each number in the
lottery there were, then, actually ve tickets: three with numbers, and two with
prizes.
At the draw, there were two boxes: the one contained a set of buyer’s tickets
with numbers, the other contained all the prizes, and a number of blank tickets
such that the total number of tickets in this box equalled the number of buyer’s
tickets. ¿e draw itself involved drawing a ticket from each box, matching each
bought ticket with a prize or a blank. Figure 2.1 on the following page shows a
typical prize structure.
¿e drawing of these lotteries, with their tens of thousands of tickets, took
a long time. What is considered to be the rst lottery held in England (1569)
was drawn at the west gate of St Paul’s, which came to be a favourite site for
lottery draws. It lasted for 54 days with the drawing taking place continuously,
day and night [84, p. 63]. ¿e rst large-scale lottery in England – conducted
in 1612 to fund the colonization of Virginia – lasted for just under a month,
but could well have taken longer: it was delayed because not enough tickets
were sold, and eventually 60,000 blank tickets had to be discarded [84, p. 74].
¿e Lottery Display’d supplies data for all lotteries drawn in England between
16941 and 1771: the average length of the draw was 42 days [147, p. 33], the
typical total amount of prizes ranged from £500,000 to £1,000,000, and the
1. When the rst state lotteries, rather than private ones, were introduced [162, p. 373–374].
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number of prizes prize value total value
2 £20,000 £40,000
3 10,000 30,000
5 5,000 25,000
10 2,000 20,000
15 1,000 15,000
30 500 15,000
100 100 10,000
250 50 12,500
16,275 20 325,000
16,690 £493,000
First ticket drawn for rst six days:
£1,000 each
6,000
Last ticket drawn (a er all prizes
won)
1,000
For the use of government and
expense of drawing
150,000
33,310 blanks
50,000 tickets at £13 £650,000
Figure 2.1: Lottery Prize Structure
average cost of a ticket was £5.00. ¿e lengthiness of the draw allowed the
lottery to become something of a public spectacle. O en, a blindfolded child,
and sometimes even a blind one, drew the tickets. Not only did this make a
public display of fairness, but it also had a symbolic intent: since all were equal
before her, Fortune, like justice, was always represented with a blindfold. O en,
the owners of a ticket would inscribe little verses – posies – on the counterfoil.
¿ese allowed the owner to remain anonymous, but they were also read out at
the draw as part of the entertainment. ¿ese scraps of text included “wise saws,
witty verses, even vulgar abuse, comprising truth and fancy, In English, French,
Latin, Dutch, besides more or less unknown tongues, which added to the gaiety
of the reading” [84, p. 56]:
Cast the grapple over the bote,
If God wil, for the great lot [84, p. 42]
As salt by kind gives things their savour,
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So hap doth hit where fate doth savour.
Blowe up thou trumpette, and sound for me,
For good lucke comes here I do see [84, p. 57]
As foulers mindes are fedde with every right redresse,
So fouler I, least fortune faile, do seek for some success.
(T. Fouler, Lon. 270,413, 2s. 1d.) [84, p. 58]
Aut mihi aut nihil
In God I hope, and a f – t for the Pope [84, p. 59]
¿ere is good ale
At St James Chignele [4, p. 60]
Such features meant that the lottery was a spectacle very dierent from today. It
happened in public, out on the streets; there was a drama about it of altogether
a dierent order and kind to the televised draws of today’s National Lottery;
there were torch-lit processions, songs and plays were written about it; they
were associated with other events such as the display of freaks.1 It was also very
much a metropolitan phenomenon, as is revealed in the following observation
from the Adventurer’s Guide:
Were this essay to fall into no other hands than those of the Metro-
polis, it would be needless to relate the manner of the drawing, as
it is to be supposed there are few in London who have not seen it
performed. [123, p. 12]
Lotteries of this kind reached their heyday in the late eighteenth century.
Between 1698 and 1776 they were organized on an ad-hoc basis to raise money
for the general needs of the state or for some specic project such as the building
of Westminster Bridge (1739), or the founding of the British Museum (1753). By
1755 such ad-hoc demands meant that they were occurring annually; by 1776,
1. See, for example, the hand-bill:¿is is to Acquaint Gentlemen and Ladies, that, that Prodigy
in Nature, the Living Colossus, or Wonderful Giant from Sweden, is now to be Seen at the Lottery
Oce [146].
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state lotteries had become a regular nancial instrument, and were voted annu-
ally by Parliament [189, p. 213–214], between 1769 and 1826 126 state lotteries
had been held [199, p. 2].
2.2 Lotteries, Religion, And Rationality
Alongside the growth of gambling lotteries, providential divinatory practices
continued well into the Reformation, but with a distinctively protestant cast.
¿e protestant belief was that God might choose to intervene in earthly aairs,
and that the follower could obtain benets through prayer. ¿is was not only a
possibility, it was also a commandment:
It was a Christian duty to ask each day for one’s daily bread, as a
reminder that even in the most material context man could not
hope to be sustained by his own eorts alone. In their visitation
articles the ocers of the Church called upon the parochial clergy
to remind their ock that they should give thanks toGod in times of
plenty and call upon his mercy whenever scarcity threatened. [216,
p. 112]
Although petitionary prayer was commanded, it was, of course, by no means
certain that the prayer would be answered. It was always possible to explain
the apparent failure of the prayer. Ultimately, however, the outcome depended
upon divine disposition, and that disposition, while it may have oered clues
through signs in the world, was nally unknowable.
As a means of gaining some insight into this unknowability, extensive use
was made of what we now consider randomizing devices, but what were then
sortes sanctorum: the classical practice of sortes vergilianae1, was reworked as a
method of biblical consultation. ¿ese practices were condemned by the clergy,
but were widely adopted by the congregation. Lots were a natural tool for this
sort of divination. ¿omas’s Religion And ¿e Decline Of Magic [216, p. 118-]
1. Divination by randomly selecting passages of Virgil.
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oersmany examples spanning a period from the 12th and 17th centuries.1 In the
12th century, pilgrims would use lots to decide which shrine to visit, in the 16th,
patronagewas allocated by lot byWells Cathedral, in the early 17th century, three
maid-servants cast lots annually for money le by a benefactor [p. 119]. ¿ese
examples may be understood in a material sense as ways of achieving a clear
and binding decision when other means would be clouded by self-interest. But
a greater signicance must be attributed to the practice of a whole congregation
casting lots to determine such matters as the most propitious time to sow crops,
which regiments to send to Ireland, which condemned man to pardon, and so
forth. In these cases, the decision of the lot may only be understood as a having
the imprimatur of divine approval. William Perkins2 said of the lot that it was
an act of religion in which we refer unto God the determination of
things of moment that can no other way be determined. . .We are
not to use lots but with great reverence, in that the disposition of
them immediately cometh from the Lord, and their proper use is
to decide great controversies. [174, p. 141].
Lotteries were, in this view, grave and momentous devices, and the use of the
lot as a game of chance was entirely forbidden: such uses were an aront to god,
a frivolous call upon his providence. Because of this, the only legitimate uses
of lots at the time were ‘divinatory’ or ‘divisory’ (for the purpose of resolving
disputes over property). ¿ey could certainly not be ‘lusory’, for mere pleasure
or self-interested material gain, and their use for such purposes was roundly
condemned.3
It is, however, no surprise that despite condemnation of such a use, the main
object of lots should eventually pass over from the divinatory to the lusory, for
the lot contains a special anity with any kind of speculative enterprise. Just as
they might allocate some resource on the basis of providence, they might also
1. See also Csikszentmihalyi and Bennett’s An Exploratory Model of Play [52, p. 47–49], and
Devereux’s encyclopedia entry on gambling [58, p. 53].
2. 1558-1602, a prominent Puritan, exponent of Calvinism, rector of St Andrews, Cambridge.
3. See, for example, Balmford’s A Short and Plaine Dialogue Concerning the Unlawfulness of
Playing at Cards or Tables, Or Any Other Game Consisting in Chance [6].
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allocate those resources at the service of purely chancy speculation. Further-
more, the particular relationship of protestantism and the spirit of capitalism
allows a direct translation of the providential into the causal and calculable.
What may be found, therefore, is a threefold anity between a technology, a
religious world-view and an emerging economic and social formation. It is also,
surely, not by accident that speculative lots were rst used to support the great
imperial adventures of the major geopolitical actors of the time – England, Hol-
land, and France – at home, for the development of large-scale capital projects,
and abroad, in the establishment of the colonies in the New World. Indeed,
it may well be the case that the military adventures of English Civil War and
the ¿irty Years’ war were decisive in introducing a spirit of gambling into the
populace of England. Rescher [182, p. 134] suggests that “Whenever life is cheap
and hard – as it certainly was for seventeenth century soldiery – gaming and
gambling becomes a prospect whose attractions follow only a short distance
a er those of drinking”, and that the soldiery brought a pursuit of gambling to
the citizenry.
¿e intellectual turning point in favour of lusory lots was provided by the
hugely inuential, if controversial, protestant Divine ¿omas Gataker.1 His
workOf¿eNature andUse of Lots: ATreatiseHistorical and¿eological involves
the careful and, for the time, innovative separation of the casual (by which he
means something close to random), the contingent, and the determined. He
rejected the providential view of lots, asserting that there was nothing especially
divine about the casual:
¿e casualtie of an event doth not simply of itself make it a work
of God’s special or immediate providence. It is apparent: for there
is o times a more special providence in many things that are
not casual but contingent only, than in the most things that are
casual. [93, p. 29]
1. In his history of the spirit of rationalism, Lecky said: “¿e rst writer, I believe, who
clearly and systematically maintained that lots were governed by purely natural laws, was an
English Puritan minister named Gataker. . . a well-reasoned and curious book, teeming with
quaint learning” [136, p. 307]. It would not be too far-fetched to compare his role in this history
with that of Benjamin Franklin in Weber’s¿e Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
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¿ere is neither ‘casualty’ nor contingency, he says, with God, but only ne-
cessity [p. 42]. Lotteries are determined not by divine will but by the laws of
nature:
In the blending of scrolls or tickets together, themotion of the vessel
wherein they are blended causes some to lie this way and some
to lie that way. . .No man can say certainly that there is ordinarily
any special hand of God, in the shuing and the sorting of them,
crossing the course of nature. [93, p. 46]
Casualty is a property only from the human perspective, it is “founded, and
dependeth upon man’s ignorance” [p. 118]. As such, it is not endowed with any
special signicance, to endow it with any is to believe God to be frivolously
capricious:
¿an an ordinary Lot there is nothing more uncertain, ready upon
every new shaking of the Lot. . . Is it not frivolous, if not impious,
therefore to say, that upon every second shaking or drawing God
alters his sentence, and so to charge Him with contradiction or
contrariety? [93, p. 159]
Indeed, he says, it is more likely that such a signicance is to be found in
contingent events: as we may know the causes of such things, so we may come
to know the divinity behind them [p. 29]. Perkins held that lots were not for
trivialities but to be used solemnly and infrequently and only when there were
no other means available: “When a man hath other means to try by, then it is a
tempting of God to use lots” [174, p. 120]. Gataker, on the other hand, asserts
that lots are only to be used “in things indierent only” [p. 128]: when there
is nothing of moment involved. All other recourses to lots are a confounding
“of the act of the Creator with of the work of the creature” [p. 25], they can
only reveal ignorance where the rational pursuit of knowledge might allow
understanding. He gives examples of the sorts of indierence that warrants
the lusory lot: a student in his study with many books to read “is indierent to
choose one, this or that, refusing the rest, for present employment, there being
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no special occasion to urge the use of one more than another”, a man with a
pair of knives is indierent to draw and use either when occasion requireth” [93,
p. 128]. As long as the principle of indierence applied and no one took the
result as divinely ordained, any secular use of lots was justied and free from
impiety. Divisory lots could be used to divide up property and games of chance
became acceptable.
By reasoning in this way, Gataker opened himself up to the charge that he
favoured games of chance.1¿at he was attacked in this way is, as Rescher notes,
evidence of the rising concern with gambling amongst religious people [182,
p. 121]. It also says much about the resistance put up by most theologians to the
idea that chance occurrences exist at all. ¿is long-standing resistance is repres-
ented in Boethius’s Consolations of Philosophy where “sober Dame Philosophy
warns that only when Fortuna ‘shows herself unstable and changeable, is she
truthful’, and preaches against the very existence of chance, conceived as ‘an
event produced by random motion and without any sequence of causes’ ” [99,
p.xiii]. ¿is attitude persists through the middle ages up to the time of Gat-
aker, and it is his diering from it that is the most signicant eect of his work,
for it gave a theological justication for the view that chance events may be
understood rationally without reference to the divine, and that they might be
susceptible to law.2 Alongside the emergence of other explanations competing
against divine providence, early sociology and economics for example, there
was a growing awareness of the mathematical basis of chance events. Probability
was a state of the art theory in the 18th century. ¿e rst texts on probability
were Pacioli’s Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni e Proportionalita
of 1494 and Cardano’s 1550 Liber de Ludo Aleae. ¿is book was only published in
1655, during the rst ourishing of the mathematical study of games of chance.
In 1654 Pascal and Fermat essentially created probability theory in correspond-
1. An example of such an attack can be found in Increase Mather’s Testimony Against Profane
Customs [152].
2. While the view that there is no such thing as chance may have waned, it is still visible
today, and not only amongst religious fundamentalists. In August 2006, for example, Pope
Benedict sacked his chief astronomer who favoured evolution over the “theory” of intelligent
design. Central to this controversy was the astronomer’s opposition to the intelligent design
view that random variation is not compatible with a belief in divine purpose [31].
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ence about how to win at dice games. But texts on the subject in the seventeenth
century were concerned exclusively with games of chance. Huygens’s 1655 De
Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae was the rst printed account of the calculus of probab-
ility. In the eighteenth century, probability was put on a more general footing
in the works of the Bernouillis, De Moivre, Bayes, and Laplace. ¿e Genoese
number lotteries attracted the attention of mathematicians such as Euler [81]
and Jean Bernoulli [19], both of whom not only subjected them to a thorough
analysis, but also oered advice on how protably to run them. While it may
have held great interest for the development of combinatorics, the promoters
of such lotteries did not follow their advice, for “they had no need for prob-
abilities while the money kept coming in” [55, p. 145], nor, presumably, were
the players versed in the new theories of probability enough to make informed
choices about whether to play or not. ¿is growing sense of the existence of
randomness and its susceptibility to rational analysis allowed a new attitude to
fortune entirely familiar today:
No doubt few of us today are capable of stoical acceptance of the
random caprices of misfortune, but it is the awareness that they are
indeed random which distinguishes us from our ancestors. [182,
p. 656]
2.3 Lotteries and Financial Speculation
¿e new lusory quality found in the lot and legitimated by Gataker and the
mathematicians is of a piece with the governing spirit of almost all other forms
of nancial speculation in the eighteenth century: until their reining-in by
legislation in the latter quarter of that century, insurance and stock trading were
essentially anarchic enterprises far closer to gambling than they are today. ¿is
was the time, a er all, of not only the South Sea Bubble debâcle, but of a myriad
of other bubble schemes. Mackay’s Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the
Madness of Crowds1 lists some 86 proposed bubble schemes [149, 58–63]. ¿ese
1. A fascinating text from 1852 that serves as enough of amemento of the human potential
for folly that it is, apparently, required reading in some Wall Street nancial houses.
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include: for improving of gardens; for insuring to all masters and mistresses the
losses they may sustain by servants; for the transformation of quicksilver into a
malleable ne metal; for a wheel for perpetual motion – Capital, one million;
and, most intriguingly, for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but
nobody knowing what it is.
¿e appearance of what was to become the London Stock Exchange owes
itself to the growth in joint-stock companies in the late seventeenth century,
particularly to the emergence of such businesses as the East India Company, the
Hudson’s Bay Company, and the Royal African Company [159, p. 15]. Initially,
the embryonic stock market was formed in the Royal Exchange by a group of
traders who were essentially commercial renegades [213, p. 3]. In 1698, they
were expelled from the Royal Exchange for rowdy behaviour, and started to
deal out of the nearby coee-houses, eventually settling upon Jonathon’s Coee
House.
It was not until 1801, when it became regulated by Act of Parliament, that
the stock exchange was put on a fully legitimate footing. As well as trading in
stocks, there was a very active insurance market at Jonathon’s, competing with
that at Lloyd’s Coee House. Insurance, at that time, did not hold the same
legitimacy as it does today. Indeed, it was considered to be another form of
gambling. John Weskett’s 1781 Complete Digest of the ¿eory, Laws, and Practice
of Insurance says of Lloyd’s and Jonathon’s:
It would be highly improper, on occasion of these animadversions,
to let another great evil, which by far too much prevails in Lloyd’s
Coee House, and, sometimes, fatally for those who are concerned
in it, escape remark: I mean, what is called Speculation, or gaming
policies; o en set on foot and promoted, for many thousands of
Pounds, even by merchants, insurers, and brokers, who in other
respects stand fair in the eye of the mercantile world, as men of
rank, and reputation. ¿ese things are, undoubtedly, not only
disgraceful to the otherwise respectability of the characters en-
gaged in them; but are of very hurtful example; tend to sap, and
do really much aect, not only the solidity, and credit, of private
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persons in the commercial class, but the national interest: for, they
render insurers suspected, foreigners apprehensive, and the secur-
ity of commerce precarious, contaminate probity, create ill-will, as
amongst other gamblers, produce lame ducks, and may in time
introduce, at Lloyd’s as well as Jonathon’s, such apposite and polite
appellations as Bull and Bear. [229, lv–lvi]
Life insurance policies, in particular, were both adopted enthusiastically
by speculators and criticized by commentators as a wager on life itself. ¿e
mortuary tontine, for example, was in everything but name a lottery on lives.1
According to this novel form of organization, members paid set
fees to the society on a quarterly basis. At the end of the year, the
beneciaries of all those members who had died in the preceding
year shared equally from the accumulated fund, with the amount of
the payout varying inversely with the level of mortality prevailing
each year. [43, p. 76]
¿e tontines may have been a kind of wager, but it was at least made amongst
a group of interested parties. Other forms of life insurance were even less
scrupulous. ¿ere are many astonishing examples of what are essentially wagers
masquerading as insurance. A signicant proportion of these involved betting
on third parties, so, for example, a policy was taken out that “Lady Lake has
not a Son who lives to the 1 May 1762” [43, p. 44] (note here that the policy is
not that she does have a living son at that time, a policy that would perhaps
have somewhat greater propriety). ¿ere were also many wagers on the lives of
prominent public gures: Robert Walpole’s life was much insured at the time
of the Excise Crisis;2 during the Jacobite Rebellion, the price of policies on the
1. Richard Jackson, author of the enthusiastic A Guide to Adventurers in the Lottery, which
details the aims, methods and rules of his “Amicable Society of Lottery Adventurers”, attempts
to justify adventuring by comparing lotteries with tontines: “What is a tontine? but a lottery
of lives, wherein no adventurer can expect to amend his circumstances but by the deaths of
his competitors; and, as naturally as he wishes for success,must wish that a certain number of
human beings be swept away by plague or conagration” [p. 1]. ¿is suggests that, in his mind
at least, a tontine was more acceptable than lottery speculation.
2. In 1733, Walpole decided to check smuggling and customs frauds by imposing an excise
tax on wine and tobacco. ¿is was a very unpopular imposition, and Walpole eventually had to
withdraw the measure, with a great deal of political loss [135].
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Pretender and the rebel lords rose or fell with each new report of their military
advance [43, p. 49].
As Zelizer points out in Morals and Markets, the association of gambling
and insurance was sanctioned to some extent by law under the category of
the aleatory contract – actus quo fortuna praedominatur – where the contract
depends upon some uncertainty [239, p. 70]. Both gambling and insurance
contracts have as their basis just such a risk of a fortuitous event. ¿e idea
of an aleatory contract was introduced by jurists to distinguish certain kinds
of speculative nancial activity from usury. While the charging of interest on
a loan was acceptable because it was compensation of the lender for the loss
of the capital loaned,1 the lending of money for the sole purpose of claiming
the interest was strongly deprecated. ¿is distinction and condemnation goes
back at least as far as Aristotle [134, p. 15], and is a strong theme in Christian
ethics up to the Reformation and beyond. Without the element of risk, both
gambling and insurance are indistinguishable from a usurious loan, so the risk
inherent in both gambling and insurance actually becomes a redeeming feature.
Daston observes in her book on probability theory in the Enlightenment that
the early mathematical probability theorists drew heavily upon the jurispru-
dential concept of the aleatory contract, and their researches paved the way
for a normative model of market activity based upon systematic calculation of
actuarial risk [55, p. 114]. But at this time, no such analysis was possible, and,
therefore, while the Scylla of usury was plainly in view, and might be avoided by
casuistic appeals to the aleatory, the Charybdis of gambling was clouded in a fog
of confusion about chance, which allowed much ambiguity about what counted
as an unacceptable wager and what as a legitimate nancial speculation.
¿ere was, then, from the late seventeenth century andmost of the eighteenth
a certain kind of ludic capitalistic ferment that explains, to some extent, the
extraordinary popularity of lotteries at that time. If there was ever a period
deserving the epithet ‘¿e Age of Chance’, it was then. Daniel Defoe, writing
in 1697, said “Necessity, which is allow’d to be the Mother of Invention, has so
1. “Interest mea, that is to saye, it behoveth me, or it belongeth to mee, or it is for mine avail,
or it is reason, that I shall bee answered in all losses and dammages”. [134, p. 5]
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violently agitated the Wits of men at this time, that it seems not at all improper,
by way of distinction, to call it,¿e Projecting Age” [56, p. 1]. ¿e “projects” to
which he refers are such things as “the Original of Banks, Stocks, Stock-jobbing,
Assurances, Friendly Societies, Lotteries, and the like” [p. 8]. Roy Porter writes
eloquently on the new eighteenth-century passions for what Samuel Pepys
called ‘deep gaming’ [160, p. 110]:
England was gripped by gambling fever. Bets were laid on political
events, births and deaths – any future happenings. For a few pounds
challengers galloped against the clock, gulped down pints of gin or
ate live cats. A common wager consisted of taking out insurance
on other people’s lives. When George ii led his troops against
the French in 1743, you could get four to one against his being
killed. Cards were the opiumof the polite. . .Gambling itself became
nationalized. [176, p. 238]
¿is age of projects, gambling, and chance had its impact on the lives of
commoners as well, as Dorothy George suggests in her classic London Life in
the Eighteenth Century:
¿e dominating impression of life in eighteenth-century London,
from the standpoint of the individual, is one of uncertainty and
insecurity. It was a time when trade was expanding more rapidly
than population, yet the Londoner was threatened with casualties
of various kinds. [96, p. 262]
She illustrates this with, among others, the history of the Place family who went
through no less than three cycles from relative prosperity to penury, because of
gambling and drink. ¿is tale was not unusual, indeed, it was told, so Francis
Place, the son of the family, says to show that such stories were “by no means
uncommon in this time” [p. 304].
¿e ‘projects’ of lotteries, speculation, and insurance, moreover, did not exist
in isolation from each other. One of the great bugbears of the 1808 Report of the
Select Committee on the Laws Relating to Lotteries [196], a report instrumental
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in the banning of lotteries, was not so much the lotteries themselves as the
evils attendant upon them. ¿ese evils were insurance schemes: ostensibly a
prudent indemnication against losses incurred by drawing a blank with one’s
comparatively expensive ticket, in reality these were a kind of second-order
speculation on the draw itself. ¿e 1808 Committee report even went so far
as to claim that the lottery insurance schemes were what actually sustained
lotteries.
Advertised as ‘policies’ [84, p. 256], the most prominent schemes oered
insurance against a ticket drawing a blank and against drawing a prize (betting
that one would not win a prize on a given day, thus hedging against winning
a less valuable prize). But there were many other schemes. ¿e 1808 Select
Committee Report describes the Bars contract: “buying or selling the probable
gain or loss per Ticket in a Lottery where the Contractors do not get any Capitals
among the unsold tickets, above the¿ousand Pound Prizes”, comparing it to
stock-jobbing. [196, v. ii, p. 323]. Another, highly creative, development, which
became fashionable at the sporting houses in St. James Street in 1799, was
“Running of Lottery Houses”: a kind of meta-insurance policy on the success of
lottery houses themselves [84, p. 260].
It is estimated that there were more than 200 illegal insurance oces operat-
ing in the heyday of the state lotteries [162, p. 375]. ¿eir schemes, parasitical
upon the lotteries themselves, were the principal way that less auent people
could participate in state lotteries. Lottery tickets were too expensive for the
poor, and while they could buy shares in a ticket, this required organization
and the trust of a shareholder who held the ticket in his name. ¿ey became the
central cause for concern for critics of lotteries. Patrick Colqhoun, a London
Magistrate, said, for example, that he was
greatly concerned about the social evils associated with the lot-
teries and observed that when they were being drawn, ‘tens of
thousands’ of people would absent themselves from work and con-
gregate around the Guildhall where the drawing would take place.
Here the insurers would cash in on the ready willingness of the
poor to pawn their goods to take out insurance.[162, p. 376]
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¿e “little goes” – small illegal lotteries run when state lotteries were not being
drawn – were largely a pretext for insurance [162, p. 376].
With one early exception in 1697, no serious attempt to control these ramp-
antly ourishing schemes was made until the early nineteenth century, in 1809
[14 Geo. iii c.94 s.40], when it was enacted that the lottery should be determ-
ined in one day, and that “no seats should be built for the convenience of clerks
taking down the numbers’; this order, however, was not acted upon [84, p. 257].
In none of these schemes was it a requirement that the policy-holder have an
interest in the ticket itself. One could even hire a ticket for an hour or a day
(known as “riding a horse”) [147, p. 36]. ¿is separation of interest reveals a
connexion between insurance schemes and usury: while the schemes may have
the necessary element of risk, they lack any real interest, for the holder of such
a ‘policy’ does not even own the ticket they are backing.
In 1774, an Act of Parliament was enacted whose purpose was to clean up
life insurance in this respect. ¿e Act was to a large extent a response to the
Chevalier D’Éon case, which involved a speculation that the Chevalier was in
reality a woman, and that this truth would come to light within seven years. ¿e
premiums on this policy totalled £60,000, with shares ranging from 15 guineas
upwards [229, p. 582]. At the end of the term, several cases were brought to
court with witnesses claiming to have seen the Chevalier’s genitals.
¿e Life Assurance Act1 was brought in to do away with such frivolous and
undignied scenes [43, p. 48]. ¿e Act begins:
It hath been found by experience, that the making insurances on
lives, or other events, wherein the assured shall have no interest,
hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming.
¿e main provision of the Act is that no insurance may be taken out where
there is no interest of the beneting party in the insured event. ¿at this act
has the alternative title of ¿e Gambling Act reveals how closely bound up life
insurance was with gambling. And it was not long before gambling and lotteries
would come under the same sort of scrutiny from moralists and reformers.
1. 1774; 14 Geo. iii c.48
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2.4 1808: Evils Attending Lotteries
A Cautionary Tale Published as part of the Cheap Repository, to be
sold by hawkers to common people, ¿e 1796 religious tract¿e Wonderful
Advantages of Adventuring in the Lottery! tells a cautionary tale of the dangers
of playing the lottery. One day, while on his way home, John Brown walks past
a lottery oce, and his mind is seized by the idea of buying a ticket:
‘Why may I not get a prize as well as any other?’ said he to him-
self; ‘and if I get the twenty thousand prize, or even one of the
ten thousands, I shall be as great a man as my master’. It was a
woeful moment for poor John, when this imagination fastened
upon him. [236, p. 3]
His wife, Molly, is alarmed by his xation:
Trying our fortune, as you call it, is no better than tempting God,
who is the real giver of what men say fortune gives them. Our
blessed Saviour refused, you know, when he fasted in thewilderness,
to act in an extraordinary manner, in order that God might give
him riches and other things, for he said that would be tempting
God, for would it be taking an extraordinary course in order to try
whether God would make us rich? [236, p. 4]
But John Brown’s fascination with the lottery renders him immune to his wife’s
pleading and theological reasoning. Intending to buy just the one ticket, eventu-
ally he buys six, to spread his luck. When two of these numbers come up blank,
and one at a mere ten pounds, John Brown becomes drawn into an insurance
scheme oered by a well-heeled broker who leads him to believe that he can
not lose. He loses everything. From then he is plunged into greater losses, into
deceit, and into drunkenness. One evening, John Brown, drunk a er yet more
gambling losses, falls into an ad-hoc alliance with another man with whom
he conducts a botched robbery, resulting in their shooting dead the victim.
¿e accomplice, a known villain, is eventually arrested, turns King’s Evidence
against John Brown, who is arrested for the murder. His wife dies of a broken
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heart. Sentencing him to be hanged, drawn and quartered, the judge addresses
John Brown:
You might have lived long, useful, and respected, had you been
content with what you acquired by honest industry; had not the
desire of hasty and unrighteous gain taken possession of your heart.
I mourn over the existence of such a public nuisance as appears
to have been the rst occasion of your fall: and I cannot help
declaring that I have never sat upon this bench a er the drawing
of the Lottery, but I had reason to think it had proved the ruin of
many of the unhappy culprits who appeared before me. I would
earnestly exhort the crowds that hear me to abhor the thoughts of
adventuring in it, and to y from it as from a plague, which will
destroy happiness and inward peace, and bring upon them every
kind of distress. [236, p. 16]
It is not the lottery tickets that are the principal villain in this story, it is the
insurance scheme that leads John Brown down to greater depths of vice and
indigence. ¿is view – that the main problem of lotteries was in what attended
them – was the principal nding of the Select Committee on the Laws Relating
to Lotteries, which published its ndings in two reports of 1808.
¿e rst report [195], published 13 April, recommended: (1) limiting lotteries
to 2 per year; (2) licensing lottery ticket sellers; (3) the minimum number of
tickets needed to entitle someone to hold a licence should be raised from 30
to 150; this was intended to prevent persons from setting up a lottery oce
as a front for illegal insurance schemes; (4) limiting the hours of business of
lottery oces (5) large penalties for persons hawking lottery tickets, distributing
hand-bills, illuminating lottery oces so that they might draw people to them,
exhibiting schemes on billboards, carts, or carriages; (6) that lottery oce
keepers should no longer be exempt from the jurisdiction of Justices of the
Peace and Police Magistrates.
¿ese ndings suggest an optimism that some of the excesses of lotteries could
be reduced, but the committee had not yet taken evidence from various people
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involved in the promotion and regulation of lotteries. A er this consultation,
the condence of the Committee was completely lost that lotteries could be
cleaned up. ¿e second report comes out strongly in favour of the banning of
lotteries. Insurance schemes were found to prevail to a much greater extent than
was previously thought. Lottery oce keepers and, presumably to protect their
jobs, some state-employed Lottery Inspectors armed that the evils arising from
the Lottery had been done away with [196, p. 7], and promoters such as¿omas
Bish that insurance schemes were not so usual. But it was the committee’s view
that:
It has been represented to Your Committee, that the Lottery and
illegal Insurances are inseparable; that the former cannot exist
without the latter for its support; that a system of connivance in
those Acts which the Law prohibits pervades all ranks concerned,
from the Persons contracting with Government under the Law,
down to the meanest wretch employed under violation of the Law,
and its most ordinary victim. [196, p. 10]
¿e recommendations of the rst report reveal much about the preoccupa-
tions of the Committee: broadly speaking, the problem of lotteries was one of
their tendency to be unregulated and unruly. Lottery Oces were places of
great bustle and activity, they attracted people by extraordinary means1, and
they were the site of many illegal unchecked insurance schemes. ¿e regulation
of lotteries and the attempt to proscribe lottery insurance schemes followed the
same path as regulation of life insurance and of the stock market: all were in
some degree instigated because of the fear of the mob, the rowdy behaviour
of the coee houses and farcical cases such as the Chevalier D’Éon aair. ¿e
eighteenth century was dominated by this preoccupation. ¿e author Henry
Fielding was highly critical of the folly of lotteries, which he satirized in many of
his works.2 As a Justice of the Peace, he founded, with his brother John, the rst
1. One advertisement promises that Gentlemen and Ladies of Quality could see in the oce
“¿at Prodigy in Nature, ¿e Living Colossus, or Wonderful Giant From Sweden” [146].
2. Including¿e Lottery [86], from which comes the epigraph to this chapter. Battestin’s
A Henry Fielding Companion [8] contains a comprehensive list.
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police force in London. He was also deeply concerned about the power of the
mob: “None of our political leaders take notice of. . . ”. In London people had
discovered the power of taking to the streets during the nal years of Charles ii
and the reign of James ii.1 As a result, the Riot Act was passed in 1715. But it
had little eect: in 1719 there were riots by weavers; in 1736, the Rag Fair Riots
against the Irish; in 1736 riots followed the introduction of the Gin Act; ¿e
Gordon Riots saw an resurgent anti-Catholicism on the streets, culminating in
a full-scale assault on the Bank of England; the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 and the
French Revolution had installed a strong fear of public uprising amongst the
ruling élite. In this context, the exuberance of the lower classes was considered
dangerous by such gures as Wilberforce, of whom E. P. ¿ompson says:
In every manifestation of moral indiscipline he saw the danger
of Jacobin revival. . .his conviction as to the intimate correlation
betweenmoral levity and political sedition among the lower classes
is characteristic of his class. [217, p. 442]
¿e large crowds and the moral levity at the drawing of lotteries were viewed
with considerable trepidation by the propertied classes as the breeding ground
of political unrest [162, p. 377]. ¿e behaviour the lower classes at the draw was
associated with drunkenness [160, p. 116], and hence with the wave of moral
panics over the consumption of gin [226].2 As well as providing an opportunity
for a dangerous collective eervescence, gambling, once the domain of concern
had shi ed to the lower classes, was also seen to have sedition in its kernel, for it
undermined the proper attitude to work, as the 1808 Report stated in a passage
reminiscent of the judgement of John Brown:
¿e mind is misled from those habits of continued industry which
insure the acquisition of comfort and independence, to delusive
dreams of sudden and enormous wealth which must generally end
in abject poverty and complete ruin. [196, p. 10]
1. See Roy Porter’s London: A Social History [177, p. 190–193].
2. Braudel says that “By the early eighteenth century, the whole of London society, from
top to bottom, was determinedly getting drunk on gin.” (cited in Rybczynski’sWaiting for the
Weekend [191, p. 98]).
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Gambling was dangerous not merely because it was immoral, but also because it
could be politically destabilizing: the promise of unearned luxury undermined
the station of the lower classes to such an extent that John Fielding warned that
it “bid fair for the total overthrow of subordination” (cited [162, p. 377]).
For these kinds of reasons, the Second Report of the Select Committee on the
Laws Relating to Lotteries [196] was greatly exercised by the activities peripheral
to lotteries, such as insurance schemes, and their consequences. It asserted in
this colourful, o en-quoted passage:
By the eects of the lottery, even under its present restrictions,
idleness, dissipation and poverty are increased, the most sacred
and condential trusts are betrayed, domestic comfort is destroyed,
madness o en created, crimes subjecting the perpetrators of them
to the punishment of death are committed, and even suicide is
produced. . . Such, have been the constant and fatal attendants upon
State lotteries, and such Your Committee have too good ground to
fear will be their invariable attendants so long as they are suered,
under whatever checks or regulations to exist. [195, p. 11]
¿is was, as Miers and Dixon note, the rst time that an ocial opinion ex-
pressed the view that state lotteries carried such dangers of moral dissipation,
albeit dissipation attending lotteries, that “no system of regulation could be
devised which would both guarantee them as ecient sources of revenue and
prevent their attendant mischiefs” [162, p. 378]. ¿e second report found res-
onances amongst moralists – who drew from it evidence of the immorality
of public leisure – and amongst law-reformers – who took it as grounds for
campaigning for the removal of an unsound instrument of government [162,
p. 379]. Despite the robust tone of the report and its adoption by moralists and
reformers alike, the abolition of lotteries was not enacted until 1823, the delay
due to the nancial needs of ghting the war against France, and the last ocial
lottery was conducted in 1826.
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2.5 Lotteries in the 20th Century
2.5.1 1916–1976
¿e Committee’s resounding judgements became the Ur-text for growing criti-
cisms of gambling from a moralistic perspective, and there was a great increase
in such attacks later in the nineteenth-century.
¿e striking phrases of the 1808 Select Committee’s Report appear
regularly both in moralists’ propaganda and in parliamentary de-
bates. ¿e dire social problems of the state lotteries were taken both
as a precedent and as a warning of what would result if gambling
were not suppressed. In such circumstances, the reintroduction
of public lotteries could not be a matter for serious consideration.
Lotteries, with their evocation of corruption, dissipation and mass
urban participation, represented the past: their attractions were
few to the new ‘civilized’ world of Victorian Britain. [162, p. 380]
¿e basis of gambling debates and legislation became bound up with the ap-
pearance, problematic for many, of working-class leisure. Downes asserts that
the growth both of gambling and of opposition to it can only be understood
in this context, for it fostered the sense that work, far from being something
natural, was an imposition upon a natural state of idleness: the discipline of
the factory “had to be rigorously imposed upon recalcitrant material, and must
not be allowed to break” [70, p. 37]. Working-class leisure had, therefore, to
be controlled; it could also be exploited by the newly emerging gambling in-
dustry. As I have described, gambling had already been separated out from
legitimate forms of nancial speculation.1 In the subsequent period upper- and
lower- class gambling underwent a similar separation, and gambling legislation
became increasingly concerned with morality and the working classes:
Victorian parliaments were interested in the control and reform-
ation of working-class leisure, rather than in providing new op-
portunities for gambling which, in its waste of time and money,
1. See also Downes [70, p. 33–].
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its alleged links with crime and idleness and its perceived irra-
tionality, contradicted the sacred canons of Victorian bourgeois
morality. [162, p. 380–181]
Despite this upsurge in the moral opposition, gambling was steadily securing
a foothold both as an industry and as a culture. ¿e proscription of lotteries was
only partially successful: small-scale private lotteries ourished in the absence
of those organized by the state. In particular, “specs” – illegal, privately run
sweepstakes on horse races – enjoyed a great deal of popularity [162, p. 379].
At the same time, a gambling industry began to emerge organized around
bookmakers [70, p. 39], taking up some of the infrastructures of the old state
lotteries [162, p. 379].
In the twentieth-century there was a growing interest in lotteries amongst
legislators, charities, and those seeking extraordinary sources of funds. ¿e rst
indication of this was in 1916, when “bonus bonds” were to be introduced as a
means of scal recovery a er the First World War. ¿is plan was subject to a
Select Committee prior to its implementation. Many in the 1918 Committee
were in favour of introducing a lottery, but fear of controversy meant that the
Bill was defeated in the Commons on its second reading [162, p. 383].
¿e rst wide-ranging debate about the possible benets of lotteries came in
1932. It came in response to the the IrishHospitals Sweepstakes: not onlywas this
successfully raising signicant revenue, but it was also attracting illegal entrants
from the United Kingdom. ¿e Royal Commission of 1933 suggested that two
kinds of lotteries, in addition to Art Unions lotteries1, should be permitted:
“small lotteries” such as those held at church fêtes, and “private lotteries” such as
those held at working men’s clubs. Both of these had been taking place anyway,
but they were largely ignored as harmless [160, p. 383].
From 1933 onwards the history of lotteries is one of the growth of these small-
scale and charitable draws. Its main themes are the growing reliance of charities
on such lotteries and uneasiness about the illegality of some of these. In 1951
a Royal Commission addressed this problem. Many sports and charitable or-
1. ¿ese had been permitted since 1846 for the distribution of works of art by lot.
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ganizations had been conducting lotteries based on the 1934 provisions, but
which were, in fact, illegal. ¿e Commission recommended extending and gen-
eralizing legal forms of lotteries such that any society registered for charitable,
sporting, or cultural purposes would be permitted within nancial limits: 1 shil-
ling tickets, £100 in prizes, and a maximum turnover of £750. By the late 1960s,
these constraints seemed trivial when compared with large lotteries abroad, and
particularly the Irish Hospitals Sweepstakes, which many in the UK were still
entering illegally. ¿is created some pressure on charities to increase revenue
from their lotteries; it also pushed them into the fringes of illegality. In chapter 6
I will indicate some remarkable and possibly counter-intuitive anities between
the charitable and the gambling impulses, but this strange association between
legitimate charities and illegal, or at least not unambiguously legal, gambling is,
perhaps, one the most surprising aspects of the association of gambling and
charity. ¿e most common explanation of how it came about is that the need
for revenue found in the law a complexity and lack of clarity that meant that
“neither promoter nor police could say with certainty when a competition was
unlawful” [162, p. 385].
By 1970, however, there were indications that the ambiguity would be resolved
at the cost of the charities. ¿ere had been a judgement that a particular compet-
ition run by a promoter on behalf of the Tenovus medical charity was an illegal
lottery [162, p. 384]. Several other large charities such as the Spastics Society
were also using the same kind of competition. ¿e Tenovus case generated fears
of prosecution and of damaging the reputation of such charities. ¿ese fears
generated, in turn, pressure to revisit, once again, the question of charitable
gambling. ¿e pressure to do so was increased by cultural and political gures
who had seen the benets of lottery funding in other countries. ¿e television
interviewer Robin Day took up the cause of lotteries in a letter to¿e Times on
25 November 1967. Having seen the successful funding by lottery of the building
of the Sydney Opera House, he suggested that something similar could be done
to build a National ¿eatre, and that if this were to be done, it would show how
a national lottery could be used for the funding of arts that would never receive
public funding [207, p. 28]. He went on to champion national lotteries through
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the 1970s.
In response to these pressures, the 1971 Report of the Gaming Board (¿e
Witney Report), proposed the extension of societies’ lotteries to local authorities,
the raising of the nancial limits, and a provision for “large lotteries” to be
run by charitable organizations under licence from the Government; these
recommendations were enacted in 1975 and 1976. But these Acts proved unequal
to the task of regulating a burgeoning lottery industry. Between 1977 and 1978,
there were 347 lottery schemes registered by local authorities, generating £26
million in receipts from ticket sales. ¿e sum of receipts from all lotteries
was £65½million: under the predicted turnover of £100 million, but enough
to indicate that the current legislation was not up to the task of regulating a
burgeoning multi-million pound industry [162, p. 389].
2.5.2 1976: The Rothschild Commission
¿e Rothschild Report [189] was the outcome of a Royal Commission set up in
1976 to review the provision in law for gambling in the face of these legislative
diculties.1 It marks a a turning point in attitudes to lotteries, and to gambling
generally. Where ‘normal legislation’2 in the twentieth century had been a
series of piecemeal adjustments to render legitimate gambling for acceptable
causes within a framework of general proscription, the Rothschild Report’s
conclusions suggested and instigated a decriminalizing of gambling activities,
and the realization of a new regulatory principle for their control. ¿e 1808
Commission, it will be recalled, began with the hope of regulating lotteries but
lost condence in the face of evidence about the scale of the problems attending
lotteries. ¿e Rothschild Committee found similar grounds for scandal:
Despite the good work being achieved through many lotteries, the
situation we have discovered is scandalous. ¿ere is wholesale
disregard of the law which is inadequate and confused, commercial
1. It had an interesting membership, including, amongst others: an international banker as
chair (Lord Rothschild), a newspaper agony-aunt (Marjorie Proops), a sports journalist (David
Coleman), and a philosopher (Bernard Williams), author ofMoral Luck
2. My coinage, following Kuhn’s ‘normal science’.
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exploitation to a totally unacceptable degree, gross lack of security
and, we strongly suspect, a good deal of plain dishonesty. [189,
§12.134]
While the committee – a looking-glass counterpart to the earlier one – did
not dissent from the conclusions of the 1808 report that lotteries were not the
most ecient way of raising money for the state. It also agreed that, at time
of the earlier report, the harmful social eects of state lotteries were very real,
that these were derived from the activities attending the lotteries, and that
these activities had become so bound up with state lotteries that they could not
be entangled. Citing as proof the evidence from lotteries abroad, it asserted,
however, that
It would be absurd to accept today the [1808] Select Committee’s
conclusion that the ‘evil and calamities’ they describe so eloquently
are forever inseparable from large lotteries, in whatever way they
are run. [189, §13.10]
In this passage, the report reects on the diculties of “drawing a line between
what some may call paternalism and the ‘it’s their own business’ attitude”. Be-
cause of this attempt to nd a middle ground, it has been described by Dixon
as working “within the perimeter of an explicitly liberal, social-democratic
consensus” [66, p. 340], and by Downes as “distinctively British. . .basically lib-
eral, though aiming to preserve a mixed economy rather than classical laissez
faire” [69, p. 236], carrying an “almost casual” [p. 235] acceptance that the legal-
ization and decriminalization of gambling was justied. Where commissions
and other bodies prior to this one had taken for their basis matters of prin-
ciple about gambling, the Rothschild Report was largely concerned with with
essentially pragmatic matters of “the regulation of gambling, concentrating
on the gambling market itself, the elimination of abuse, and on bureaucratic
control” [162, p. 399].
¿e main principles that the Commission derived were: (1) minimal inter-
vention: restrictions on gambling should only be imposed where there was
danger of socially damaging excesses or of the incursion of crime into gambling;
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(2) “unstimulated demand”: the principle that facilities should only respond to
demand for gambling, they should not create such demand; (3) information:
“gamblers should be invariably bemade aware of what they are letting themselves
in for when they gamble – in other words what they may lose (Gamblers usually
know, or think they know, what they may win).” [§1.8].
¿e real centrepiece of the Report is its recommendations for the introduction
of aNational Lottery for GoodCauses. ¿emost recent parliamentary debate on
national lotteries had taken place in 1968 on the reading of a Private Member’s
Bill (¿e National Lottery Bill). ¿is debate witnessed the usual objections: that
a lottery would add to the social evils resulting from a gambling habit, that the
state should have no part in gambling, and so on. But there were two more
unusual points that the Rothschild Commission saw t to address in some
detail: (1) if there were a national lottery to which people subscribed voluntarily,
none of the prots should go into the general revenue; it should all be used for
good causes; (2) objects of national concern should not have to depend on a
national lottery; they should be paid for out of general taxation [189, §13.36].
Inuenced, perhaps, by the campaigning of Robin Day, who submitted a seven-
page proposal [207, p. 31], the Committee found it inconceivable that taxation
would be able to bear the costs of objects that were not essential [§13.37].
¿e notion of objects desirable but not essential is the basis of the ethos of
the National Lottery. It is reiterated later in the report,
In practice, a Government of any party, subject to day to day public
and political pressures, nds it impossible to devote more than
meagre resources to good causes of the kind which are desirable
rather than essential. [189, §13.62]
Here, though, it becomes elevated from a matter of expediency to a more
political view of the importance of “desirable objects”, and indeed of their
necessity:
[T]he paradox is that while each individual cause may not be es-
sential, it is essential for the health of our community that some
resources are devoted to such purposes. ¿ere is a crucial need in
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our society for a source of substantial funds to provide support of
a kind with which any Government experiences great diculty.
Philanthropists might previously have fullled this need, but it was the Com-
mission’s belief that the accumulation of private wealth had become so dicult
that “there will be no new Nueld Foundations”.
Such exigencies rendered the arguments against a national lottery “feeble,
under modern conditions” [§13.63]. For a small cost, lotteries, found to be
mostly harmless in earlier sections of the report, could be used to allocate funds
“to deserving good causes unfettered by short termpolitical and public pressures”.
As long as its harmlessness could be maintained by adequate regulation and
information to the consumer, and as long as government could be kept out of
its workings, a national lottery would be a sort of virtual philanthropist, which
would provide “a rare opportunity to improve indirectly, of not directly, the
quality of British life”.
It took rather a long time a er the report’s ndings were published for them
to gain strong enough political appeal. It was only with JohnMajor that the Gov-
ernment had a leader who was not disposed to consider the Lottery a “squalid
rae”1. It is not surprising that Margaret ¿atcher was entirely opposed to a
national lottery, for it would have been anathema to her Methodist background.
It is, therefore, ironic that the grounds for the Lottery were laid by the social
and political ethos that her administration espoused. A state lottery came late
to the UK . But its immediate historical referent is not other lotteries in other
countries. Rather, as Douglas suggests, it nds its ground in developments in
public administration that came about because of the deep economic problems
of the 1970s [68, p. 1]. In this period, there was a breakdown in the post-war
consensus over how economies should be run: a broadly social-democratic and
Keynesian consensus. New institutional forms began to appear in themid-1970s
that led to privatization and the disaggregation of public administration by the
state into private and market-led bodies and regulatory ‘watchdogs’.
1. Harold Wilson’s description of premium bonds on the announcement of their introduc-
tion: “Now Britain’s strength, freedom and solvency apparently depend on the proceeds of a
squalid rae” [Budget debate 1956].
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In accord with the general adoption of the mixed economy model, twentieth
century lotteries across the world had been placed under government control on
a “safety rst” principle [68, p. 2]. ¿e BritishNational Lottery on the other hand,
established a er the collapse of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s, was the
rst privately run national lottery; it remains the only one to date. ¿is decision
has created an interesting regulatory terrain for the lottery. With respect to its
gambling aspect, its privatization reects amove to free gambling in somedegree
from its historical constraints. ¿e basic principle of regulation is consumer-
oriented – “player protection” – the player must be given adequate information
about the odds and therefore the risks involved in playing, about how to play
the game, and about the disbursement of funds raised by the lottery. ¿ere
is, however, much evidence of the susceptibility of players to many ‘heuristics
and biases’1 in their evaluation of gambling odds: in the bounded rationality
of their gambling. ¿e strength and pervasiveness of these errors suggest that
no amount of information could render playing the lottery transparent and,
therefore, that the player can never make a truly informed choice even if the
information is available and were they to be interested in seeking it out.
If one could be condent in the eective transmission of information and
of players’ rationality, the lottery (or lotteries) would be run on a competition
model, much as privatized utilities and telecommunications are. But the Na-
tional Lottery is a regulated monopoly. It is so, not only to allow for a necessary
economy of scale and “critical mass” of revenue [68, p. 4], but also to allow
the regulator to limit ticket prices, the size and frequency of rollovers, and the
licensing of interactive lottery machines. In this respect, the regulation of the
lottery retains some of the paternalism of previous gambling legislation, but for
signicantly dierent reasons:
Whether information ows are or are not sucient there are some
areas of social policy in which government will intervene, on the
pretext that decision-makers in the marketplace will continue to
make irrational and/or wrong decisions. [68, p. 40]
1. For more on this, see Chapter 3, page 75.
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¿e principle of “unstimulated demand” – the ostensible grounds for the ex-
istence of such strong regulatory measures as those governing the lottery – is,
however, rendered irrelevant: the very introduction of the National Lottery
does away with such a principle by denition.
2.5.3 2001 Gambling Review
¿e latest major review of gambling in the UK was published in July 2001
[92]. ¿e review body also commissioned a survey of attitudes to gambling in
Great Britain [170]. ¿e Chair’s introduction notes that gambling has become
a “rather more complex world” since the Rothschild Report was introduced.
¿is new complexity is due in some degree to the introduction of the National
Lottery and the growth of on-line betting. But rather more is due to the “dri ”
from the outright and moral condemnatory tone of the 1808 report to the more
conciliatory tone of the Rothschild Report. When gambling is seen as inherently
evil, conclusions are simple; when gambling is seen primarily as an attractor,
so to speak, for evils, and not an evil itself, the problem is how to reduce the
likelihood of attendant evils occurring. ¿is is broadly the conclusion of the
Rothschild Report. ¿e introduction of the idea of “Good Causes” is perhaps of
a piece with this approach: their existence itself a kind of moral hedging. One
consequence of this approach, not merely conned to the Rothschild Report,
but rather a tendency of gambling reviews and legislation in the 20th century,
is an ad-hoc and piecemeal handling of gambling: specic forms of gambling
have specic deleterious attendants requiring specic remedies.1 ¿e 2001
review attempts to reduce this fragmentation, at least at the level of policy, by
recommending the unication of regulation of gambling under one body the
Gambling Commission.2
¿e Rothschild Report, it will be recalled, found “absurd” the conclusion of
the 1808 Select Committee that gambling was radically evil. ¿e 2001 Gambl-
ing Review similarly distances itself from what it describes as the “intolerably
1. See Downes [70, p. 29].
2. It is interesting that the one exception to this is spread-betting, which the report recom-
mends should remain under the Financial Services Authority.
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paternalistic” view of the Rothschild Report [§3.25]. Despite the ostensible
liberality of the earlier report, its central theme was the issue of “unstimulated
demand”, and its underlying and question-begging idea of “social excess”. ¿e
Review suggests that behind this attitude lies the idea that “liberalization of
gambling might produce a state of society which was undesirable, even if those
who were gambling were not unhappy” [§3.26]. If gambling were completely
liberalized then the liberalizers would approve of the new freedoms people had
to spend time and money as they see t, while the moralists would disapprove
of a perceived decline in the quality of social life.
A further cause of the new complexity in the world of gambling is the growing
recognition that gambling is a sociological problem as much as it may be a
social problem, the chairman notes in his introduction:
¿e Report is unanimous and it is being published to schedule.
We wait to see how it will be received. It was no doubt naïve to
hope that it would be an easy matter to establish widely acceptable
principles. It soon became apparent that gambling is an activity
where individual values about such matters as the nature of society
and the role of the state quickly become paramount. We know
where the limits are – complete prohibition or complete deregula-
tion – but there are no widely acceptable principles which tell us
where we should stop between the two limits.
¿e way the report sets up the limits is revealing: “complete prohibition” is
not opposed to its logical opposite, which would be something like ‘complete
freedom to gamble’. Likewise, and more importantly, the logical opposite of
“complete deregulation” is ‘complete regulation’, and not “complete prohibition”.
Complete freedom to gamble is a corollary of complete deregulation, but the
subtle displacement of this end of the continuum is telling.
2.6 Conclusion
It is tempting and not unwarranted to nd similarities between the ebullient
nascence of organized capitalism in the eighteenth century and the a ermath
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of its rise to maturity today. ¿e recent dot-com bubbles1 are the counterpart
of those of an earlier period. ¿e complexities of nancial markets defy current
abilities to model and, therefore, to regulate them. Derivatives markets, for
example, have abstracted value away from any actual concrete fundamentals
to such an extent that the model used in the regulation of such markets – the
Black-Scholes model – does not and can not serve neutrally as an instrument
to assess reasonable risk, but has actually “altered the world in a general way
that made itself true” [150, p. 110]. Since the model is a kind of bricolage or
“creative tinkering”, the commodity highly non-substantive, and themarketplace
a massively complex global network of nancial markets, there is a sense of a
return to the eighteenth-century ambiguities that confounded the boundaries
between nancial speculation, insurance against risk, and gambling.
Alongside this return to uncertainty in the post-Keynesian economic sphere,
there has been a gradual so ening of attitudes to lotteries and to gambling
in general, which has been complemented by a movement away from moral
objections. Some have described attitudes to gambling as following a trajectory
from sin to vice to disease.2¿e idea of the gambling as a pathology appears in
literature and psychoanalysis, but it was only in 1980, on the publication of the
third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’sDiagnostic and Statistical
Manual that it acquired full recognition as a form of mental illness [45, p. 69].
Since then the idea has come to dominate the literature on gambling.
It has also become current in everyday life. ¿e Times newspaper of 15 June
1995, for example, featured a front page story which described lottomania: “a
delusional illness triggered by publicity surrounding the UK’s National Lot-
tery”. My interviewees spoke freely and without prompting about addiction.
¿e notion of an “addictive personality” appeared frequently. Some spoke of
their playing of the lottery, particularly of buying scratchcards, as “getting a
x” [interview: Bob W], or in terms of its “buzz” [interview: Gary H]. Some,
1. More recently, the high-valued otation of some on-line gambling companies has gener-
ated speculation that a new bubble is forming.
2. Rose in Compulsive Gambling and the Law: From Sin to Vice to Disease [187], Rosencrace
in Compulsive Gambling and the Medicalisation of Deviance [188], Dixon in¿e Discovery of the
Compulsive Gambler [65], and Castellani in Pathological Gambling: ¿e Making of a Medical
Problem [38].
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indeed, celebrated their various – holisms:
Kathy P I’m addicted to these syndicates. . . I smoke, so that means
I’ve got an addictive personality. . .As I say, I get a buzz out of going
shopping. . . I’m sort of a shopaholic, a spendaholic.
And others were concerned not to encourage their own perceived “addictive
personality”:
Mary O I never buy scratchcards. Never have done, never would
do, and one of the reasons for that is that I think I probably have
a mildly addictive personality and I’d probably become of those
people that become totally. . . you know, I have some friends who
when they do their groceries they treat themselves to two scratch-
cards, two one pound scratchcards, but I know that if I once scratched
o 5 pound or 10 pound I’d think “Whoah”, you know, the tempta-
tion of easy money, it’d be a bit like cigarette addiction and all those
other things.
¿ere are some notable properties of this shi , for, while moral opposition to
gambling implies a basic ethical suspicion about it, the pathologymodel is also a
normalizing model, since for any pathology there must also be a corresponding
normal condition. ¿e interview passages above suggest that there is also a
sort of cheerful, celebratory normal pathology of addiction: shopaholism is
not used here as a clinical condition, but as a ‘harmless’ form that has as its
correlate ‘harmless’ forms of gambling. Where it is not celebrated, the notion of
addiction, particularly when it appears in the idea of the addictive personality,
is used as a means of dening the boundaries of conduct.
But this is a highly individualized kind of a boundary: the personality and the
self. And this tendency is an indication of one of the most important dierences
between state lotteries past and present. In the past they were thoroughly
public aairs: they took place on the streets, and those considered victims of its
corruption suered their fates on the streets; they were directly run by the state;
and their condemnation was from the standpoint of public religion. ¿e current
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state lottery, on the other hand, takes place in the private sphere. If it can be
said to “take place” at all. ¿ere is no equivalent to the West End of Saint Paul’s
Cathedral for the National Lottery. Today the lottery “happens” across a large
computer network, its draw lasts for  eenminutes on the television, not for six
weeks. If it may be said to take place in something resembling an actual location,
it is in sites intended for other purposes: in shops and supermarkets in the
buying of tickets and in the workplace in the running of syndicates. ¿e use of
a Genoese number lottery is of a piece with this sense of disembodiment of the
Lottery: despite the spectacle of choosing one of the machines, the independent
auditor, and the celebrity pressing the start button, Guinevere, Arthur, Lancelot,
and the other machines could be replaced with any randomizing device that
selects 6 numbers from 49 without replacement.
In its charitable aspect the Lottery remains public; indeed, it is more public
in this respect than it was before since there seems to be no debate about where
the money went in eighteenth-century lotteries. In its gambling aspect, its
moving into the public sphere should not be understood as a retreat or as a loss
of signicance. Nor should the apparent disappearance of the religious roots
of the uses of lotteries and debates be taken as nal. In all its dimensions, the
current lottery contains in reworked or vestigial form past ideas of ideas of what
lotteries are, what theymean, and what they do. In the following chapters I show
what forms its relations to the most important of these dimensions – to the
rational, to the lusory, to the providential, to work, and to the economic sphere –
have taken and the relationship of these forms to contemporary modern society.
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Chapter 3
Theories Of Gambling
Comment oser parler des lois du hasard? Le hasard
n’est-il pas l’antithèse de toute loi? [How dare we speak
of the laws of chance? Is not chance the antithesis of any
law whatsoever?]
—Joseph Bertrand, Calcul des Probabilités [20, p. vi]
¿e history of the introductions and bannings of lotteries, of their protagonists
and antagonists, is highly suggestive of sociological theories of gambling. It
is even possible to maintain that the work done by some in condemning and
abolishing lotteries and by others in supporting them constitutes a nascent
theory of gambling, so strongly does it refer to the most profound forces that
shape social organization and social change. For the preoccupations of those
involved in debates about the lottery may be attributed, in some degree at least,
to responses to the rise and subsequent maturation of modern society. One
can nd in these debates, as I have indicated, more than a trace of some of the
most central and most compelling problems of modernity, and in particular
those of the relationship between rational calculativeness and pleasure-seeking,
the relationship between self-interest and the interests of the collective, and the
relationship between an ethic of acquisition and an ethic of welfare.
Of particular sociological note is Gataker’s distinction between divinatory
and lusory lots, discussed in the previous chapter, which involved a separation
of providential thinking into two distinct ideas:
. . .God’s morally opaque disposing will on the one hand, which
controlled the outcome of particular events, and His directing will
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on the other, which generally concerned the operation of the world
in terms of right. [43, p. 36]
Some claim that Gataker, notwithstanding that he was received with scepticism
by most of his contemporaries and with robust outrage by some [43, p. 35], was
a leading force in the development of rationalism.1¿is is borne out when one
compares the distinction that he proposed, and its general correlative indicated
above, with the social and intellectual moment that is to be found in Max
Weber’s account of the development of rational ascetic capitalism: the “opaque”
God of the Calvinists became transformed through a peculiar turn in the logic
of predestination into an expectation that there was some underlying rationality
to events in the world. Where before one might believe that one’s fate was
administered byGod personally and opaquely, nowprovidence, while ultimately
a manifestation of God’s will, seemed mediated by earthly natural causes, and,
increasingly, by causes that may be determined rationally by calculation and
the scientic method, by causes that may, in fact, be rendered transparent.
In the prior world, divinatory lots made sense: the act of casting the lots
allowedGod to determine how theymight fall, and how the lots fell was a sign of
how God had determined events would fall.2 In the latter period, the divinatory
aspect of lots held less of a sway. Lusory lots, on the other hand, became
increasingly relevant by way of an increasingly sophisticated understanding of
the fundamentals of probability. With this new relevance, they also became
more of a danger to virtue, and the nature of the hazards involved also changed.
Divinatory lots involved the player in the act, perhaps even a blasphemous one,
of appealing “on trivialmatters to the adjudication of theDeity” [136, p. 307]. ¿e
hazard of the lusory lots, however, wasmore earthly, for it involved personal loss
and the risk of squandering one’s life in fecklessness. Most fundamentally, the
lusory lots incorporated the morally hazardous possibility of gaining something
for nothing, a possibility entirely at odds with the puritanical ethos of hard
work in one’s calling. ¿us, a satirical epitaph to the lottery on their banning in
1. See page 36, note 1.
2. “¿e lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the lord” [Proverbs,
16:33]. On this point, See Lecky [136, p. 307]
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1824, spoke of the “series of tedious complaints” that brought about the ban:
As they increased, it was found that their continuance corrupted
the morals, and encouraged a spirit of Speculation and Gambling
among the lower classes of the people. [4, p. 239]
¿ese traces of modernity in attitudes to the lottery, coming to fruition even
while opposition to lotteries was mounting, may be found in the later life of the
lottery. In her study of the introduction of lotteries to Sweden in the late 19th
century, for example, Husz shows that lotteries were perceived as just such a
distinctly modern phenomenon. Certainly, there were objections to the lottery,
but these objections took a rather dierent form. One critic said:
¿e lottery romanticism comes from America; it is surely the out-
come of the same spirit as the worship ofmoney, whichwas brought
to Europe by movies. And it is spreading like a mental conta-
gion. [122, p. 57]
Here, we have no trace of the religious argument that lotteries are inherently
wicked. Rather, the referents are: “romanticism”, implicitly counterposed to
rational realism; the worship of money, perhaps here there is something of
the religious, but it is not about providence; and “mental contagion”, the very
metaphor of gambling as a disease. Onemight also add to this list of new aspects
the danger of introducing or making worse a compulsion to gamble [25, p. 50].
In some respects the debates about the lotteries here refer back to the early
period of lotteries, when, as the satire mentioned previously put it, “the family
[of the lottery, that is] ourished under the powerful protection of the British
Parliament; ¿e Minister of the day continuing to give them his support for the
improvement of the revenue”.
¿is is very dierent from the earlier condemnations of the lottery which had
a marked religious cast. ¿e change, in sum, is a shi from emphasis on ‘evil’
to an emphasis on ‘danger’, and from a deontological morality that stresses the
importance of correct action irrespective of the consequences1, to a consequen-
1. As captured in the expression at justitia et pereat mundus [let justice be done though the
world may perish].
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tialist one that would weigh up the possible outcomes of an act. ¿ere is an
interesting historical parallel here with changes in approaches to other aspects
life, and particularly economic life, that involve the quantication of chance
and contingency, that attach a value to some good on the basis of an account of
the individual’s degree of responsibility for events. Of particular relevance to
this thesis is the connexion with charity, which I explore in chapter 6.1
3.1 Veblen: Gambling, Waste And Consumption
Conceptions of leisure may be divided into two categories.2 ¿e one, which
may be dubbed the Aristotelian, is the view that leisure is the condition where
activity is undertaken as an end in itself. ¿e other, characteristic of ¿orstein
Veblen, is that leisure is a kind of waste, a “non-productive consumption of
time”. ¿e distinction separating the two seems slight, but it is directed at a very
large dierence in the understanding of leisure. In the ‘Aristotelian’ point of
view, leisure nds its apotheosis in contemplation:
Pure contemplation is. . . leisure’s most sublime form. In order to
engage in contemplative activity, individuals must posses the ability
to both reason logically, that is, generalize from the particular, and
intuitively understand the good. But knowledge is to be used not
for personal or material gain but for self-illumination. Its purpose
is self-actualization not social aggrandizement. [218, p. 104]
Veblen’s approach to leisure, by contrast, nds in it something rather less lo y:
Time is consumed non-productively (1) from a sense of the unwor-
1. Another area where this anity may be found is in the growth of the life insurance
industry, as documented by Zelizer inMorals and Markets: ¿e Development of Life Insurance
in the United States [239], and by Clark in Betting on Lives: ¿e Culture of Life Insurance in
England, 1695–1775 [43]. On this connexion, Husz notes that lotteries and insurance are similar
not only in that they are “practices of objectication oriented towards the future” [122, p. 67]
(objectications, that is, of contingencies), but at the time of the widespread introduction of
insurance policies to Sweden, the advertising of the two industries was remarkably similar, with
images of theGoddess Fortuna, of cornucopia withmoney, and of theGoddess of Liberty [p. 70].
2. ¿is classication is derived from Tilman and Tilman’s Veblen’s Leisure Class ¿eory and
Legalized Gambling [218].
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thiness of productive work, and (2) as an evidence of pecuniary
ability to aord a life of idleness. [221, p. 46]1
Leisure time is either an escape from alienated labour or, if one is in the happy
position of not needing to labour, is a demonstration of that fact. Where the
one view dignies leisure with the possibility that it might realize virtue, that
through generality and rationality one may come to know virtue, the other view
is that there is something negative about leisure, not merely conceptually, by
way of the privative denition, but also morally. ¿e rst view nds in leisure
something that holds out the promise of the sublime; the second view always
nds an invidious abjection, either in the subject or in the subject’s conspicuous
freedom from abjection.2
It might seem, therefore, as though Veblen is a Marxist of sorts; but this
is not so. He is not so much a theorist of production and of alienation from
the process of production;3 he is rather more a theorist who starts from the
principle of decorum: that there should be a congruity between the cognitive
style demanded by modern society and the actions and beliefs of actors. Much
of his work sets itself against “crackpot realism”, a phrase coined by CWright
Mills4 to capture Veblen’s belief that
. . . the very Men of Aairs who everyone supposed to embody
sober, hard-headed practicality were in fact utopian capitalists and
monomaniacs; the the Men of Decision who led soldiers in war
and who organized civilians’ daily livelihoods in peace were in
fact crackpots of the highest pecuniary order. ¿ey had “sold” a
1. Note also the notion of ‘consuming time’, a metaphor that has become, as Veblen would
note with disapproval, dead, or a least lifeless enough that it passes almost unnoticed.
2. ¿is discussion follows similar lines to Arendt’s discussion of the distinction between
labour and work in¿e Human Condition [3].
3. Although Marx, in the later period of his work substituted exploitation for alienation, in
an attempt, perhaps, to render his work more scientic, it is, I would argue, undeniable that
the idea of homo faber is the premise of all his work, and that the dialectically necessary loss
involved in production is the structuring principle of history, even in Capital. For Veblen, on
the other hand, the key problem of capitalism was that people were captivated by a “manic
desire for status” [26, p. vii].
4. In his introduction to¿e¿eory of the Leisure Class.
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believing world on themselves; and they had – hence the irony – to
play the chief fanatics in their delusional world. [221, p. vi–vii]
ForVeblen the “delusional world” is theworld of consumption. Consumerism,
as expressed in conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption, is a kind
of false consciousness; it is false, not because it hides the underlying facts of
production, but because it runs counter to the formal-rational spirit of the
times. In more traditional periods it may have been appropriate to have a
reied, or ‘animistic’ in Veblen’s parlance, understanding of causality. Inmodern
society, however, it is not appropriate to impute “a quasi-personal character to
facts. . . conceived to be possessed of volition.” [p. 184]. A correct understanding
of cause and eect is a requirement for the individual, who “must be endowed
with the aptitude and the habit of readily apprehending and relating facts in
terms of causal sequences” [p. 186].
He considered, therefore, gambling to be a stupid act unbecoming for mem-
bers of advanced industrial modernity. In his¿eory of the Leisure Class [221]
he inveighs against the atavism of a belief in luck, a propensity that, for him,
underlies the attraction of gambling, and which is, for him, a world-view out of
place:
. . . an archaic trait, inherited from a more or less remote past, more
or less incompatible with the requirements of the the modern
industrial process, and more or less of a hindrance to the fullest
eciency of the collective economic life of the present. [221, p. 183]
It is not only the belief in luck that he nds distasteful, but also the inherent
agonism of gambling. Betting on contests implies that one wants one side to win
at the expense of the other. Veblen claims that this actually involves a sense that
one is trying to bring about a favourable outcome, a sense that “the animistic
congruity of things” will mean that the one who has propitiated the most “by
so much conative and kinetic urging” [p. 184] will be the one who will prevail.
¿is is bad enough for Veblen, but he also determines that it leads to a sort of
favouritism. ¿e fact that the bet seems to propitiate good outcomes means
that one is led to believe that one’s betting will actually inuence the outcome.
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¿is is not only animistic, but also “unmistakably a predatory feature”, for one is
projecting one’s desires into a support of one person at the expense of another.
Veblen’s characterization of gambling, and leisure in general, is as an ideo-
logical activity which generates “invidious comparisons”, and hence a sort of
ressentiment, between people who, under the egalitarian formal rational prin-
ciples of capitalism, should be equals. ¿is idea, encapsulated in the concept of
conspicuous consumption, has been richly fruitful in the sociology of leisure
and consumption.1 But it does not really say enough about gambling in itself.
Hampered by an almost obsessive moralism about the lack of t between gambl-
ing and capitalism’s ethos, it bears a curious resemblance, albeit an inverted
one, to the religious condemnation of gambling: the one complaining of not
enough faith, the other of too much.
3.2 Devereux: Gambling As A Safety Valve
A properly sociological theory of gambling cannot but entertain the assumption
that gambling somehow is part of society, that there is some good, at least a
public good, to gambling, whose nature is in some sense derived from itsmorally
problematic character. ¿is approach is exemplied by Edward Devereux’s
work Gambling and the Social Structure [59], an orthodox piece of structural-
functionalism2, with a strong avour of the Max Weber of the Protestant Ethic.
In Weber’s account, salvation anxiety generates a psychological pressure that
may not be relieved by religious means. Worldly activity in one’s calling is the
sole means of release, and then it is only a partial means and one subject to
diminishing returns.3¿e worldly ethos of puritanism eventually secularizes
the god-given Beruf and renders it meaningless, since the formal-rationality
engendered erases the ultimate value upon which the Beruf rests. Vocation, in
the fullest sense of the term, becomes a mere occupation.
1. Despite the unquestionable inuence of Veblen on the sociology of consumption, his
work on gambling does not gain much mention in texts on gambling.
2. It may, in fact, be the only extensive example of this kind of analysis.
3. Signicantly, in the second edition, Weber uses the psychoanalytic phrase ‘Abreagieren’
(abreaction) [227, p. 97, 106]; this nuance is lost in Talcott Parsons’s translation.
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It is this recongured tension that is the basis of Devereux’s theory of gambl-
ing. In general, he examines the function of recreation and avocational activities
in a world in which vocation itself does not fully satisfy the needs of the indi-
vidual. Recreational activities, Devereux suggests, are one kind of institutional
device for solving some of the inherent value strains of capitalism [p. 954]. ¿ey
are not, he adds, expressions of human nature; they are products of social
structures with which they stand in a functional relation.
Gambling has a privileged position amongst these kinds of activities; its
privileges are derived from the peculiarities of its straddling of the economic
and recreational domains of life. Unlike most if not all other forms of recreation,
gambling is unethical; it is not even anti-ethical, but non-ethical. ¿is feature
explains, Devereux suggests, the sub rosa quality of gambling [p. 955]. It is an
activity that takes place covertly within the value system: under the counter, so
to speak, rather than outside the door. So, the questions he asks are:
Why has gambling been assigned its persistent social stigma? And
in the face of this, why is it so perennially popular? Why do we
make and maintain laws only to break them? And since we do,
what kinds of structural accommodation are made to maintain a
façade of legitimacy? How are these deviant behaviour patterns
and sub rosa organizations tted into the general frameworks of
social structure, and how is a tolerable condition of equilibrium
established and maintained? [59, p. 4]
¿e broad answer to these questions is that gambling involves a “playful recom-
bination” of the values of the values of the dominant institutional pattern; it is “a
particularly convenient mechanism in which the psychological consequences of
economic frustration, strain, conict and ambivalence may be ‘worked out’ ”.1
He indicates several kinds of motivations2 for gambling where this ‘working
out’ may be found.
1. Or, one might say, ‘abreacted’.
2. Devereux himself indicates [p. 957] that some care needs to be taken when the idea of
‘motivation’ is invoked; perhaps, as he suggests, ‘motivational pattern’ is a more appropriate
phrase.
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economic motivations ¿e most immediately available explanation
of gambling binds it to economic processes: gambling allows a short cut to
gain that by-passes work. But there is more to gambling than mere gain, and
the economic aspects of gambling are not reducible to gain itself. Another
economic motivation is what Devereux calls the “protest against the tyranny of
the budget” [p. 958]. ¿e need for budgeting draws attention to one’s economic
constraints. A budget symbolizes the need to economize and the need to
weigh up the costs and benets of any potential expenditure. ¿e budget is a
continual reminder of the limitations of income, and of the institutional values
of frugality, rationality and caution. More generally, it dramatizes the tension
between constraint and freedom, and between pleasure and the deferment of
pleasure.
One of my interviewees, while talking about when and how he plays the
lottery, said:
Gary H Umm. I think it’s probably because if you’re anxious about
money and you’ve gone over the bills and we realized that we
haven’t got enough to meet our requirements, then I suppose then
the whole idea of money suddenly saturates your being and you
think how can we respond to it? well of course you can’t, unless
you go out and get a better job, but then suddenly you think, well
perhaps we’re going to win the lottery, or perhaps we might have a
good chance of doing that. So we usually rush out and buy a ticket.
Of course we never get anywhere, but that’s not the point. . . I mean
we realize that the odds are so few and far between. But, as an
anxiety lessening ritual to go through it tends to work.
I mean we may have, say Friday. . . I mean, we’re grown up about
it, but, say a Friday night we go through the money and we get
worried about it and then we think, right we’re going to buy the
lottery ticket, and just, just chance our arm really.
¿is introduces an interesting temporal aspect to the dramatization of which
Devereux speaks. ¿e “anxiety lessening ritual” of thinking about the constraints
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of the budget, of shuing and re-shuing the nances, and of deciding to buy
a lottery ticket happens on a Friday evening: in the space between the ‘managed’
time of the work week and the ‘free’ leisure time of the weeked. It is noteworthy
here and elsewhere in this part of the interview – for he spoke extensively on this
point – that he speaks always of buying a lottery ticket in terms of haste – “rush
out and buy a ticket” – in contrast to his talk about careful budgeting.
Petty gambling – gambling, that is, within budgetary constraints – is not
likely to end the tyranny of the budget for once and for all, but it does represent
a “satisfactory channel of protest and escape” from this tyranny. Any money
gained from any such small-scale betting constitutes a type of what Viviana
Zelizer calls ‘special monies’ [240]. Because the money was not earned, and
hence not ‘deserved’ in some sense, this kind ofmoney is freed from institutional
values of thri . Devereux notes that in his studies winnings are almost never
assimilated into the budget, they are always ‘blown’ on frivolities. ¿is sort of
attitude appears inmy own interview data. ¿ewinner of a small, but substantial,
amount said:
Norman SEach of us, each of us in the family had a little bit to do
something ridiculous with.
Indeed, winnings might even be spend on further gambling:
Elaine D. . .we had thirty pounds in winnings, and it would have
worked out that if we’d shared it out we’d have only got a few pounds
each. So we said what shall we do, and the verdict was we should
blow it all on scratchcards.
It is only when the amounts involved are in the scale of a yearly income or above
that the possibility seems to appear of doing something closer to “sensible”
budgeting such as paying o the mortgage.
Conversely, I found that money gained outside of work is more readily avail-
able for gambling. A particularly interesting form of money in this respect is
the ‘bottle money’, the small change that falls into the interstices of budgeting,
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and ends up in containers until it reaches a spendable amount. For several of
my informants, this money was hypothecated for gambling, for example:
Helen SIf my purse gets a bit heavy I think ‘Oh I’ll get rid of some
of these coppers’ and throw them in the bottle. And I’m not sure
that I would be able to happily justify, you know, taking ten pound,
you know proper ten pound frommy purse and just thinking. . . [I’ll
spend it betting] on a horse.
For one couple that I interviewed [interview: Neil and Lesley K] the question
of what counts as spare change, and therefore what would count as gambling
money, was the source of lively discussion and disagreement between the two.
One does not even have to win and to squander one’s winnings on “ash
consumption” to benet from this kind of protest. Lotteries are particularly
interesting on this point, for the minuscule glimpse they give of almost absolute
freedom from the budget allows a kind of relief in the fantasy of such an escape.
protests against rationality Gambling’s especial usefulness as a
form of “protest” against economic constraints nds an equivalent in the sphere
of rationality. It is this aspect of gambling that Veblen highlighted and demon-
ized in¿e¿eory of the Leisure Class. As with the protest against economics,
Devereux, unlike Veblen, nds a place for gambling’s relation to rationality
within both the psychology of the actor and the institutions of society. ¿e actor,
constantly reminded of the impositions of reality, must nd a way of under-
standing “an indierent and sometimes hostile universe animated by causes
independent of his will” [59, p. 961]. ¿e principal means for doing so is ration-
ality. Reason, however, entails a disciplining constraint to knowing the world,
the kind of constraint that, ultimately, assumes the form of a Weberian “iron
cage”: rationality, a means of knowing, predicting and controlling the world,
presents itself to the actor as an external and dominating force. Psychologically,
the reality principle1, conveyed by and embodied in reason, is at odds with the
1. In the Kantian and broadly Enlightenment sense of an epistemologically necessary con-
gruence between reality and reason, rather than the ontological, Heidegerian, sense of reality
as Being prior to reason.
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freedom and pleasure-seeking aspects of personality. Hence, the association of
the lottery with “romanticism” in an earlier quotation.
Institutionally, the “structural imperatives” of capitalism [p. 960] encourage
a heavy stress on rationality in culture. But events always seem to fall short of
the strong promise that rationality makes:
In addition to the inevitable psychological constraints that ration-
ality imposes, the objective consequences of this discipline are
o en deeply frustrating. Because of the grave inadequacies of even
the best available knowledge and technique, man is continually
called upon to face the consequences of events he cannot predict,
or control, or understand. [59, p. 962]
¿e consequences of this are, Devereux says, a latent resentment against the
reality principle, and an accompanying mistrust of the capabilities of reason to
orient and adapt to circumstances.
All societies, therefore, require some way of making up for the shortcomings
of the “narrow dictatorship of reason”; they do so either by lling in the gaps, so
to speak, of reason, or by allowing the actor to release the emotional pressures
induced by these frustration.
Once again, gambling is ideally placed to full this functional requirement.
Chance, central to gambling, and the source of fascination for the gambler, ies
in the face of reason, “makes a mockery of . . . the orderly, meaningless world of
cause and eect” [p. 963]. Furthermore, gambling’s entanglement of chanciness
and economic activity is a “barb at the heart of all the institutionalized logics of
the legitimate sphere”. Gamblers might use rational and quasi-rational schemes
to ‘beat the game’, but, Devereux notes, they also, o en even wilfully, fail to
make full use of the facts available about the game.
¿ere is strong support for this view in the prospect theorists’ experimental
work on economic rationality. ¿e exemplication par excellence of ‘making
full use of the facts’ in economic action is the expected utility model. ¿e
work of Kahneman, Tversky, and others tests, largely by experiment, the empir-
ical validity of this model, which is so central to economic theory. From von
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Neumann and Morgenstern’s¿eory of Games and Economic Behavior [223]
onwards, thought experiments involving gambling, especially lotteries, have
been used extensively in economic theorizing on questions of choice when
the possible outcomes can only be expressed as probabilities. ¿e models de-
rived assume, however, that the actor has perfect knowledge of the probabilities
involved and that, in possession of this knowledge, the actor will make the
objectively correct choice. ¿e prospect theorists have shown, however, that
gambling decisions are made not with any thorough-going calculation, but with
a set of heuristics that ignore some of the information necessary to make a
fully rational decision.1 Some examples of these are: availability: the recall of
specic instances where one has been successful over those where one has not;
conrmation bias: neglect of regression to the mean; illusory correlation: the
priest at the football game ensures the team’s victory because he was there when
they last won; and justiability: preference for a rule with a justication over
one with none.2
¿ese example heuristics go some of the way to helping us to accept the thesis
put forward byDevereux. But not all the way. In the inaugural paper on prospect
theory, Kahneman and Tversky conclude that gambling is attractive because of
cognitive biases that give too much weight to low risk probabilities [130, p. 286].
¿is would have little relevance to Devereux’s point if the actors merely believed
erroneously that they were maximizing their expected utility; if this were so,
the “protest against rationality” would evaporate leaving a residue of mere error.
What needs to be shown is that some kind of a virtue, however ambivalent,
is made of these errors, that actors have something to gain. ¿at they enjoy
1. ¿is is not to say that they have shown the economists to be wrong, but merely that
there are some problems actualizing their ideal-typical model. Indeed, such an actualization
is, arguably, not the purpose of the model, as Binmore notes: “Economists are very careful
not to claim that people really have utility generators inside their heads. It is true that the
brain contains pleasure and pain centres, but what is known about these is too slender to form
the basis of a viable theory. When economists discuss utility maximization, they therefore
only claim that rational individuals will behave as though their aim were to maximize a utility
function” [21, p. 98] (emphasis in the original).
2. ¿ere aremany other such heuristics; an extensive list (as well as a critique of the heuristics
model) may be found in Paradoxes of Gambling Behaviour [224]. Prospect theory is described
in Prospect ¿eory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk [130]; other relevant texts on the subject
of gambling are Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases [129] and Propensities and
Counterfactuals: ¿e Loser that Almost Won [131].
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employing such heuristics and biases, for example. Wagenaar and Pleit-Kuiper’s
research detailed in¿eMultiple Objectives of Gamblers [225] provides this kind
of evidence. Using principal components analysis to disaggregate the complex
bundle of motivations of gamblers, they show that although the tendency has
been to assume that maximization of expected value is the prime motivation
of gamblers, there are other signicant factors, such as excitement ( “I like
doubling and splitting because it makes the game more exciting” [p. 173] ),
sociability, and entertainment ( “more important than winning” ). ¿e analysis
of responses to a range of stimulus statements such as these shows that there are
two interpretable dimensions other than expected value: the perceived game
objective and risk attitudes [p. 167]. ¿us, they conclude that these other factors
contribute signicantly to the utility structure of gambling situations [p. 176].
¿e other aspect of gambling that allows a “protest” against rationality is
as a means of ight from reality. In this respect, there is an anity between
gambling and the state of mind that Csikszentmihalyi calls ow:
We shall refer to this peculiar dynamic state – the holistic sensation
that people feel when they act with total involvement – as ow. In
the ow state, action follows upon action according to an internal
logic that seems to need no conscious intervention by the actor. He
experiences it as a unied owing from one moment to the next,
in which he is in control of his actions, and in which there is little
distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and
response, or between past, present and future. [51, p. 35]
¿e attractive qualities of ow are its sense of total involvement, its autotelic1
nature, and, importantly, the fact that it is avocational:
Although it would be ideal to enjoy one’s work, and in a few for-
tunate societies this might indeed be the case, it is generally true
in our society that most people do not nd deep involvement and
enjoyment in their productive work, but seek it instead in leisure
activities. [163, p. 36]
1. An end in itself.
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Flow allows a degree of completeness that, in Devereux’s analysis, is not achiev-
able under the background ethos of capitalism:
When everyday activity is constraining, routinized, invariant,
overly structured, when experience of the world is one of excessive
regulation and oppressive discipline, then people seek variety and
personal challenges in their recreation. [163, p. 45]
¿is completeness may be either an escape from the stiing demands of ration-
ality, or it may be a means of satisfying rationality’s unsatisable demands:
In short, those who experience a surplus of certainty in their daily
lives, that is, those who are alienated, will seek uncertainty in play.
On the other hand, those who view the world as mainly uncertain,
that is, anomic persons, will seek certainty in recreation. [163, p. 46]
protests against ethics ¿e pattern of Devereux’s thought should be
clear from the preceding account. Some aspect of the motivation for gambling
nds a place within some fundamental psychologically and socially hard-wired
tension. At the most general, these tensions are the basics of being, acting and
knowing: freedom and constraint, the reality principle and the pleasure prin-
ciple, reason and intuition. ¿ey become institutionalized in specic historical
forms. ¿e dominant historical formation – rational ascetic capitalism – at-
taches a premium to the most rational of these forms, but it can not completely
evade the others. It can not do so for two reasons: rst, because it needs the
wild-cards of risk-seeking and innovation to sustain itself as a dynamic system;1
second, because reason is not a suciently resonant principle for the individual
that it compensates for the losses that it incurs. Social forms are derived from
these tensions, realizing them in institutionalized deviancies. ¿e purpose of
these forms is to redirect the psychological pressures generated by these strains.
Gambling has a special place because it actually works as an interface between
1. A point acknowledged, incidentally, by the 1808 Second Report of the Select Committee on
the Laws Relating to Lotteries: “A spirit of adventure must be excited amongst the community,
in order that Government may derive from it a pecuniary resource” [196, p. 11].
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rational action, specically rational economic action, and some antagonistic
counterpart of such action.
In the sphere of ethics, it is the puritanical economic ethic that fails to satisfy
the individual’s needs entirely. Some aspects of it are in fact “peculiarly abhorrent
to the less ascetic components of human nature” [p. 963]. ¿ere are many other
ethical values embedded in culture that just do not t, and the ascetic economic
ethic is not even internally consistent. ¿ere is, therefore, much scope for
ambivalence, strain, guilt, and a sense of injustice.
Gambling, yet again, is an ideal channel for “ethical escape, protests or re-
bellion”. And again, this is because of its central involvement with chance.
Chance is, by disposition, non-ethical. ¿e allocation of resources on the basis
of chance involves no value judgement, save, of course, for the decision to use
chance in the rst place. Lotteries have o en been used or proposed to free up
otherwise impossible “solomonic judgements” [79]: the Betaseron lottery to
allocate an expensive treatment for multiple sclerosis is a celebrated example,
another instance is Dickens’s suggestion that lotteries would be fairer than eth-
ics committees in choosing organ transplants [62], and a more gruesome one
is told by Tacitus, that to punish a battalion for cowardice, Lucius Apronius
revived an ancient practice of having every tenth man ogged to death, using
lots to choose the victims [214, p. 126]. To introduce, as gambling does, this
non-ethical element into economic aairs. . .
. . . dees not merely the logical imperatives of cause and eect but
also the fundamental ethical imperatives regarding the relation-
ships between eort and reward. With respect to these values,
chance is deliciously and spitefully irrelevant. [60, p. 966]1
¿e inherent anti-ethical property of gambling is further bolstered by the ex-
istence of social and legal disapproval and sanctions. So gambling is a fertile
ground to stage deant protests against ethics: “the recreational setting of gambl-
ing fosters a permissive attitude of irresponsibility; since it is ‘all in fun’, one
may ‘do as one pleases’ ” [p. 966].
1. ¿is echoes Caillois’s assertion that chance is an “insolent and sovereign insult to
merit” [section 4.2, p. 102].
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3.2.1 Criticisms
¿ere is a direct and, in my view not very satisfactory, criticism of Devereux
that stems from his theoretical (or perhaps methodological) standpoint. His
adherence to structural-functionalism makes him easily susceptible to the ca-
nonical criticisms of reication of social structure and teleological explanation.
¿ere has been much debate about the extent to which any propositions1 gener-
ated by such totalizing grand theories may be disaggregated from the theory
itself, or how the dierent “logics” of dierent modes of theorizing may be
integrated the one with the other.2 But such criticisms, interesting as they are,
seem like the gnawing of mice in the face of the extraordinary scope and the
highly productive insights of his work:
¿e charges commonly made against structural-functionalism as
a doctrine seem rather irrelevant when, as here, its utility as an
organizing conceptual framework paid such rich dividends. [70,
p. 20]
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see what might be done with a theory
of gambling that sets its store against functional explanation. And the most
exemplary of this kind of approach is Geertz’s analysis of gambling that seeks
to understand it not in terms of its functions, but in terms of its capacity to
generate meaning, to see gambling as an inherently interpretative act.
3.3 Geertz: Gambling And Deep Play
Geertz’s Deep Play: A Description of the Balinese Cockght [94], is a description
and analysis of the sport of cock-ghting in Bali, and the gambling activities that
surround it. ¿e central point of the piece is sociological: to nd the connexions
between a cultural activity and the society in which it takes place.
¿e cockght has two aspects: on the one hand it is a “fact of nature”, expressed
through the very real ghting to the death of the cocks, on the other hand, it is
1. In Yin’s sense of propositions as predicates derived from a theory [238, p. 30].
2. See, for example, Mouzelis’s Sociological ¿eory: What Went Wrong [166].
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a “fact of culture”, a social form that is structured by and structures the social
order of Balinese society [p. 661].
¿e critical analytical work that needs to be done to understand the link
between the cockght and Balinese society is, Geertz suggests, an analysis of
how the bettingworks. AsDevereux notes time and again, gamblingwould seem
to be the example par excellence of activities that encompass the ambivalences
of modern society. ¿e explanation that comes most easily to hand for betting,
lottery playing, cockghting, and all other forms of gambling is that it one
sense or another they appeal to something that is missing, to the parts of us
that are not fullled or structured by norms and values. Explicitly directed
against both utilitarianism’s deprecation of gambling and the kind of functional
account oered by Devereux, Geertz’s study is an attempt to show that there is
something altogether more constructive taking place in the cockghting ring,
and, by extension, in other arenas of gambling in other societies.
He makes much of the observation that ‘play makes nothing happen’1, but
arrives at the paradoxical conclusion that precisely because play makes nothing
happen it is actually capable of making a great deal happen. As well as being
a classic and exemplary piece of ‘thick description’, the text is also a critical
engagement with utilitarianism, the philosophy that stresses, above all, the
formal-rational value of ‘making something happen’.
¿ere are actually two kinds of betting at the cockght, the bets that take
place in the ring amongst the players, and those taken up by the onlookers,
Geertz calls the one ‘deep’ and the other ‘shallow’ (table 3.1). ¿e two systems
of betting seem to be at odds with each other: what would count as “fair coin”
at the centre would be biased on the side [p. 662]. But the two are, in fact,
economically interrelated. ¿e play in the centre has a tendency to be balanced
and even-money; and this means that the side-betting is drawn to shorter
odds, since no-one will buy at the long odds. In order to make the side-betting
interesting, therefore, there has to be a greater volume of single bets. ¿e higher
the stakes in the centre, the more likely it is that the cocks are evenly matched,
1. An allusion, presumably, to Auden’s In Memory of W B Yeats: “ For poetry makes nothing
happen: it survives / In the valley of its making where executives /Would never want to tamper.”
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deep shallow
central peripheral
ocial, rule-governed informal, unregulated
single multiple
principal players audience
collective individual
large small
quiet, deliberative noisy, impulsive
even money never even money
Table 3.1: deep and shallow betting
and, therefore, the more likely it is that the side-bets will be short-odds and
high in volume. In Geertz’s words: “the centre bet ‘makes the game’, or perhaps
better, denes it, and signals. . . its depth” [p. 666].
¿is idea of depth, Geertz borrows from Bentham’s idea of “deep play”:
¿e loss of a portion of wealthwill produce, in the total happiness of
the loser, a defalcation greater or less, according to the proportion
of the part lost to the part which remains.
Take away from a man the fourth part of his fortune, and you
take away the fourth part of his happiness, and so on.
[In deep play] though the chances, so far as relates to money
are equal, in regard to pleasure, they are always unfavourable. I
have a thousand pounds. ¿e stake is ve hundred. If I lose, my
fortune is diminished by one-half; if I gain, it is only increased by
a third. Suppose the stake to be a thousand pounds. If I gain, my
happiness is not doubled with my fortune; if I lose, my happiness
is destroyed; I am reduced to indigence. [16, p. 386]
¿is is classical utility theory with an added moral dimension: for Bentham,
deep play is irrational and therefore immoral; indeed, he suggests that it should
be banned by law.
In the Balinese cockght, the ‘shallow’ bets are closer to the marginal utility
model, since it is possible for the utility of winning to outweigh the disutility of
losing (if the odds are long enough). It is precisely the high status, high stakes
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and even-money betting that corresponds to deep play. So why do the most
prestigious actors act in the most irrational, and for Bentham immoral, way?
Economists, psychiatrists and lawyers may be puzzled by this, but a part of
the answer is already suggested by the observation that the central bets are the
‘centre of gravity’ of all betting. It is the “solid citizenry around whom social life
revolves” [p. 668] who are involved in the big matches and the deep bets: those
who dominate and dene their society, those of whom, indeed, one would make
greater moral demands, also dominate and dene the play in the cockght.
What is staked is not merely money, but status:
What makes the cockghters deep is not the money itself, but what
the money causes to happen: the migration of the of the Balinese
status hierarchy into the body of the cockght. ¿e more money is
involved, the more things happen. [p. 669]
What happens in the cockght is a “simulation of the social matrix”. ¿is
happens, in a sense, because nothing actually happens. No real changes in
fortunes occur, and it is not possible to achieve social mobility in the game
itself. So, the cockght, by virtue of its separation from everyday life, is actually
deeply embedded in the socio-moral order.
¿ere are other areas where the cock is embedded in Balinese society. As
they are in British society, the word ‘cock’ is always subject to “tired jokes,
strained puns, and uninventive obscenities”. ¿e whole of (male) Balinese
society is “shot through with roosterish imagery” [p. 657], and in the cockght
itself, there is a peculiar intimacy between men and their cocks. Indeed, Geertz,
following Bateson and Mead, suggests that that cocks are viewed as “detachable,
self operating penises, ambulant genitals with a life of its own” [p. 656]. ¿e
successful cockghter is a type, denoting the hero, the champion, or the warrior.
Indeed, one of the greatest heroes in Balinese mythology is ‘¿e Cockghter’,
who managed to thwart an attempted coup because he was away at a cockght
when the assassination attempt took place [p. 670].
¿e structure of the play, the meaning of the cock, along with other aspects
such as the temporal structure of the ght [p. 672], root the cockght within the
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broader Balinese culture. Geertz attributes its power to its separation from the
context of everyday life, to the fact that it is a Gomanesque ‘focused gathering’.
Although it might be taken as such, Geertz maintains that he is not oering a
functional explanation here, because the role of gambling is interpretative and
not integrative. His analysis, he says, is not, as the functionalists would have
it, that that the cockght reinforces status discrimination; it is rather an act of
interpretation:
It provides a meta-social commentary upon the whole matter of
assorting human beings into xed hierarchical ranks and then
organizing the major part of collective existence around that assort-
ment. Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a
Balinese reading of Balinese experience; a story they tell themselves
about themselves. [p. 674]
3.4 Gambling, A Virtue Made Of Chance?
It is debatable whether the distinguishing characteristic of functional explana-
tion is, as Geertz seems to suggest, that it explains activities such as gambling
in terms of the reinforcement of of social stratication. It is not an implausible
to claim that his explanation is itself a brand of functionalism masquerading
as interpretivism. ¿e phrase “Its function, if you want to call it that. . . ” in the
preceding quotation hides a multitude of methodological complications. For
what, a er all, does it mean to say that the cockght is a way of explaining the
hierarchies of Balinese society to its members if it is not an explanation of the
function of the cockght? Ironically, his work is far more concerned with social
stratication than Devereux’s explicit functionalism (but less so, of course, than
Veblen’s).
Nevertheless, there is something very dierent to be found in the approaches
of Devereux and Geertz. ¿eir theoretical works move in opposite directions;
the one starts from norms and values and nds these in the processes of gambl-
ing; the other starts from the processes and works outwards. And there are
prots and losses involved in both routes. ¿e dramas of these prots and
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losses have been rehearsed many times in debates between functionalism and
interpretivism so o en that they do not required reprising here. ¿e more
interesting and compelling question to ask is: what would a satisfying theory of
gambling look like? Downes makes the following suggestion:
Any adequate theory of gambling should provide homologous ac-
counts of the dynamics of gambling as a phenomenon, the dynamic
of the social reaction to gambling, both as expressed by dierent
groups and as institutionally based, and of the relationship between
the two phenomena. [70, p. 21]
¿e key to nding such homologies in all three theorists is the relation of
gambling to economic life, and to its institutionalization as a more or less
problematic set of norms and values. In Veblen and Devereux, gambling is
understood as standing in opposition to economic life; in both, gambling rubs
against the grain, producing an expressive wastefulness for the one and a means
of relief for the other. It is interesting to note that Geertz’s theory takes the
economic as its starting point too, but that it does so in a very dierent way. His
analysis begins with the minutiae of the economic activity within the cockght
and argues that the characteristics of betting patterns may only be explained
in terms of something other than economic values, hence the discovery that
it is status that is staked, but that this staking may only be understood as a
provisional ‘dramatization’ of staking.
Lotteries have their own special characteristics that need to be considered.
For one thing, state lotteries such as the UK National Lottery involve an extra
charitable dimension that complicates its relation to the economic. One question
that needs to be asked of the Lottery is how this dimension relates to the ethical
problems – sociological problems, that is – engendered by gambling. More
generally, as I have indicated in the introduction, so little is known at the level
of the player about the practices of playing the lottery that to derive meanings
for these in the style of Devereux would, in fact, be a form of theorizing by at.
In particular, reading values o from societal norms and values would make it
all to easy to recapitulate extra-sociological debates about the morality of the
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lotteries. And taking such a path would lead, perhaps inevitably, to Veblenesque
accounts, to diagnoses of invidiously “selling hope” [44] and to a fascination
with jackpot winners and gambling addicts. All of these would be at the expense
of an understanding of the core of ‘ordinary’ players who play regularly but
never win large amounts. ¿e lottery for them is not experienced as a drama in
any straightforward way: when playing becomes habitual and routinized, when
the stakes are so small and the chances of winning so slim, when it is dicult
to determine the location of the lottery (where does it take place?), and when it
is even possible to entertain the thought that the lottery is not gambling at all,
then there appears to be much less upon which to gain a purchase.
¿e best way to approach an adequate understanding of gambling and the
lottery, therefore, is in the spirit of Geertz: to look at what is actually involved
in playing the lottery. But this approach needs some kind of conceptual prim-
ing. Clues to a useful theoretical ground may be found in Devereux’s idea
that gambling ‘playfully recombines’ the values of the values of the dominant
institutional pattern, and Geertz’s assertion that “play makes nothing happen”.
¿ere is something about play, the superclass of gambling, that means that
it may be consequential by virtue of its inconsequentiality. But the question
remains begged in both of just how this ostensible paradox is actualized in
contexts of play. ¿is problem is of especial importance to the lottery, for as I
have indicated nothing much at all seems to happen. ¿e second phase of the
theoretical work of this thesis is, therefore, to examine in more detail theories of
play, to understand how a virtue may be made of the absence of consequences
and necessity, and, in the case of gambling, how a virtue may be made of chance.
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Chapter 4
Play
Play as a special form of activity, as a ‘signicant form’,
as a social function – that is our subject. We shall not
look for the natural impulses and habits conditioning
play in general, but shall consider play in its manifold
concrete forms as itself a social construction.
—Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens [119, p. 22]
In 1983, Cliord Geertz responded, somewhat ambivalently, to a trend he saw
in the analogies of social-scientic thought: away from the mechanical and
organic, and towards the cultural:
In the social sciences, or at least in those that have abandoned
a reductionist conception of what they are about, the analogies
are coming more and more from the contrivances of cultural per-
formance than from those of physical manipulation – from theatre,
painting, grammar, literature, law, play. What the lever did for
physics, the chess move promises to do for sociology. [95, p. 22]
¿e three analogies he singles out as making an especially strong showing in
recent times are game, drama, and text. Within the game category, Geertz nds
three distinct kinds of analogy [p. 24]:
1. Wittgensteinian conceptions of forms of life as language games, from
which is derived the “notion of intentional action as following a rule”
2. Game theory, a er von Neumann and Morgenstern’s¿eory of Games
and Economic Behavior, looking at “social behaviour as a reciprocative
manoeuvring toward distributive payos”
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3. Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, with its idea of “play as a paradigm form of
social life”
Of the three broader categories, game/play, drama, and text, the most general is
the game/play analogy. Drama is a kind of gaming, and is evenmore obviously a
kind of play. ¿e relation of text to games and play is less straightforward, but it
may be placed either under the Wittgensteinian category of language games or,
in the post-structuralist move towards textuality, under the aspect of play. ¿is
ordering of categories serves to suggest the importance of the concepts of game
and play, and their signicance as analogies for social-scientic work. In this
chapter, I will discuss one of the three types of game/play, ‘play as a paradigm’,
as a Geertzian “lever” for the rest of the thesis. I conceive of play here not in
terms of its “social function” nor as a “social construction”, as Huizinga does in
the epigraph heading this chapter, but as a social form. A er moving through
some of the key theorists of play as a social activity I indicate a central problem
with these conceptions, that they depend too much on the static boundedness
of play, and I suggest a more exible conception of play better suited to the task
of understanding the National Lottery.
While the Lottery may be approached from other directions – as a social
problem or as a form of charitable giving – taking the line through play itself is
the most productive way of proceeding. A social problem approach, or, more
broadly, one which looks to the deviant aspects of the Lottery and of gambling
is too limited in possibilities. I have indicated these issues as they appear in
debates over the introduction of the Lottery in chapter 2. ¿e theories and
their limitations are discussed in chapter 3, where I critically discuss Devereux’s
thesis that gambling is a “institutionalized deviant pattern” [59], deprecated but
somehow accepted as necessary in a sub rosa fashion. An approach through
charitable giving, the best line for a dierent thesis, is not appropriate for
the question asked by this research: what are the beliefs and practices of the
ordinary Lottery player? Issues of deviance and charity do have a signicance
in the analysis, but any discussion of these must follow a shaping up of an
understanding of play.
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Two texts discussed in chapter 1 demonstrate the importance of the idea
of play for this research. Gataker’s [93] distinction between ‘providential’ and
‘lusory’ lots, between on the one hand those that attempt to access divine will as
a means of either determining the future or demonstrating through luck the
gi of grace, and on the other hand those that are pure play, indicates what is at
stake in the denitions of gambling and work and play. ¿e decision arrived
at by the Rothschild Report [189], that lotteries are ‘harmless fun’, albeit a kind
of fun particularly susceptible to criminal and psychological harm, suggests
that it is possible to nd in the lottery some kind of ‘pure’ play, and that its
‘harmlessness’ hangs upon this purity.1 In its analysis, the lottery is a ‘so ’ form
of gambling because it is less consequential and hence closer to Gataker’s ‘lusory’
category. Both of these have a strong moral investment in the purity of play,
but both beg the question of just what play is, and how it manages this purity.
¿eories of play tend to hang upon similar notions of purity and they tend to
see it as somehow embattled by history: the ‘spirit of play’, o en associated
with childhood and innocence2, rubs up against and is abraded by the spirit of
capitalism.
A natural rst move in a discussion of play is, therefore, to oppose it to work,
the most radical theorist of which is perhaps Marx, for whom the capacity
and desire to produce is the dening characteristic of human species-being.
Huizinga, by all accounts the inaugural anthropologist of play3, counters Marx’s
homo faber with the assertion that civilization “does not come from play like
a babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises in and as play, and never
1. On this issue, the Gambling Review Report of 2001 observes that “It is dicult to judge
how far current regulations are based on a moral disapproval of gambling but it is hard to
escape from the sense that gambling, even if harmless, is at best an unworthy activity. ¿e
comments of the Rothschild Commission are quite revealing and show how they struggled
with the issue.” [92, §3.23]
2. See Margaret Carlisle Duncan’s Play Discourse and the Rhetorical Turn [37] for a semiolo-
gical analysis of Homo Ludens which discusses this theme.
3. While many writers apply this epithet, his work receives cursory attention in their works,
warranting only a few lines of commentary.
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leaves it” [119, p. 198].1 As the title of his text suggests, Huizinga substitutes
homo ludens, man the player, for homo faber, man the producer.
Work and play at odds; this is one of themain tensions lying behind gambling,
and one which resonates strongly within the moralizing debates discussed in
chapter 2. In the current chapter, I examine the concept of play as it is worked
up by Huizinga, Caillois and Goman, and Simmel. A common theme for
these four is a conception of play as a distinctive enclave of experience whose
boundaries are dened by some quality of ‘separateness’2. A key dierence
separating these theorists is how they place play in relation to ‘life’, and especially
everyday-life. Huizinga and Caillois see the two as in some sense opposed, while
Goman nds in play a part of the process of constituting self and society in
everyday-life.
¿e strongest claim for play’s ‘separateness’may perhaps be found inGadamer,
for whom the removal of play from the sphere of utilitarian goals was so marked
that it was only proper to nd in it a distinct mode of existence: “the player
experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him” [91, p. 89]. ¿ere are
problems with this heightened idea of separateness, and the lottery brings these
problems to the fore. Briey, while it is certainly a kind of ‘play’, it is not clear
where the Lottery’s boundaries lie: where and when its players nd separateness.
At rst glance, it would seem obvious that this is something to do with escapism
and fantasy, and with freedom from work, or at least that the moments of the
lottery, buying a ticket and checking the numbers, are the moments within
which the Lottery ‘happens’. But the evidence from my interview data suggests
that the picture is more complicated, and that playing the lottery is much more
embedded in everyday life, even while it retainsmany of the qualities of play and
gambling. ¿is embeddedness gives form to the thematic chapters to follow, all
of which take their lead from the conception of play developed in this chapter,
and specically from the problem of boundaries, which the lottery highlights.
1. I should point out that he doesn’t actually discuss Marx in his text, although he does
criticize the banal economic reductionism of Marxism (see section 4.1.2, page 98). It would
be interesting to bring together into some kind of discussion Marx and Huizinga (or at least
the idea of playfulness as a dierent kind of action (ludic rationality?)). Habermas could come
along too. And Rorty.
2. Gerda Reith’s word [181].
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Prior to this issue there is a problem in the conceptual relation between play
and gambling. ¿eories of gambling may shadow theories of play, but gambling
has its own specicities. ¿e conception of play developed here will be used
as an ideal-type to interrogate these specic qualities of gambling, and the
specicities of the Lottery will be used to bring some nesse to both the more
general and the more specic theories.
4.1 Huizinga: Homo Ludens
Huizinga’s philosophical anthropology draws upon what was originally a Pla-
tonic connexion between play and culture.1 For Plato, paidià, the play of chil-
dren, is a fundamental category that is the template for paideía, the ‘serious’
ritual play of the fully formed adult personality:
Play is the starting point for the choric education of children, on
which is gra ed, in due course, the content of communal culture –
from the proper participation in the choric rituals of the community
to the insight into the aesthetic, moral and religious values which
they embody. [222, p. 181]
Play and ritual are one and the same thing, but this does not reduce the magic
of ritual, and rather implies the sacredness of play itself. Play does not lose
its playfulness in the transition, it becomes social.2 Huizinga is, in this way,
interested in an armation of the status of play as a category sui generis. Where
other theories against which he sets his store tend to nd in play something
else, Huizinga attempts to dene it as if it were a fundamental category with
1. For a discussion of Huizinga’s use of Plato, see Voegelin’s review of Homo Ludens [222].
2. ¿ere is an echo of this in George Herbert Mead’s distinction between play and games in
Mind, Self & Society [158]. ¿e transition from the one to the other is, for Mead, the “genesis
of the self ” [p. 144]. When play moves away from animalistic play, it does so through ‘playing
at’ something, and thus involves taking on roles of others. A child playing at “Indians”, for
example, “has a set of stimuli which call out in itself the responses that they would call out in
other, and which answer to an Indian” [p. 150]. While children can play like animals “running
away, when chased, as the dog does”, they have the capacity to play by putting themselves in the
place of the other. ¿is is carried forward and generalized in the game, where the child “must
have the attitude of all the others involved in that game” [p. 154]. ¿us play is a vehicle for the
realization of the self, which for Mead is always a social self. See also John Dewey on the “play
theory of art” in Art as Experience [61, p. 277–280].
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which the traditional oppositions, play and seriousness, play and work, do not
hold. As George Steiner notes in his introduction to the second edition ofHomo
Ludens, “its only opposite is the negative category ‘non-play’ ” [119, p. 10]. ¿is is
a problematic and productive move. Problematic because it tends either to reify
play or to handle it as a transcendental signier, and also because, as I show in
section 4.3, he does not manage to sustain the purity of this conception of play.
Productive because it allows his conception of play to be used as a heuristic
angle into the construction of such oppositions.1
4.1.1 Huizinga’s Conception of Play
Huizinga begins his argument by pointing out that play precedes culture: culture
presupposes society, but play is something which humans share with other
species, and is, therefore, prior to both culture and society. Where human
play diers, however, from animal play is in its signicance, signicance being
something distinctive to human societies.2 Play is, therefore, in some degree a
sociological phenomenon, and not reducible to physiological or psychological
reexes. Accounts which make such a reduction also hold to the assumption
that play serves some other purpose and is not an end in itself.3¿us, play is
o en explained as a “discharge of superabundant vital energy”, the fullling of an
“imitative instinct”, or the manifestation of a “need for relaxation” [p. 20]. Other
theories, Huizinga notes, nd in play a training for adult life, or the expression
1. Although this was hardly Huizinga’s intention in setting up play in this way.
2. One might say, following Durkheim, that play is necessarily “rich in social elements” [73,
p. 9].
3. He does not name the authors he has in mind here. An example of this kind of thinking,
roughly contemporary with Huizinga, is Gillin’s Sociology of Recreation, where play is equated
with an emotional “spree” [101, p. 803]. Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Psychology [208] puts
forward a “surplus energy” approach to play, while Groos sees play as a preparation for life
in¿e Play of Man [109]. One might also add to this list Freud’s work on play, where it is
seen as a kind of wish-fullment in the face of the reality principle, healthy for children but
pathological for adults (see [183]). Piaget nds something more positive in a similar structuring
of work and play. For him, intelligence lies between the poles of accommodation to reality on
the one hand, and assimilation of reality to the self on the other. Play is marked by the “primacy
of assimilation over accommodation” [175, p. 87]. Erikson suggests yet another role for play,
symbolic repetition of traumatic experiences “to turn what was passively suered into a theme
of active mastery” [80, p. 42]. For a succinct summary of these various perspectives, see Sage’s
Sport and the Social Sciences [192], and for a more extensive discussion, albeit one from the
perspective of the behavioural psychologist, see Ellis’sWhy People Play [78].
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of innate desires to compete and dominate. A nal set of explanations that
Huizinga mentions is of great relevance to the theory of gambling: play as a
safety-valve, as a kind of wish-fullment, or as a “ction designed to keep up
the feeling of personal value”. ¿ese nal categories reappear in many of the
sociological theories of gambling, and they will be dealt with in succeeding
chapters.
All of these theories carry some truth, but they push to the margins the more
interesting question: what is play in itself ?1While play involves the emotions, a
biological or psychological account does not suciently cover the phenomenon.
¿ere is simply too much going on in play for this to be an adequate explanation.
If play is a superabundance, it is a superabundance of practices over and above
those which are necessary for its ostensible purpose:
¿e intensity of, and absorption in, play nds no explanation in
biological analysis. . .Nature. . . could just as easily have given all her
children all those useful functions. . . in the form of purely mech-
anical exercises and reactions. But no, she gave us play, with its
tension, its mirth, and its fun. [119, p. 21]
In fact play, for Huizinga, is a transcendent category, a totality which “cannot
have its foundations in any rational nexus”, and as such it is a category that must
be understood on its own terms, and not as a supplement to some other prop-
erty of human nature. Moreover, Huizinga claims that play holds a privileged
position in the hierarchy of abstractions: “you can deny, if you like, justice,
beauty, truth, goodness, mind, God. You can deny seriousness, but not play”.
¿e proper analysis of play, then, takes it seriously as an entity in its own
right, looks to the social aspects of play, to its articulations in cultural practices,
and, since play as culture is all about its signicance, should be centred around
meaning. ¿e appropriate style for such an analysis is, therefore, broadly phe-
nomenological, and for the purposes of this thesis hermeneutical. Such an
analysis requires an heuristic, and Huizinga oers this model of play:
1. See also Csikszentmihalyi’s Beyond Boredom and Anxiety, for a similar point [p. 7].
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Summing up the formal characteristics of play, we might call it
a free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life
as being ‘not serious’, but at the same time absorbing the player
intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material
interest, and no prot can be gained by it. It proceeds within its
own rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of
social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy
and to stress their dierence from the common world by disguise
or to other means. [119, p. 32]
Caillois, whom I discuss in section 4.2, makes several criticisms of this model;
here, however, I will give an account of the elements of Huizinga’s model as the
basis of a more adequate conception of play. ¿ese elements all depend upon
the superuousness of play, upon the way it entails an “overow of the spirit
beyond the level of necessity” [222, p. 183], and upon the actor’s recognition of
this surplus. ¿is conceptual stem calls up some of the debates on additionality
described in 2.5.2: the idea that money raised by the Lottery is somehow special
and should be earmarked for ‘extras’, and that it should not simply be folded
into the general exchequer.
4.1.1.1 Free
It is an essential property of play that it is freely entered into; “play to order is
no longer play: it could at best be but a forcible imitation of it” [p. 26]. Precisely
because of this, play is held apart from “the course of the natural process”, is an
addition, “spread out over it like a owering, an ornament, a garment”. Huizinga
considers the objection that peoplemust play because instincts compel them
to do so, but rejects this on the grounds that this merely begs the question of
instinct itself; the calling up of ‘instinct’, is nothing but “a makeshi , and admis-
sion of helplessness before the problem of reality” [p. 35]. What is important
is that some choice is involved in play, the consenting adult can take it or they
can leave it at will. He goes on to add that the urgency of play is driven by the
pleasure of the play itself, and, further, that this pleasure may be deferred, is
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never imposed “by physical necessity or moral duty”.
4.1.1.2 Extraordinary
From the contingency of play, and its interruption of the ow of “natural pro-
cesses” comes the idea that play is dened by its separateness from everyday-life.
Play, for Huizinga, is a “stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of
activity with a disposition all of its own”. Play is always understood as ‘only
pretending’ [p. 26–27].1¿at it ismere pretending implies that it is secondary
to reality, but, as Huizinga suggests, this does not undermine the seriousness
of play that comes from the players’ absorption in its internal dynamics. In
fact, while play may be inferior in so far as it is a moment of departure from
everyday-life which entails a return to the real world, its stronger sense of a focus
and its clarity of form allows for a purer and hence deeper sense of seriousness:
“¿e inferiority of play is continually oset by the corresponding superiority
of its seriousness. Play turns to seriousness, and seriousness turns to play”.
Play, then, is not opposed to seriousness; indeed, Huizinga claims that play
is capable of reaching “heights of beauty and sublimity that leave seriousness
far beneath” [p. 27]. ¿ese interrelations and inversions of the serious and the
playful are developed in Huizinga’s discussion of the relationship between play
and ritual.
¿e uidity of the serious and the non-serious indicates the permeability of
play. While play is dened as outside of everyday-life, and as a kind of interrup-
tion of its “appetitive processes”, this quality itself allows it some purchase upon
the life it interrupts. Play is a kind of tmesis, an interpolation of a dierent set of
desires and satisfactions as an end in itself, “an intermezzo, an interlude in our
daily lives”. But play, apart from ‘life’, becomes an integral part of life through
repetition:
It adorns life, amplies it, and is to that extent necessary both for
the individual – as a life function – and for society by reason of
the meaning it contains, its signicance, its expressive value, its
1. Riezler discusses the ‘mere’-ness of play in his article Play and Seriousness [184].
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spiritual and social associations, in short, as a culture function. [119,
p. 27]
It might seem that there is a contradiction here: play is dened by its freedom
and disinterestedness, yet Huizinga is claiming that it is necessary and, in a
sense, ‘interested’ in the life within which it carves out a space. He works around
this by making a distinction between the needs of the individual as individual
and of the individual as social being: play’s purpose as a social activity is external
to its servicing of individual needs, biological and psychological. Looked at in
this way, Huizinga’s angle on play resembles Durkheim’s conception of social
facts as external to and constraining of the individual. As such, it is open to
the same charge that it tends to reify the social: Huizinga slips easily into a
reication of play as an entity that has its own needs, he talks o en, for example,
of ritual serving a general social ‘play instinct’. But, of course, Durkheim’s
concept of constraint is not entirely negative, and allows for the individual’s
positive engagement with the moral order. Never the less, there is a clear
tendency towards a hypostatization of play in this work.1 ¿e interactionist
perspective of Goman discussed in section 4.4 is an important corrective to
this, and Giddens’ theory of structuration, brought to bear upon the topic of
play in chapter 5 nesses this further.
4.1.1.3 Secluded in Time and Space
¿at play is an interruption implies its third characteristic: its “secludedness”
and “limitedness” in time and space. ¿ere is a clear beginning and end within
which play is ‘played out’. In the play, there may be all kinds of dynamics,
“movement, change, alternation, succession, association, separation” [p. 28],
but this is always nite, always involves a return to the time of the life from
which it departs. Huizinga nds here a “curious phenomenon” of play: while
impermanent, it assumes a kind of xity as a form. Reproduced in memory, and
eventually tradition, and folded into life through repetition and dierence, play
1. For a general discussion of these issues in relation to structural-functionalism, see
Mouzelis’s Sociological ¿eory: What Went Wrong? [166].
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supplies rhythm and texture to life; “the elements of repetition and alternation
(as in the refrain) are like the warp and woof of a fabric”.
As with time, so too with space, and more so. All play has its playground
marked o, materially or ideally, within which “special rules obtain” [p. 29].
Huizinga is quick to assert that this marking of the spaces of play is the same as
that of ritual’s ‘consecrated spots’:
¿e arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage,
the screen, the tennis court, the court of justice, etc., all are in
form and function play-grounds, i.e., forbidden spots, isolated,
hedged round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain. All
are temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the
performance of an act apart. [119, p. 28–29]
Because play involves “special rules”, it is, claims Huizinga, the ideal grounds for
ritual. Its superposition of an “absolute and peculiar order” upon the otherwise
imperfect world [p. 29] lays the grounds for a “stepping out of common reality
into a higher order. ¿e representations of childish play-acting, the prince or
the wicked witch or the tiger, may be found also in sacred performances. But
with one key dierence. Where play-acting is ‘false’, in as much as the players
pass themselves o as someone or something else, ritual makes things real and
makes things happen: “the action actualizes and eects a divine beatication,
brings about an order of things higher than that which they customarily live.”
4.1.2 Civilization Sub Specie Ludi
As noted, Huizinga thinks history sub specie ludi – through the category of
play [p. 198]; he asserts that play is prior to and constitutive of the fundamental
forms of social life. It is not, however, simply a stage that societies go through
in their evolution, but exists in society as an ever-present form, a “veritable
ferment” pervading life. So, Huizinga is not merely mapping a model of human
development, play as a phase in growing up, onto social development. In fact,
he contests the claim that play is just a phase in the life of the individual as
strenuously as he does for the role of play in history. Although play is ever-
97
present, Huizinga seems to be saying that the degree and depth of playfulness
is variable across history, and that the forms which play takes tend to become
more sophisticated. ¿us, the central questions he asks about the role of play in
history are:1
[Does] civilization in fact never leave the play sphere? How far
can we detect the play-element in later periods of culture which
are more developed, rened, and more sophisticated than the early
ages. . . ?
He notes that in the preceding discussion he has made much use of examples
from the eighteenth century, a period that was, for him, “full of play-elements
and playfulness”,2 and wonders where all the play has gone in contemporary
society; “how then”, he asks, “ should we have lost all spiritual anity with so
recent a past?”. His criticism of Marxism sits within this historical purview.
Marxism emerges at a period in which play is being submerged under the
instrumental rationality at the heart of the industrial revolution, where ‘life’ is
reduced to productivity:
¿e nineteenth century seems to leave little room for play. Tend-
encies running directly counter to all that we mean by play have
become increasingly dominant. Even in the eighteenth century
utilitarianism, prosaic eciency, and the bourgeois ideal of social
welfare – all fatal to the Baroque – had bitten deep into society.
¿ese tendencies were exacerbated by the Industrial Revolution
and its conquests in the eld of technology. Work and produc-
tion became the ideal, and then the idol, of the age. . .As a result
of this. . . the shameful conception of Marxism could be put about
and even believed, that economic forces and material interests
determine the course of the world. [119, p. 218]
1. He seems to use civilization and culture interchangeably; an imprecise elision, perhaps,
of a useful and historically real distinction: Elias’s (later) work in¿e Civilizing Process [77],
describes culture and civilization at odds with each other. Huizinga’s short-circuiting of the
distinction is, however, not a problem for the current discussion.
2. ¿is observation echoes the discussion in 2.3 of the eighteenth century as the heyday of
lotteries in the UK.
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¿e Baroque period, for Huizinga the height of playfulness, is marked by a
“tendency to overdo things” [p. 208], and this “style of the times” made its mark
to an unprecedented extent upon all spheres of life.1¿e outward manifestation
of this style is a tendency “to deviate further and further from the simple, the
natural, and the practical until, about 1665, the high point of deformation is
reached” [p. 209]. As an example of this, he discusses the history of the wig,
whose history, so he claims, is a chapter not only in the history of fashion but
in the history of civilization itself. Citing the evidence of paintings, he points
out that the wig became the “obligatory head-gear” [p. 210] for any member of
the well-heeled classes, or for any aspirant to such a class. In the 1660s, the wig
reached its peak of sumptuousness and bizarreness, “chic gone mad”. Where
before it had served an almost practical purpose, covering up baldness, by the
sixties the wig had shi ed into the eld of pure play, had become “a true element
of style”. ¿e index of this is its ‘deformation’ in appearance. Where the early
wigs were mimetic devices, designed to emulate the appearance of hair, later
wigs became increasingly stylized until the connexion between the signier and
the signied – the wig and a naturally full head of hair – became completely
severed: “every pretence of imitating nature is abandoned; the wig has become
the complete ornament” [p. 211].
All of this changed in the industrial period. Where in the Baroque playfulness
was worn like Baxter’s ‘light cloak’2, in the later period it became increasingly
constraining, rule-bound and contaminated by productivity. ¿is may be seen,
Huizinga claims, in the growth of organized sports such as athletics and football,
and also in the elaboration of card games into complex variants of which bridge
is the best example. In a similar vein, Rybczynski notes that “people used to ‘play’
tennis; now they ‘work’ on their backhand” [191, p. 18].3 Ironically, Frederick
1. Walter Benjamin found a similar spirit of playfulness in the literature of the time: “It is
common practice in Baroque literature to pile up fragments incessantly.” [14, p. 51].
2. SeeWeber’s Protestant Ethic And¿e Spirit Of Capitalism, and section 4.1.1.1 of this chapter.
3. See also Guttman in From Ritual to Record [110, p. 69]: “Sport is not an escape from the
world of work but rather an exact structural and functional parallel to the world of work. Sport
does not oer compensation for the frustrations of alienated labour. . . It seduces the luckless
athlete and spectator into a second world of work more authoritarian and repressive and less
meaningful than the economic sphere itself.”
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Taylor, deviser of Scientic Management, also won the USA Men’s Doubles
championship in 1881 – a er systematically working on his backhand technique
(and designing a special racquet) [116, p. 197].
For Huizinga his shi is regrettable. Gataker deprecated ‘providential’ lots
on religious grounds and Huizinga shares this sentiment. For both, pure play is
privileged over play whose boundaries extend beyond the play itself. Gataker’s
argument is religious, Huizinga’s secular. ¿e similarities and the dierences
between the two call up the Weberian narrative of the shi from the Protestant
Ethic to the Spirit of Capitalism. But the connexion between Gataker and
Huizinga introduces a twist in this narrative thread. While Gataker’s thought
sits well with the ethos, Huizinga’s sets itself against the spirit of instrumental
rationality.
4.2 Caillois: Agôn and Alea, Ludus and Paidia
Caillois’Man, Play and Games [30] goes along with much of what Huizinga
has to say. Indeed, he is still more ambitious than Huizinga in his handling of
play, claiming that his work is not merely a sociology of games, but a laying of
“the foundations of a sociology derived from games” [p. 67]. But he is critical
of Huizinga on the grounds that his denition of play is “at the same time too
broad and too narrow” [p. 4]. It is too broad because he draws too much into
the sphere of play. It is not plausible, for example, to atten the distinction
between play and ritual, and in a sense Huizinga reduces all of culture to play.
If all culture is playful, then the need to separate play from culture disappears;
Huizinga might just as well undertake a study of culture or of civilization
tout court.1Moreover, Huizinga makes much of the non-productive quality of
play, yet some play is productive in a simple sense – gambling – and all play
produces something, involves utility, even if this is mere pleasure. What is
needed, therefore, is a theory of play that takes up the ideal-typical qualities
supplied by Huizinga, but which nds in instances of play – games – specic
1. Game theory, inaugurated by von Neumann and Morgenstern in¿eory of Games and
Economic Behavior [223], and elaborated in rational choice theory, is guilty of a similar reduction.
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articulations and congurations of these qualities. ¿is is what Caillois sets out
to do inMan, Play and Games. ¿is schema is more useful in its own right as a
more subtle articulation of a base denition of play than it is as a correction
of Huizinga’s conception of play, for it has to be said that there is not much of
a conceptual dierence between them. Caillois’ list of the qualities of play is
remarkably similar to Huizinga’s, and, while he claims a dierence in the area
of productivity, his own thoughts about productivity in play arrive at roughly
the same point as Huizinga by way of a somewhat circular detour. For Caillois,
games which involve an economic interest only do so within the game itself,
any attempt actually to make money out of gambling, for example, makes of
the player a ‘professional’ player or an entrepreneur, and hence not a player at
all. What’s more, Caillois claims, play makes nothing new:
A characteristic of play, in fact, is that it creates no wealth or
goods. . .Nothing has been harvested or manufactured, no master-
piece has been created, no capital has accrued. Play is an occasion
of pure waste: waste of time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and o en of
money for the purchase of gambling equipment or eventually to
pay for the establishment. [30, p. 6]
Having established play’s importance and its general contours, he develops a
fourfold typology of its characteristics which he names, using somewhat arcane
language, agôn (competition), alea (chance),mimicry (simulation), and ilinx
(vertigo).
agôn is all about competition and the surmounting of obstacles, about dis-
cipline and perseverance. It is where; “equality of chances is articially created,
in order that the adversaries should confront each other under ideal condi-
tions” [30, p. 14].
alea from the Latin for “die”, is where the outcome is outside of the control
of the player where “destiny is the sole artisan of victory” [p. 17]. Competition
exists only in asmuch as “thewinner has been favoured by fortunemore than the
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loser”. He draws attention to the passivity of the aleatoric player who can only
wait “in hope and trembling” for the casting of the die. Like agôn, there is a kind
of fairness to alea: where the former uses rules to level the playing eld, the latter
uses chance. Unlike agôn, however, alea negates work, patience, experience,
qualications, and, in fact, history tout court since the past is meaningless
and “in one instant, all winnings may be wiped out”.1 Consequently, Caillois
describes alea as an almost carnivalesque “insolent and sovereign insult to
merit”.
mimicry or simulation. Of this Caillois says “one can escape himself and
become another, this ismimicry” [p. 19]. It is a kind of escape thorough alterna-
tion of identity; he notes, with a somewhat arbitrary etymology, that the word
‘illusion’ has as its root the phrase in lusio, ‘in the game’.
ilinx “pursuit of vertigo” [p. 23] these are the kinds of activities which “mo-
mentarily destroy stability of perception and inict a kind of voluptuous panic
upon an otherwise lucid mind” examples would be whirling dervishes, Mexican
voladores, or a child spinning until s/he becomes dizzy.
4.2.1 From Turbulence to Rules
Caillois adds another schema which overlays these categories: ludus and paidia.
¿ese are “not categories of play but ways of playing” [p. 53]. Ludus is the
turbulent, chaotic, emotive aspect of play, paidia the organized, rule-bound and
dispassionate. ¿is pairing, Caillois claims, is a basic opposition in ordinary
life:
[Ludus and paidia] pass into life as invariable opposites, e.g., the
preference for cacophony over a symphony, scribbling over the wise
application of the laws of perspective. ¿eir continuous opposition
arises from the fact that a concerted enterprise, in which various
expendable resources are well utilized, has nothing in common
1. ¿is is reminiscent of the National Lottery scratchcard catch-phrase “Forget it all in an
Instant!”.
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with purely disordered movement for the sake of paroxysm. [30,
p. 53]
¿ere is, for Caillois, a basic force behind play: a spirit of joyful improvisation.
He names this power paidia, a borrowing from the Greek that has a slightly
dierent intent from the Platonic idea of paidiàmentioned earlier;1 here, it is
the connotation of childishness that is important. Ludus is a kind of disciplining
force to paidia. In its strongest form, it represents the institutionalization in
rules of the impulse to play. In this way, it corresponds in some degree to paideía,
and to Huizinga’s concept of play as rule-bound. It would also seem that the
concept ludus steps on the toes of agôn, but there is, in fact, a nice distinction
between the two, and one which makes Caillois’ theory of play much subtler
and richer than Huizinga’s. ¿e distinguishing characteristic of agôn is that it
involves opposition to others. With ludus, on the other hand, it is simply the
existence of laws or rules that counts. ¿e simplest forms of ludus are games
such as yo-yo, whichmake use of natural laws, Caillois alsomentions kite-ying,
which makes use of specic atmospheric conditions [p. 29]. Flying a kite is a
step up from yo-yoing because it involves a kind of projection of the self, or, as
Caillois has it, “a kind of auscultation upon the sky from afar. [¿e kite-yer]
projects his presence beyond the limits of his body.” ¿is progression moves
through simple puzzles to crossword puzzles, and reaches its heights in such
activities as chess and bridge problems.
Although ludus is not the same thing as alea, there is certainly an anity
shared by the two. And this anity is not accidental. Lying behind Caillois’ play
scheme there is a progressive historical narrative. ¿e coupletmimicry and ilinx
are the kinds of play typical, for Caillois, of simple societies with their ecstatic
and fetishistic practices. ¿e other pairing, agôn and alea, are the distinctive
modes of play in advanced societies. Behind this there is clearly some sense
of a qualitative historical shi in play styles, and, by implication, of a shi in
1. He considers and rejects two other phrases, the Sanskrit kredati is found promising, but
rather too closely associated with gamboling and gaiety, and the Chinese wan is too restrict-
ive [p. 27]. Caillois’ work is marked by a creative use of words and phrases worked up through
such articulations of the niceties that separate them, and by an unusual sensitivity to the relation
of the connotative and denotative planes of language.
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the sensibilities of dierent ages. For one thing, both mimicry and ilinx are
‘physical’ while agôn and alea are abstract. Mimicry involves the taking on of a
dierent guise, ilinx, at least in its purest form, is a simple physical sensation.
Agôn and alea, on the other hand, are about form rather than content, they
replace the normal rules by which players live with their own, for the one it is
with chance that this substitution is made, for the other, it is rules. Mimicry
and ilinx are, in a Durkheimian sense, expressive of mechanical solidarity, and
agôn and alea of organic solidarity. ¿e purpose of games in contemporary
society is the equalization of chances, the governing principle of the game
attens any inequalities that may exist outside of the game. Caillois suggests
that play is a kind of simplication and purication of the complexities of the
demands of a given society. It is agôn that is the dening principle of modernity,
corresponding to the formal-rational demands of ascetic capitalism. But while
we live in an agonistic society, we are confronted with diculties because life is
not a game:
[Nothing] in life is clear, since everything is confused from the very
beginning, luck and merit too. Play, whether agôn or alea is thus
an attempt to substitute perfect situations for the normal confusion
of contemporary life. [30, p. 19]
Nomatter what is done, politically or individually, there are inequities in society.
¿e rules cannot be kept pure, as they may in a game of chess. Play is a com-
pensation for the powerlessness people experience in the face of the impurity
of the real rules of life:
[¿ere] arises the nostalgia for crossroads, for immediate solutions
oering the possibility of unexpected success, even if only relative.
Chance is courted because hard work and personal qualications
are powerless to bring such successes about. [30, p. 114]
¿is is possible with agôn as well as alea, but as agôn bears the strongest anity
to the spirit of the times, so alea is its natural Other. Agonistic skill may come
from hard work, or from the (lucky) circumstances of one’s life chances. Alea is
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skill-free. Anyone can win the Lottery; “the unskilled and the indolent may be
equal to the most resourceful and perspicacious as a result of the miraculous
blindness of a new kind of justice” [p. 114].
4.3 Play Versus Life
While Huizinga and Caillois dier on some crucial points, a similar set of
oppositions underpins their works. ¿ese common paradigmatic oppositions
are summarized nicely in Ehrman’s table [75, p. 41] reproduced in gure 4.1.
¿e main diculty in Huizinga is that of begging the question: while he wants
seriousness
usefulness
fecundity
work
science
reality
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
which are opposed by
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
play
gratuitousness
sterility
leisure
literature
unreality
Figure 4.1: play and its opposites
to allow for the serious in play, his assertions about this hang upon a prior
distinction between the two. In ritual, the sacred game, play and seriousness
may only be said to become one and the same only if the prior separation of
the two is assumed.1 But the most signicant problem with both Huizinga
and Caillois is that their idea of play relies upon some idea of everyday life,
but there is not much of an account of just what ‘everyday life’ means. For
Huizinga it seems both full and empty of meaning. It is empty because it is the
frictionless sphere of “natural processes”, interrupted by play and embattled by
instrumentality. It is full because it is the locus of all meaning for the individual.
It is possible to argue that processes such as play lend denition to the ineability
of the everyday in much the same way that the ethnomethodologists assert that
the tacit assumptions that constitute ‘doing’ are only observable in their breach.
A corollary of this would be that such processes in a sense produce the everyday
dialectically.
1. Ehrman makes this point well [75, p. 41].
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Huizinga and Caillois, then, have much to oer for analyses of play, they give
sharp denitions of its basic qualities, and Caillois has a good classicatory
scheme for kinds of games. Where they both fall down is in the foundations
of their arguments: those elements which are simply taken as essential truths.
¿eir historical naïveties are troubling, but not especially problematic, since
these may be bracketed o from the conceptual parts of their arguments.
¿eir glossing of the idea of the “ordinary” is, however, muchmore damaging
to the validity of their conceptions of play. An interestingway out of this problem
is indicated by Novak, who turns the work/play – real/unreal distinction on its
head: “Play is reality. Work is diversion and escape” [168, p. 40]. ¿e reason why
play is more real than work, Novak claims, is because it is about the present:
play is “pure nowness”, while work is about the future, about the deferral of
pleasure in the Weberian account of the ethos of rational ascetic capitalism.
WhereHuizinga holds that play is surplus, for Novak it is work that supplements
play.
In its most exaggerated form, the here and now of play becomes what Csik-
szentmihalyi calls ow: “the holistic sensation that people feel when they act
with total involvement” [51, p. 36], and one could classify play and games in
terms of their nearness to such a form.1 But there are problems when what is
going on in a play activity departs from this type, when play becomes purposive,
for example. And even when it becomes purposive within its own sphere, that
is, when it has a goal and a set of means to that goal. Goman’s analysis bears
some similarities to Novak’s emphasis on the ‘nowness’ of play, but it has some
more interesting elaborations which, to some extent, overcome this problem.
4.4 Goffman: Play and Framing
Huizinga and Caillois both attempt to radicalize play, to nd in it something
deeper and more intrinsic to psychology and social being than a mere supple-
mentary activity or impulse. For the one, play is found at the base of civilization;
for the other, sociology may be entirely rethought through the category of play.
1. See Figler’s Sport and Play in American Life [87].
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¿ere is something of this second ambition in Goman’s work too. Although
he characteristically places a great deal more emphasis on the workings of play
in “focused gatherings” [105, p. 17], inWhere ¿e Action Is [102] he also follows
Caillois’ lead, by developing a general model of action, in his case from an ideal
or pure moment of gambling.
‘Action’ is, of course, a key concept in sociological theory, but it is also has a
privileged place in the lexicon of gambling:
A decade ago among those urban American males who were little
given to gentility, the term ‘action’ was used in a non-Parsonian
sense in reference to situations of a special kind, the contrast being
to situations where there was ‘no action’. Very recently, this locution
has been taken up by almost everyone, and the term itself ogged
without mercy in commercials and advertisements. [102, p. 149]
¿ese “situations” are the ones that oer the possibility of a gamble. InWhere
¿e Action Is, Goman is interested in bringing the everyday idiom and the
sociological concept together in an exploration of the meaning of action itself :
“wheresoever action is found, chance-taking is sure to be” [p. 149].
Action, he claims, is evident when there is deliberate risk-taking. It is to
be found “whenever the individual knowingly takes consequential chances
perceived as avoidable”, whenever, that is, someone does something non-trivial
whose outcome is not absolutely determined, and when they could have done
otherwise. ¿is has some similarities with the Weberian concept of action,
and with Weber’s methodology. Ringer, for example, characterizes Weber’s
methodology as the probabilistic analysis of singular causes: “an image of
causal relationships – and of causal analysis – that deals in courses of events, in
counterfactuals, and in divergences between alternate paths and outcomes” [185,
p. 77]. ‘Action’ in Goman’s specication encompasses all kinds of action, but
in a face-to-face encounter, and especially one that involves an activity such as
gambling, the sequence of decision, action and outcome happens “in the same
breath of experience” [p. 156]. Two boys tossing a coin decide to do so, throw it
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in the air, and the one choosing the right face wins.1¿e two key characteristics
of action are that it is consequential and that it is fateful. Goman remarks that;
We still believe that the truest record of an individual’s character is
his or her reaction to fateful activities sought by choice. It is these
activities that constitute action. Gambling is an archetype of action
of fateful activity. [p. 194]
Gambling is not just a model for action generally, it is a privileged kind of
activity where the individual may demonstrate characterful fatefulness in ways
that life outside of the brackets of the game do not allow:
By virtue of the fact that they are solely responsible for their own ac-
tions, that theymake things happen in the consequent unfolding of
a game, gambling confers a degree of autonomy on players, and. . . it
is this that arms gamblers’ self-worth and makes gambling a site
in which one’s existence can be conrmed. [181, p. 134]
4.4.1 taking fun seriously
Where the Action Is is mostly interested in gambling because there Goman is
interested in fatefulness, consequentiality, and action. In Fun in Games, Go-
man discusses the more general characteristics of play in “focused gatherings”,
exploring the question of “how far one can go by treating fun seriously” [105,
p. 17]. Focused gatherings, as the name suggests, involve an encounter amongst
actors where there is a single “visual or cognitive focus of attention”. ¿ese
“ecological huddles” always involve some kind of bracketing, if only to produce
the shared object of attention. ¿e central device for this bracketing is, there-
fore, the separation of things that are relevant to the gathering from things
that are not: the creation of an enclosing “membrane” of salience around the
activity [105, p. 71]. In the case of games, these “rules of irrelevance” are clearer
than in other kinds of encounters. Goman gives the example of checkers: it
does not make any dierence whether the game is played “with bottle tops
1. See page 129, note 5.1 for a discussion of what may happen if the coin always comes up
heads.
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on a piece of squared linoleum, with gold gurines on inlaid marble, or with
uniformedmen standing on coloured agstones”. For Huizinga, play is similarly
framed by “special rules”, but there is no indication of just how these rules
appear. Goman, therefore, adds an important element to the conception of
play. He is, however, only talking about a specic kind of play, a limit that he
sets himself at the very beginning of the text: “the kind of games that are played
around a table” [p. 7], and his analysis is of little use for other kinds of play
which are less clearly organized around specic contexts, the National Lottery,
for example.
¿is problem of contexts is dealt with to some degree in Frame Analysis
through the set of ideas: frames, strips and keys.
¿e question “what is going on here?” is a question Goman nds “suspect”,
since any ‘here’ may be described more or less broadly or narrowly, and also,
“in terms of a focus that is close-up or distant”[106, p. 8].1¿e word ‘suspect’
here is not to be taken as a criticism of the asking of the question, but as
a suspicion that the question may be not satisfactorily be answered in any
straightforward or positivistic way. ¿is suspicion also, incidentally, undoes
Novak’s conception of play as ‘here and nowness’, since there is no clear-cut time
and place for play to refer to. ¿e problem that “in most ‘situations’ many things
are happening simultaneously – things that are likely to have begun at dierent
moments and may terminate dissynchronously” [p. 9] means that asking ‘what
is it that’s going on here?’ creates a bias in favour of “unitary explanation and
simplicity”. ¿is suspicion leads, therefore, directly into the central theme of
Frame Analysis, which is how actors go about putting together ‘heres’: how they
make meaningful contexts out of everyday life.2
¿e theory of framing is augmented by two more concepts: strips and key-
ing. Goman breaks everyday life down into what he calls “strips”, which are
“arbitrary slice[s] or cut[s] from the stream of ongoing activity” and slices made
1. Burns calls this the “Rashomon problem” a er the Kurosawa lm [29, p. 242]. ¿e in-
triguing metaphor of spatial distance reappears in the discussion of Simmel in section 4.6.
2. OnWilliam James, Goman notes: “Instead of asking what reality is, he gave matters a
subversive phenomenological twist, italicizing the following question: Under what circumstances
do we think things are real?" [106, p. 2].
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from the perspective of the actor or actors involved. ¿ese slices are arbitrary
because they are merely “raw batches of occurrences. . . that one wants to draw
attention to as a starting point for analysis.” [p. 10]. ¿is “concrete, actual activ-
ity. . .meaningful in its own right” [p. 560] is given new meanings through what
Goman calls keying: “a transformation of materials already meaningful in
accordance with a schema of interpretation” [p. 45]. Keying is related to the
linguistic concepts code and register, the one a “special [way] of displacing
utterances from their lodgment in everyday discourse”, the other “the linguistic
requirements of a particular kind of social occasion”.1 And the characteristics
of keying closely resemble those of play: all participants know that “systematic
alteration” is involved; there are cues for the beginning and the end of the
transformation; and anything can be keyed, “even carpentry”.
¿is is a promising start in relation to the problems of context in playing.
Goman, however, says of the biases introduced by too readily replying to the
question ‘what is going on here?’, that “this bias, too, I must be temporarily
allowed”. Presumably, this temporary permission extends around the frame of
the book. He plays with this device in later passages of the introduction [p. 16–
20], where, inter alia, comments on prefaces [p. 17], apostrophic devices (“dear
reader”) [p. 17–18], (potentially) innite metalinguistic regresses [p. 18], and
general play about the relationship between “getting dodgy with prefaces” and
“writing about tricks done with prefaces” [p. 19], serve as illustrations of im-
possibility of arriving at a nal framing.2Whether this passage reinforces or
undermines Goman’s argument is not clear, but it makes evident that the
ensuing discussion depends upon a limiting factor. Indeed, Goman’s sociology
as a whole may be seen to be systematically limiting in this respect. Giddens [98,
p. 271], for example, points out that up to and including his inaugural lecture,
where he arms the analytic viability, not to say vitality, of what he calls, “for
want of a happy name”, the interaction order [107, p. 2], Goman was interested
in a very sharply delimited area of human social activity. And Geertz describes
Goman’s area of interest as “something not vertebrate enough to be called
1. See Burns’s Erving Goman [29, p. 255].
2. Perhaps especially impossible for a text on framing.
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a group and not structureless enough to be called a crowd”[94, p. 661]. ¿is
domain of interest has o en been taken as the micro-sociological, but, as Gid-
dens suggests, it is better understood as the domain of co-presence. For all
of Goman’s elaboration of detail on such situations, this is a very small area
of focus, not even upon groups, as Giddens points out: “groups exist when
their members are not together. Encounters, on the other hand, by denition
only exist when the parties to them are physically in each other’s presence” [98,
p. 256]. Goman’s emphasis on “situated activity systems” [98, p. 256] renders
him susceptible to the canonical criticism that he fails to take social structure
into account:
It is as if the forces that somehow create the structural character-
istics of social systems are quite distant from individuals in their
day-to-day lives. Actors seemingly move in a pre-structured world,
of which they take no account in their actions, but which they play
no part in bringing into being or perpetuating. [98, p. 252]
But this kind of criticism fails to do justice, as Giddens acknowledges, to the
modesty of Goman’s explorations. He makes no claim to be talking about
social structure, as he says in Frame Analysis: “those matters have been and
can continue to be quite nicely studied without reference to frame at all” [p. 13].
Rather, he is interested in raising the dignity of the interaction order, that
it might tell us something particular about social life, something not readily
representable by any other means.
4.5 This is Play
When we get to the limits, however, of the frame in Goman, to its “rim”, we
nd the whole business of framing susceptible to overows, paradoxes and
innite regresses. Indeed, some have argued that Goman’s understanding of
the frame is a precursor of deconstruction. Burns nds in Frame Analysis a
resemblance to Derrida’s use of quotation marks in Eperons, his discussion of
style in Nietzsche:
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However many degrees of complexity – of layerings – Goman’s
transformed frames may have, there is always a ‘rim’, by which
the framed experience is ‘anchored’ in the ‘real world’ of ongoing
events. But the anchor o en turns out to be lightweight, or easily
displaced, and the reality of the world it is supposed to be anchored
in is a matter of belief rather than unassailable fact. [29, p. 246]
¿ere is perhaps an even clearer family resemblance to the Derrida of Truth in
Painting, where he tackles the meaning of frames themselves. But whether or
not Goman pregures Derrida, it is true that there is something paradoxically
disembodied about Goman’s frames. For all of his elaborate detailing of the
processes of creating ‘heres’, it is clear that there is no real ‘here’ there at all.
What we have, it seems, is the focus of co-presence staving o the paradoxes of
framing.
What would a conception of play look like if it encompassed the kinds of
paradoxes Goman hints at in his preface?
¿ere is a suggestion of this in Winnicott’s work on playing in Playing and
Reality [232], where he describes the key characteristic of a child’s play (through
transitional objects) as “paradox, and the acceptance of paradox: the baby creates
the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a
cathected object”1 [p. 89]. Winnicott calls this the dicult part of his theory of
the transitional object, for “a paradox is involved which needs to be accepted,
tolerated, and not resolved” [p. 62]. It needs to be accepted because, in fact, it
cannot be resolved since the baby must at the same time create the object and
treat it as if it were already created: “the baby – and later the child at play and
the adult at art (and religion) – recognizes some things and situations as ‘not
me. . .not not me’ ” [193, p. 29]. A more direct connexion between this kind of
thinking and Goman’s is, however, to be found in Bateson’s A¿eory of Play
and Fantasy [7], since Goman’s concept of the frame has a direct provenance
in Bateson’s work. Goman recognizes this debt when he states that it was
Bateson who
1. (emphasis in the original)
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directly raised the question of unseriousness and seriousness, al-
lowing us to see what a startling thing experience is, such that a bit
of serious activity can be used as a model for putting together un-
serious versions of the same activity, and that, on occasion, we may
not know whether it is play or the real thing that is occurring. [106,
p. 7]
Bateson’s theory of play is based on the distinction between denotative com-
munication (“the cat is on the mat”), and metalinguistic communication (“the
verbal sound ‘cat’ stands for any member of such and such class of objects”) [7,
p. 178]. In an observation reminiscent of Huizinga’s assertion that language itself
is a kind of play with a “wondrous nominative faculty”, Bateson speculates that
an important stage in the development of communication happened when, in
his words, signs became signals, when individuals “recognize[d] that the other
individual’s and its own signals are only signals, which can be trusted, distrusted,
falsied, denied, amplied, corrected, and so forth.” Playing requires something
of this shi ; it needs to convey the sense that “this is play” and not reality; play
ghting, for example, must involve the message that it is not a real ght [p. 179].
Conveying this message, however, necessarily involves paradox [p. 180]: the
statement “this is play”, when expanded becomes, “these actions in which we
now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would
denote”, which, when itself expanded, becomes, “¿ese actions, in which we
now engage, do not denote what would be denoted by those actions which
these actions denote”. ¿ere is, perhaps, a technical objection that two dierent
levels of metalanguage are hidden behind the two uses of the word ‘denote’,
but Bateson suggests that this can be brushed aside: “it would be bad natural
history to expect the mental processes and communicative habits of mammals
to conform to the logician’s ideal”. Notwithstanding this potentially intractable
objection, what Bateson is nding here in play is the spirit of a class of paradoxes
from Epimenides’ “all Cretans are liars” to Borges’s “all animals that do not t
into any category”. ¿e logical problem does not go away, but leads Bateson to
dene frames as “psychological” rather than logical. ¿is diagram of a frame
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illustrates the paradox:1
All statements within this
frame are untrue.
I love you.
I hate you.
Except that if the rst statement is false, then it is possible that one ormore of the
other assertions is untrue, because the falsifying of ‘all’ may lead either to ‘none’
or to ‘some’. Bateson resorts to a psychological argument here, claiming, quite
plausibly, that cognitively (in terms of “primary” or unconscious processes),
“the thinker is unable to distinguish between ‘some’ and ‘all’, and unable to
discriminate between ‘not all’ and ‘none’ ” [p. 184]. ¿is argument gains some
plausibility when it is compared with some the work of the prospect theorists,
and indeed when compared with the extraordinarily compelling fallacies that
fall easily to hand when probabilities are assessed. Both of these I discuss in
chapter 5.
¿e claim that there is something essentially paradoxical in play, even if
the paradox lies at the cognitive rather than the rigorously logical level, has
captured some imaginations. Schechner, for example, was inspired byWinnicott
and Bateson to propose a conception of play as a positive enactment of those
paradoxes. Writing o the western concept of play as a “rotten category” [p. 27],
rotten because it is “tainted by unreality, inauthenticity, duplicity, make believe,
looseness, fooling around, and inconsequentiality”, he turns instead tomaya-lila.
¿is composite Sanskrit word denotes a “performative-creative act of continuous
playing where ultimate positivist distinctions between ‘true’ and ‘false’, ‘real’ and
‘unreal’ cannot be made” [p. 29]. Maya is a strangely porous, and ambiguously
uid concept, whose meaning oscillates between “making something that was
not there before” and “making something that was there into something that
was not really there” [p. 28–29]. Lila means something close to ‘play’, indeed
there is an etymological connexion between the two words. I will not go into
1. Reproduced from A¿eory of Play and Fantasy [p. 184].
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any detail on Schechner’s argument thatmaya-lilamay revitalize the “rotten”
category of play, since I consider this to be tainted with a fanciful exoticism,
but he does have a point when he suggests that this concept may be a better
try than the Batesonian metaphor of the frame, which, for him, is “too sti,
too impermeable, too ‘on/o ’, ‘inside/outside’ ” [p. 41]. He suggests instead the
metaphor of the net: “a porous, exible gatherer; a three-dimensional, dynamic,
ow-through container”.
4.6 Simmel: Play and Sociability
If Goman’s attempt to understand play in the context of the “focused gathering”
is limited because it is too constrained, then there is some promise in Simmel’s
idea of a play as a form, that it might supply a more adequate and more general
conception of play, free from the contextual bindings of Goman’s frames and
“ecological huddles”. Itmay, indeed, provide the kind of “ow-through” container
that Schechner called for.
¿e theoretically interesting aspect of the frame concept is that at the same
time that it provides a good analytical tool for understanding a clearly demarc-
ated activity, it also raises diculties of the indeterminacy of boundaries: the
stimulation of parmenidean paradoxes, and the tendency of frames to “overow”.
Simmel’s sociology has an anity with this duplex, particularly his understand-
ing of the relationship between form and content, and most particularly in
relation to the concept of sociability. In this section, I discuss the Simmelian
notions ofWechselwirkung, usually translated as “interaction” or “reciprocal
eect”, the form-content distinction, and nally sociability.
4.6.1 Form and Content
¿e play form has a special place in Simmel’s sociology. ¿e clues to this are
that he uses sociability – “the play form of association” – as his example of
“pure” sociology in the Fundamental Problems of Sociology [202, p. 45], and
that it is in this chapter that he gives his most direct explanation of the form-
content relation. ¿ere are good reasons why sociability is so important for
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Simmel, reasons which I go into later in this section; to anticipate, it is clear
that the play form is of a piece with his general conception of form itself. It is
epistemologically congruent with his conception of pure form giving shape to
the contents of social life, in ways in which the other forms, the ones Levine
calls “institutional”, are not [139, p. xvii], and both play and form are marked by
what Vaihinger calls the “As-If ” [219].
To describe the play-form is to give an account of Simmel’s key distinction
between form and content. Typically, for such central concepts in the classical
social theorists, a denition is nowhere oered head-on, and its meaning must
be inferred from his usage. ¿e distinction between form and content is the
central idiom in Simmel’s sociology.1 An indication of what Simmel means by
these ideas may be found in Sociability, where Simmel notes:
Strictly speaking, neither hunger nor love, neither work nor religios-
ity, neither technology nor the functions and results of intelligence,
are social. ¿ey are factors in sociation only when they transform
the mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specic forms of
being with and for one another – forms that are subsumed under
the general concept of interaction. [202, p. 41]
Simmel is very close to a Kantian position here. Form is something given to
the materials of life, which are not accessible directly, it “acts as a ‘circumference’
within which a particular set of contents ‘merges into a unity’ ”[228, p. 33]. He
considers the possibilities and limitations of the Kantian question “how is nature
possible?” in his essay How is Society Possible? [204]. ¿e dierence that he
draws attention to is that it is not possible to nd in society2 anything equivalent
to Kant’s transcendental cognitive self. ¿e reason for this is that society is
independent of any of its individual observers, is itself a set of cognitive selves.
1. ¿ese kinds of central concepts in classical, and no doubt contemporary, sociology, tend
to be used everywhere and dened nowhere, or at best their denition is le tantalizingly
ambiguous. Consider, for example, how dicult it is to nd the exact meaning of society for
Durkheim, or to nd in Weber any denition of the elective anity. (Levine makes this point
in Sociology’s Quest for the Classics [141, p. 65]) ¿ese concepts are better described, perhaps, as
idioms; that is, as characteristic and particular uses of words as if they had a meaning dierent
from the usual.
2. Society, that is, conceived as something more than a mere aggregate of individuals.
116
In Kant’s view, Simmel points out, “the unity of nature emerges in the observing
subject exclusively; it is produced exclusively by him in the sense materials, and
on the basis of sense materials, which in themselves are heterogeneous” [p. 338].
Society, by contrast, “needs no observer”, because it is composed of “conscious
and synthesizing units”: it is a precondition of the social that it is already
cognitively congured by its members. ¿ere is, then, a fundamental dierence
between “my representation” of nature and my representation of society [p. 339].
While the question of what is involved in coming to know nature as a unity,
may be answered through the idea of a synthesizing act of the subject that
applies forms of cognition, sociology, for Simmel, is concerned with the “storey
above”1 Kant, where the preconditions for understanding at the level of the
individual are already in place.2
4.6.2 Interaction, Form, Content
Form and content are but relative concepts. ¿ey are categories of
knowledge used to master the phenomena, and to organize them
intellectually, so that the same thing which in any one relation
appears as a form, as though it were looked at from above, must
in another relation, where it is viewed ‘from below’, be labelled
content. [142, p. 1103]
¿e assertion that what is form in one context may be content in another is
troubling at rst sight. Indeed, it is something of a puzzle as to how this is
possible. Styles of analysis that emphasise form tend to take as unbreachable the
divide between formand content. One can see this for example, in the separation
of the signier and the signied and of langue and parole in structural linguistics,
and in Durkheim’s ontological separation of the social as an entity sui generis.
With Simmel, something more interesting and more dynamic is going on: form
and content are in a continual interplay, forms emerge from content and merge
back into it.
1. My coinage, following Simmel’s Philosophy of Money.
2. See Weingartner’s Experience and Culture: ¿e Philosophy of Georg Simmel [228, p. 28].
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How this happens needs some clarication. An important key to the question
of the apparentmutability of form and content can be found inKaern’s attempt to
read Simmel as a philosopher and sociologist of the As-If. ¿e critical aspect of
Simmel in this regard is his notion ofWechselwirkung, the subsumption of form
under the concept of interaction1, and the relational position that this involves.
Some writers on Simmel have called this key point in his sociology “relativism”.2
¿e choice of term may be misleading, since it connotes an anti-foundational
epistemology that, even if it is true of Simmel, is not really to the point. Perhaps
a better term is relationalism, since for Simmel, nothing may be thought of
in isolation, but must be considered as it stands in relation to other objects or
actors, whether that standing is ‘up close’ or ‘at a distance’. Whatever the term
used, what counts is that form is the means by which relations come about, it
“provides the structure which makes it possible for contents to be related” [228,
p. 33]. To place things in some kind of relation involves an invention; one might
even venture to say that it involves a kind of play. ¿ings must be taken to be
something they are not, otherwise they would be incommensurable isolated
objects. ¿us, “relations between objects are not part of reality, they are not
qualities of the object. However, we treat things as if they were related” [127,
p. 171]. Money as exchange is a good example of this, for money allows us
to treat two objects as if they were the same.3 ¿e distinction between form
and content is another example. In fact, this relation is arguably the central
expression of As-If in Simmel. Form, Simmel notes, is rich because “it can
absorb an innite number of contents”, and, reciprocally, content is rich because
“it can enter into an innite number of forms”.4¿is richness and innitude,
and the corresponding nitude that emerges when form and content meet,
is, in the parlance of Vaihinger, necessarily a ‘ction’, and not an ‘hypothesis’.
For Vaihinger, hypothesis is to ction as science is to philosophy; hypotheses
are “portrayals of reality” [219, p. 15], positivistic and probabilistic assertions
1. See the Simmel quotation on page 116.
2. See Kaern’s Understanding Georg Simmel, for example [127].
3. It also presupposes they are dierent, which is another story.
4. “Der Reichtum der Form ist, daß sie eine Unendlichkeit von Inhalten aufnehmen kann;
der Reichtum des Inhalts, daß er in eine Unendlichkeit von Formen eingehen kann. Wo beide
Unendlichkeiten sich treen, ensteht das endliche Gebilde.” [200, p. 3–4]
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about what the world may turn out to be; they are veriable (or falsiable), and
are designed to ‘tap into’ and exactly cover the causal phenomena to which
they refer. Fictions, on the other hand, are untruths about the nature of the
world, “instruments for nding our way about more easily in the world” [p. 15].
Examples of such ctions are Weberian ideal-types, economic concepts of
rational behaviour1, Rawls’s “original position”2, innitely divisible space in
the calculus, bayesian probability theory, and so on. Simmel’s forms are not
ctions in any archetypical sense; they are not, as Duncan correctly observes,
to be taken in the same spirit as the Goethean primal plants and animals [71,
p. 103].3 Nevertheless, the distinction between form and content is a kind of
ction: as Kaern points out, they are not “independently subsisting entities”,
and the separation of form and content is not a “distinction”:
¿ings become forms and contents because our mind treats them
as if they were in a form-content relation. An isolated thing cannot
be talked about in terms of the form-content relation because it
takes another entity to make the relation possible. [127, p. 174]
Kaern suggests that the form-content relation may be the same as the theory-
model relation in mathematical logic. A model is “an interpretation of a theory
that satises the axioms of the theory” [127, p. 173]. He suggests that part of
the usefulness of a theory is that it is capable of of generating a large number
of models. One might also call this the ‘richness’ of a theory, and by analogy
suggest that the richness of a form is related to the richness of contents which it
is capable of shaping. A corollary of the theory-model interpretation what could
be called the over-determination of contents: “the same content area may admit
of more than one theory”. ¿us, contents are simultaneously represented in an
indenitely large number of forms. From these points, it is possible to grasp
what Simmel means when he says that form may become content. Kaern uses
the example of probability theory. ¿e game of roulette is a model for theory of
1. See Rubinstein’sModeling Bounded Rationality [190, p. 10].
2. See Binmore’s Playing Fair [22, p. 13–14].
3. Goethe’s primal plant and animal may be read in a light that brings them closer to Simmel,
however (see, for example, Vaihinger’s interpretation).
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probability, it is the ‘content’ of the theory. But probability theory can not be
considered exactly as a thing which is form, because it in itself is a content of
mathematics. Weingartner makes a similar point using a mathematical analogy:
¿ere must be a content ‘wobbly obtuse triangle drawn with purple
chalk’, ‘drawn obtuse triangle’, ‘obtuse triangle’, ‘triangle’, ‘geometric
gure’, and ‘shape’. [228, p. 29]
4.6.3 Autonomization
¿ese two examples run the risk of misleading, in fact they may be well chosen
because they mislead. ¿e use of mathematics, and the suggestion that the
form-content relation is a relation of class and instance would seem to suggest
that an object’s essential nature may be traced back through its succeeding more
general super-classes until one arrives at a transcendental proposition: the
wobbly obtuse triangle drawn with purple chalk resolves into the very general
category of space. ¿is would represent the method Kant uses in the Critique
Of Pure Reason, and there are good grounds for concluding with Kaern that
Simmel, despite his clear debt to Kant, diers from him on this issue. Kaern’s
claim that Simmel is at odds with Kant [128, p. 76, 83] hangs essentially on
the open-endedness of mind and knowledge for Simmel, and therefore upon
the impossibility of arriving at a transcendental deduction of the social. If
social contents are structured by forms, and forms create the grounds for new
formings, then there is no way of arriving at any complete understanding,
for the aprioris are always mutable, always involved in a dialectic of forming
and unforming. Neither can forming be considered a strictly unidirectional
hierarchy of abstractions of content. But this is not to be taken as a suggestion
that forming is of necessity a capricious enterprise, an activity of the sort found
in stories by Borges, and perhaps in the framings of Goman. ¿ere is a ‘logic’
to the construction of forms: autonomization.
In¿e Philosophy of As If , Vaihinger makes much of the tendency for means
to become an end in themselves; indeed, he elevates this to the dignity of a law
of the “Preponderance of Means Over Ends”:
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It is a universal phenomenon of nature that means which serve
a purpose o en undergo a more complete development than is
necessary for the attainment of their purpose. In this case, the
means, according to the completeness of its self development can
emancipate itself wholly or partly and become established as an
end itself. [p. xlvi]
¿ere is in this statement a clear resonance with some of the aspects of
play discussed earlier in this chapter, and this resonance is still stronger when
Vaihinger refers to Nietzsche, who is, if anyone is, the philosopher of play:
[Nietzsche] holds that over against the world of ‘shi ing’, ‘evanes-
cent’, becoming, there is set up, in the interests of understanding
and of the aesthetic satisfaction of the ‘fantasy’ a world of ‘being’
in which everything appears ‘rounded o ’ and complete. [p. 342]
¿e philosophy of As If derives from this fantastic rounding-o, and it is no
less important for play, where the crucial characteristic is its ‘separateness’ from
everyday life, from work, and, indeed, from any productive process. Becker
notes the family resemblances between the ideas of the consequences, the het-
erogeny of ends, and unintended consequences of purposive social action [13,
p. 221], and in the autonomization of forms we nd in Simmel a similar organ-
izing principle. ¿e ‘crystallization’ of form is of a piece with this notion of
unintended consequences: forms have a tendency to take on a life of their own,
to become, so to speak, formal ctions of their contents. ¿is is demonstrated
most clearly in Simmel’s discussion of sociability, Simmel’s privileged example
of the workings of form.
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4.6.4 Sociability
Typically, Simmel starts his text Sociability1 with a dualism of ultimate values.2
¿e “old conict” [206, p. 127] of the nature of society is a conict over which
is prior: ontology or epistemology. On the one hand, society may be seen
as an objective entity that grants meaning to its actors. On the other hand,
society may be seen as a placeholding concept for the resources upon which
the actor may draw to make sense of the world. Typically again, this dualism is
only obliquely related to the pivotal duality around which the piece revolves:
that regardless of where one stands in the conict, one must recognize that
there is an enduring duality to society: individuals as bearers of structure, and
individuals as bundles of specic “interests” which “motivate [the] union” of
actors with each other [p. 127]. ¿e forms of social life, Simmel says, arise out
of the need to realize these contrasting pulls.
Sociability is a special form of this mediation, since, while it derives its
meaning from the need to realize impulses in association, it also contains
within it a margin that is not reducible to “special needs and interests”:
To be sure, it is for the sake of special needs and interests that
men unite in economic associations or blood fraternities, in cult
societies or robber bands. But above and beyond their special
content, all these associations are accompanied by a feeling for, by
a satisfaction in, the very fact that one is associated with others and
that the solitariness of the individual is resolved into togetherness,
a union with others. [206, p. 128]
Simmel derives this margin from an analogy with the impulse to play and to
create art. While play and art may serve some purpose, exogenous or otherwise,
1. Simmel published two texts on sociability, the text in Levine’s collection On Individuality
and Social Forms [140] is earlier (1910) than the one in the Wol collection¿e Sociology of
Georg Simmel [233] (1917). While the main bodies of the texts are substantially similar in what
they have to say, despite some moving around of the content, the Wol piece is more general,
as I have mentioned, since it uses sociability as an example of a formal sociology. I have used
both texts here, because sometimes the translation of a particular point seems better in the one
or the other.
2. A characteristic remarked upon by Frisby [89, p. 73].
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there is a residue to these activities that is an end in itself, a residue which is
general to all instances, “a common element, a likeness of psychological reaction
and need” [p. 128]. ¿ere may be methodological problems with this kind of
analogical argumentation; indeed, whether it is warranted or not depends
upon where one stands in relation to the original conict described by Simmel
at the beginning of the piece. Nevertheless, there is something persuasively
suggestive about this observation; it allows us an understanding of a facet
of social life that would otherwise would disappear under what Simmel calls
“rationalism” [p. 129]: either treated as trivial – “what does that prove?” – or
subsumed under some other purpose – “what function does that perform?”. A
functional account, for example, would ask how does sociability serve society,
a game-theoretical one would nd in it rational self interest masked as a game.
Sociability is the sole means by which association is fully realizable, Simmel
claims, because it is only through a form that has no end outside of itself that
the necessary conditions of reciprocity may be met:
Sociability creates, if one will, an ideal sociological world, for in
it – so say the enunciated principles – the pleasure of the individual
is always contingent upon the joy of others; here, by denition, no
one can have his satisfaction at the cost of contrary experiences
on the part of others. In other forms of association such lack of
reciprocity is excluded only by the ethical imperative which governs
them but not by their own immanent nature. [206, p. 132]
¿is quality of reciprocity has a democratizing function; sociability is “an ab-
straction of association. . . it demands the purest, the most transparent, most
engaging kind of interaction – that amongst equals” [p. 133].
It is interesting to compare this with another pure social form: bureaucracy.
In Fun in Games, Goman rather ungenerously criticizes “Simmel’s embarrass-
ing eort to treat sociability as a type of ‘mere’ play, sharply cut o from the
entanglements of serious life” [105, p. 21]. His counterexample is bureaucratic
organization, which is dominated by “rules of irrelevance” in much the same
way that play in focused gatherings is. ¿e centrality of rules in bureaucracy
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seems to provide it with an equivalent equalizing power, but Goman fails to
take into account the crucial reciprocal nature of Simmelian sociability, which
makes it a dierent form from bureaucracy. While it is true, as Goman asserts,
that “a crucial part of the conduct of business, government, and the law has
to do with the way in which an ocial handles clients or customers in direct
face-to-face dealings” [p. 21], what really counts in a bureaucracy is the imper-
sonality of its rules and the hierarchical structure of rules over employers and
clients. ¿ere is, in short, no immanent reciprocity in bureaucracy.1
¿is point may be developed further. While it makes no mention of Simmel,
Sennett’s discussion of the intrinsic democracy of play in¿e Fall of Public Man
carries similar ideas about play. For Sennett, there several vital aspects to play
which hang upon its disinterestedness. ¿e rst aspect recalls Mead’s work on
play: is in a vehicle for self-distancing and for coming to know generalized
others: the rules of games present themselves as objective entities in much
the same way as bureaucratic rules do. But, crucially, these rules are not gov-
erned by a means-end rationality. Citing research on children playing marbles,
where children demonstrate a preference for complexity, and a resistance to
simplication of the rules, Sennett suggests that the rules of the game are not in
any simple sense aimed at acquisition (winning as many marbles as possible),
but are about extending the play for as long as possible [197, p. 318]. Likewise,
Simmel, when discussing the purposive content of games, says that
Even when play turns about amoney prize, it is not the prize, which
indeed could be won inmany other ways, which is the specic point
of the play; but the attraction for the true sportsman lies in the
dynamics and in the chances of that sociologically signicant form
of activity itself. [206, p. 134]
¿e second aspect is the malleability of the rules, their manipulation to
control inequalities, and the way that this “take[s] the children away from direct
1. In Strategic Interaction, it has to be said, Goman does recognize the signicance of
the intrinsic reciprocity of play forms. Commenting on the anity shared between symbolic
interaction and the study of games, he notes; “nowhere more than in game analysis does one
see the actor as putting himself in the place of the other and seeing things, temporarily at least,
from his point of view.” [103, p. 136]. See also page 91, note 2 of this chapter.
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assertion of themselves, from immediate mastery” [p. 319]. In the game of
marbles, particularly ‘long distance marbles’, if there are children of dierent
ages, the older children will devise handicaps to even out what would otherwise
give them a decisive advantage. If they did not do so, the game could not
take place. Play of this sort, Sennett suggest, provides people with the social
equivalent of the musical “third ear”:
¿is is an ability to hear oneself so that in practising one does
not woodenly repeat the same patterns again and again; almost
to be hearing a performance by someone else. . .Childhood play
is a preparation for adult aesthetic work by developing the belief
in and the rst experience of, the “third ear”. Play rules are the
rst chance to objectify action, to put it at a distance and change it
qualitatively. [197, p. 321]
4.7 Play and the Lottery
¿e Lottery is an ideal vehicle for realizing the As-If in everyday life, for it
compels one to think in the subjunctive mode. One reason that it does so is the
length of the odds for the jackpot. While they might not know the probability
precisely1, most players have some sense of its magnitude. ¿e fascination that
its players have for the jackpot is well-known by market researchers: before it
was launched, it was determined that the size of the main prize was far more
interesting for future consumers than the number and size of small prizes or
the amount that went to charity.2¿is interviewee, for example
Carol W
interviewer: ¿ese people who are. . . the two you mentioned, they
almost don’t need to win. . .
1. For the main game it is 1 in 13,983,816. ¿e Euro Millions game has even longer odds: 1 in
76,275,360 for the top prize.
2. See Luck Had Nothing to Do with It: Launching the UK’s Largest Consumer Brand [133]
and¿e Dream Machine Launch of the UK National Lottery [121].
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Yeah. I don’t think. . . it’s not about need or deserve. . . I mean I think
the. . .Oh what did I read somewhere about the odds of winning
the lottery? ¿ey compared it to something, and it was something
about the odds. . . I can’t remember what it was now. . . It was some-
thing quite, you know, your chances of being so-and-so are more
likely. And something really obscure like you know your chances
of giving birth to live triplets or quadruplets is more likely than
winning. . . that sort of thing. So I think it is absolutely a lottery it is
down. . . I mean, to pure luck, you know.
has enough of a grasp of the odds that she really ought not to be playing it. ¿at
she does so is testimony either to the strength of her conviction in pure luck, or
to the fact that she gets something else out of playing. It turns out that, for her,
it is the latter:
Carol W
interviewer: So why do you play then, if the odds are so bad?
I don’t know. . . it. . . sort of makes me happy
interviewer: Do you think you might be lucky?
[laughs] Well they do say It Could Be You, don’t they. . .or is it
something else now?
interviewer: Maybe, Just Maybe
Yes. ¿at’s right.
interviewer: How does it make you happy then?
Well, you know, it just gets your happy hormones going. I’ll be
shopping, and buy a ticket and I think “Oh, that’s nice”. Or at work,
when we give the money for the syndicate, we always talk about it.
You know, let’s win the jackpot and chuck in our jobs.
interviewer: Do you enjoy your job? would you chuck it in?
Oh no. Of course not, we just like to talk about it, that’s all.
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We. . .none of us hates our job really.
interviewer: So why do you talk about giving it up.
Hmm. We just always talk about it. Don’t mean anything by it. It’s
just how we talk. You know, we talk about the Lottery, what was on
the telly last night, and how we hate our jobs. But we don’t really.
For her, and for many of the others I interviewed, the pleasure of playing the
Lottery is not directly related to the prospect of winning. It is something rather
closer to the “strips” of which Goman speaks: the Lottery is “keyed” into
material from the immediate context. Its facility to conjure up the prospect of
extraordinary change while reminding one of its practical impossibility supplies
it with a special anity with sociable, inconsequential, but meaningful chatter,
since it refers at the same time to the current moment and to some remarkable
counterfactual moment. ¿e fact that its concrete referents are so very concrete:
the shopping, the pound that one uses to buy a ticket (in contrast to the millions
that one might win), the workplace, and the home only adds to this facility. ¿e
Lottery, therefore, supplies a model for a dierent kind of playfulness; rather
like a sort of prosaic form ofmaya-lila, it is determined less by its boundedness
as an activity, and more by a suppleness that, rather than separating it out from
everyday life, allows it to co-exist with the time and space of everyday life.
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Chapter 5
Time, Narrative, and the
Lottery
Well, what is gambling, I should like to know, but the
art of producing in a second the changes that Destiny
ordinarily eects only in the course of many hours
or even many years, the art of collecting into a single
instant the emotions dispersed throughout the slow-
moving existence of ordinary men, the secret of living
a whole lifetime in a few minutes – in a word, the
genie’s ball of thread? Gambling is a hand-to-hand
encounter with Fate.
—Walter Benjamin, Arcades Project [15, p. 498]
Gambling, it would seem, has a special relation to time. Unlike ‘life’, in gambling
it is possible to short-circuit the usual unfoldings of narrative. Indeed, gambling
may be said to break with the logic of narrative itself, to substitute a series
of discrete and episodic fateful moments for the logic of accumulation and
deferral of rewards in the present that is so central to the spirit of rational
ascetic capitalism. In this chapter I explore the relation of gambling and time,
and the relation of gambling and ‘life’. Gambling has usually been conceived as
an elsewhere to everyday life. In one way or another, the moment of gambling is
seen as an unusual enclave of experience, one which is either a kind of escape or
a shadow to the everyday structure of experience. For its theorists, this is true of
all play, as I have shown in chapter 4, but there is some sense in which gambling
is especially powerful in generating “temporary worlds within the ordinary
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world”.1 Although there is an indication in all of the theorists discussed that
gambling may be part of a giving of form to everyday life, this is o en imagined
in a negative sense; gambling gives a chance to act out scenes which would
not be available in everyday life, gambling is supplementary and compensatory.
Some theorists have a more nessed understanding of the relation of gambling
(and play more generally) to everyday life, notably Simmel and Goman, but,
as I point out, they are limited by their focus on the contexts of play. ¿e
National Lottery makes this focus problematic, because of its special qualities,
and particularly its loose attachment to any context. Much of the issue of context
is to do with time and space, to do with the mise en jeu where and when the
action takes place.
5.1 Gambling, Luck and Fate
If gambling does erase the usual workings of narrative, if, that is, it does undo
the logical or at least coherent unfolding of events according to plot, and if
it is possible to imagine in gambling a distinctive style of being in the world,
then it would still be wrong to see gambling as the substitution of a chaotic
organizing principle for an ordered one. Gambling may be distinguished from
work because “it strenuously denies all acquired conditions, all antecedents
pointing to previous actions” [15, p. 512], but events under the sway of pure
chance are not consistently unpatterned, but inconsistently patterned. ¿e
‘logic’ which governs this disordered orderliness is regression to the mean; as
N increases, observed probabilities converge with expected ones. Tossing ten
coins might yield nine heads, but tossing ten million is extremely unlikely to
produce nine million. So unlikely that it is safe to say that this is impossible.
In Tom Stoppard’s play Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead [212], the
coin always comes up heads, and this device carries the sense of the boring
fatefulness of two minor characters waiting to speak their already-written lines.
¿is monotonous pre-destiny is dramatically interesting because it rubs up
against the more contingent and uncertain tragic destiny of Hamlet, in whose
1. See section 4.1.1.3.
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play, so to speak, the actors are waiting to act. A similar theme may be found in
Borges’¿e Lottery of Babylon [23]: in an administered world where all chance
has been excluded, the contingencies necessary for action (in theWeberian sense
of acts which must have an ‘otherwise’) are articially produced by a lottery in
which both good and bad ‘prizes’ are won. In this “dizzy land where the lottery
is the basis of reality” [p. 55], justice becomes arbitrary, a winner might just as
likely win a prison sentence as win a sum of money. As Barbara Goodwin shows
in Justice and the Lottery [108], justice may be produced through randomness,
for example by the use of lotteries for choosing organ transplantation recipients,
and by the use of some kind of sortition, perhaps even a hand of poker, for
resolving a tied Presidential election.
It is, therefore, possible to imagine a kind of narrativizing that makes use
of chance rather than emplotment. Such a narrative would have the shape of
a bell-curve, destiny would be the tendency towards the normal.1 But this
cognitive potential is oset by the peculiar psychological distortions that always
appear when people consider chance in their lives, and these are especially
strong when they are thinking about risk. ¿is psychological aura may even be
found amongst experts in probability, statisticians. ¿is is nicely illustrated by
the Moscow professor of statistics in the second world war, who would always
ignore the air-raids on the basis that the chances of his getting injured or killed
were tiny. He turned up at the shelter one night during a bombing, and on
being asked why, he replied that there were ve million people in Moscow and
one elephant in the zoo, and last night they got the elephant.2¿e two levels of
experience, the generalizing, overarching level of regression to the mean, and
the particularizing, stochastic moments of everyday life present themselves as
two orders sui generis and which have a problematical relation, both are part of
1. ¿ere is something of this sentiment in the idea of l’homme moyen, institutionalized
by Quetelet, and the mainstay of Durkheimian sociology (see Ian Hacking’s¿e Taming of
Chance [111], chapter 19).
2. An interesting counterexample to this story is the Lottery ticket buying habits of one
interviewee, who reported that she only bought tickets personally (outside of a syndicate) when
someone famous, or at least someone associated with a celebrity won a large amount of money:
“Usually when I had read something about, you know when William Hague’s auntie won, I
thought Pah if she can win it, anyone can, you know, it’s that sort of trigger. And if I happen to
be in Sainsbury’s at about ve o’clock on Saturday. . . ” [interview: Helen S].
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the same piece, yet both have their own logics.
¿e gambler’s fallacy – the belief that prior and entirely independent events
have some bearing on the next event – does not render invalid the idea of the
‘winning streak’. It is not, in a simple sense necessarily a denial of regression
to the mean. It could be taken for a recognition that patterns will emerge, and
that I, the gambler, am in a particularly protable pattern right now. ¿is is not
the whole story of course. Discussions of luck and fate with my interviewees
suggests that for many there is at most only the nicest of distinctions between
contingency and determinism:
Jayne M . . . like I say, I’m not a religious person, but. . . I suppose it’s
a type of faith isn’t it, that you sort of would like to think, well my
luck will come through one day.
I’m a great believer that if things are meant to happen they will; if
it’s meant to be, it will happen.
I believe people are. . .Well I suppose again it’s going back to people
have got destiny haven’t they and goals in life and, you know, OK,
you’ve got to work hard to achieve those goals, but at the same time
in the world today, you’ve got to take each day as it comes and if
you’re lucky enough to have things in life, then you’re meant to
have it aren’t you, if not, then it’s not going to happen. You know,
some people are not as lucky as I am.
In this fragment, the dierence between destiny and luck is not so clear. ¿ere
is destiny and and there are ‘goals in life’, but these are placed against what
happens ‘in the world today’. Taking each day as it comes is reminiscent of the
slogans of organizations such as Alcoholics Anonymous (and indeed Gamblers
Anonymous), and thus calls up the idea of the breaking of a pattern or habit by
the reduction of time to discrete units, the day.1 In chapter 4 play was found
1. With Gamblers Anonymous, this property suggests an ironic homology between the
source of addiction and its cure: gambling, as I have noted, breaks up time in precisely the
same way. In the case of the Lottery it is the scratchcards, the Instants, which have attracted the
most criticism because of their perceived addictive qualities (see chapters 1 and 2).
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to be dened by its special qualities of ‘separateness’ in one way or another. I
suggest that there may be found in this disjunctive moment between destiny
and ‘the world today’ another kind of ‘separateness’, and in 5.2 I show how
gambling is in a unique position to produce this separation.
But there is more going on in the quotation above. ¿e ancient Greeks had a
constellation of concepts with which to address questions of destiny, merit and
luck: tyche¯ (luck),moira (destiny), and kairos (the opportune moment) [169].
Here, the interviewee brings these dimensions into a complex relation. Luck
“comes through”, and “things” happen as they will, both unfold as they are
“meant to”. But the desire for luck is subjunctive, “I would like to think my
luck will come through”, while destiny is fateful in the indicative mood, “if it’s
meant to be, it will happen”. At rst sight, this relation resembles the Calvinist
spirit described by Max Weber. Here, however, luck does not seem to be so
expressive of good destiny; luck is not a ‘sign’ of the gi of grace. Although you
aremeant to be lucky if you are lucky, this is separate from having goals in life
and achieving them. ¿e separateness of luck and destiny is something to do
with the local-ness of luck against overarching destiny. ¿is is emphasised by
the objectivity of destiny – “it will happen”, “things” – which is contrasted with
the possessive phrase “my luck”. Luck is, in a sense ‘local destiny’. While luck
has its own circularity, its own conrmatory loops, it is also true that here is a
fateful envelope that enfolds it. ¿e more general story of one’s life bears some
relation to how much and what kind of luck comes through. ¿is interviewee
has a more complicated idea of the interrelation of the tyche¯,moira and kairos
than others do. For one, the director of a successful so ware company, it is
kairos that is dominant:
Norman S [55]
interviewer: What about more generally, not just to do with gambl-
ing, are some people luckier than others in their life? I mean, you
have quite a successful business. . . do you think that’s anything to do
with luck?
I think there’s always an element of. . . [pause]. . .Luck is not theword
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I’d want to use, I can’t think what the word is I would want to use,
but there’s an element of being in the right place at the right time; I
was working for another company. My now managing director, my
partner in the business joined the company I was working for and
between us we developed the rst version of the so ware that this
company now sells. So, I was in the right place at the right time to
do that, otherwise I’d still be working for the previous company,
well I wouldn’t, I’d be redundant by now because they shut the
company. But umm. . . is that luck? it’s not a word I would use.
[56]
interviewer: I’m trying to get to what word you would use.
Yeah, I’m trying to think what that word is. Umm [pause] [pause]
[57]
interviewer: Do you think that people make those sorts of circum-
stances, make their own luck?
No, I don’t think in the majority of cases they do, no. I think it
is. . . yeah, I nearly said it. . . there’s an element of luck. It is. . .oh
alright. . . it is an element of luck, whatever you do, I think, very
few people I’m sure set out to say “I am going to be a successful
entrepreneur” or whatever it may be. I think most people start
out working for a company, or working for whatever it may be,
and they happen to be at the right place at the right time, and idea
comes along that their employer fails to develop, or you know, they
learn their skills in that and they take those skills and apply their
own entrepreneurial skills on top of that to take that forward, and
I’m sure. . . I think it’s a matter of being in the right place at the right
time, so I suppose there is an element of luck in that.
¿e idea of “happening to be at the right place at the right time” is interesting
because it seems to be entirely passive, but is, of course, also an active idea also.
¿e strongest expression of this ‘active’ conception of luck that I found was this
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with one interviewee, who every day would visualize an empty car-parking
space just before she arrived at work:
Jill M I’ll be nearly there, and I just. . .picture that it is there as
clearly as I can. ¿en, when I get there, there’s always a space free.
interviewer: Always?
Perhaps not always. But when there isn’t a space, it’s because I don’t
want it enough. . .¿ere might be something else on my mind, that
makes me think too negatively about it.
interviewer: What sort of things?
Well, not winning the lottery, of course [laughs].
¿ere are strong moral aspects to these accounts: responsibility for producing
one’s own luck, for exploiting ‘external’ luck, and indeed responsibility for
one’s own fate. In my research these aspects are most strongly articulated in
discussions of charitable giving. For the purposes of this chapter, the key factors
are temporal and spatial: what is the relation of the long and the short durées,
of the time of “being in the world today” and the time of “things happening
as they will”? In a general sense, this is a question of the relation of large and
small, and of whether these have dierent logics. As Prospect theory shows,
assessment of risks and prospects involves layers of focality, with the force of
local circumstances overriding the longue durée of the Law of Large Numbers.1
In the Lottery, this relation is hard-wired: it is at the same time both ‘small’ and
‘large’, everyday and extraordinary, small change and jackpot. It is, therefore,
in a good position for its players to build practices around it that resonate
with more general issue of focus indicated by Prospect theory. It also bears,
perhaps, an anity with historical changes in the way that chance is understood
in contemporary society.
1. See Kahneman and Varey, Propensities and Counterfactuals: ¿e Loser ¿at Almost
Won [131], and Teigen, How Good is Good Luck?: ¿e Role of Counterfactual ¿inking in the
Perception of Lucky and Unlucky Events [215].
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5.2 Gambling, Time and Modernity
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many theorists found a
connexion between the spirit of gambling and the spirit of the times. Gambling
may not only oer an opposing experience of time, it may also be possible to
nd in it a kind experience distinctive of modernity. ¿at is not to say that
people gamble more enthusiastically now than they did in the past, but rather
that there seems to be a special anity of the spirit of gambling and the spirit
of modernity.
In the ¿e Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin devotes an entire chapter to
the subjects of prostitution and gambling.1 ¿e usual reason for bringing
these two together is as part of a list of moral problems: the usual suspects,
prostitution, gambling, drink and drugs. For Benjamin, this constellation has a
dierent intent. Gambling and prostitution are some of the purest expressions
of commodity fetishism, because they make a travesty of the fundamentals
of production and reproduction. ¿ey also hold within them, however, signs
of emancipatory potential.2 Gambling has a tremendous collapsing property,
while it is irrational and while it sits well within capitalism, it is also a gesture
of rejection of continuous time. ¿is is just what Benjamin is looking for:
Each age, Benjamin says, has a longing to “awaken”. . .Awakening,
for Benjamin, is amatter of breaking free from an administered con-
tinuity, and of recognizing that the momentary now is, in relation
to what comes before or a er, the only true reality. [186]
¿e Arcades Project is an exploration of modern urban experience. For Simmel,
the psychological basis of Metropolitan life is an “intensication of nervous
stimulation which results from the swi and uninterrupted change of outer
and inner stimuli” [201, p. 410]. ¿e blasé attitude, the parrying of shock by
selection, by the glossing over of stimuli that would risk over-stimulation, is
the natural attitude of urban life [201, p. 414].
1. Actually, a “convolute”. Benjamin’s unusual approach to writing, collaging his own work
with others, makes it dicult accurately to cite him. All citations here will be attributed to
Benjamin, even if they come from somewhere else in the last instance.
2. Perhaps this is not despite, but because of the purity of their ideological veiling.
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For Franco Moretti, inHomo Palpitans: Balzac’s Novels and Urban Personal-
ity, the metropolis “calls for a change in the perception not so much of space as
of the ow of time” [164, p. 109]. Furthermore, he claims that there is a special
anity between this and a “new rhetoric of temporality” which is found not
in poetry as one might expect, but in the suspense plots of novels. All places
where people live are susceptible to and have an anity with description and
classication, in as much as value and meaning is encoded or “crystallized” in
their objects, their buildings and streets. ¿e city has its own distinctive quality,
however:
. . . its spatial structure (basically its concentration) is functional to
the intensication ofmobility: spatial mobility, naturally enough,
but mainly social mobility.. . . [¿e] city as a physical place – and
therefore as a support to descriptions and classications – becomes
the mere backdrop to the city as a network of developing social
relationships – and hence as a prop to narrative temporality. [164,
p. 112–113]
Space moves from place, from a mise-en-scène, to a temporal vector. Moretti
claims that the literary response to this change marks a signicant rhetorical
shi :
Whereas the great aspiration of mythic narration exacts the meta-
morphosis of time into space, the urban novel turns the axiom
on its head and seeks to resolve the spatial in terms of the sequen-
tial. [164, p. 112]
¿is observation is of a piece with discussions that emerged from Roman
Jakobson’s classic essay Two Aspects of language and Two Types of Aphasia [124],
in which language is found to operate in two planes, substitution (paradigmatic,
metaphoric) and combination (syntagmatic, metonymic). Poetry projects sub-
stitution onto combination, since it unfolds the paradigmatic syntagmatically.
Interestingly, this discussion led many to diagnose modernist writing as dis-
tinctively metaphoric, while Moretti seems here to be saying the opposite.
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Narration relies upon the “unheard-of ” [p. 114], the introduction of novelties.
¿e unheard-of of the plot was for a long time brought about by transgression –
themoral unheard-of – and depended, therefore, upon the extraordinary, the
unusual and the freakish. ¿e freak is a product of classication, and the uidity
of the city means, for Moretti, that it is now possible to construct narratives
without freaks:1
What engages the reader is no longer the ‘state of exception’ of
the symbolic system. . . and, thereby, of represented life, but the un-
predictability harboured in ordinary administration and ‘everyday
life’. [164, p. 115]2
Shock ismore at homewithmechanical than organic solidarity; it is a suspension
“between unswerving habit and sudden catastrophe” [p. 117]. In the Lottery, it
is the bringing together of the mundane and routinized buying of the tickets
every week, with the somewhat ambivalent prospect of winning the jackpot.
¿is ambivalence comes across time and again in the interview data: big wins
are imagined as exciting, but also as a threat. For some, it is a threat to identity:
winning the jackpot would throw into confusion all careers and projects that
one might hold [interview: Jill M]. For others, it is one’s sense of community
that is endangered. One couple, for example, said that it would be impossible
to carry on living on their housing estate where they had lived for forty years:
Betty andDouglasKDouglas: You couldn’t stay here. . . Imean. . . everyone
would know. Even if you tried to stay the same. When I went down
the pub everyonewould know. You’d have tomove to CanfordClis
[a well-to-do area of Bournemouth] or somewhere, and when you
were there, who’d want to know you?
¿ese responses represent one plane of lottery play, the other bears more anity
with Moretti’s modern form of narrativizing. ¿e idea of the “shocks and
collisions” of urban life as described by Benjamin and Simmel is perhaps too
1. One might add that it is possible to construct social sciences without freaks too: anthro-
pologies of home rather than elsewhere, sociologies of the everyday.
2. Emphasis in original.
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rigid, too tightly bound around the poles of the usual and the freakish. Moretti
calls for a more elastic conception:
City life mitigates extremes and extends the range of intermediate
possibilities: it arms itself against catastrophe by adopting ever
more pliant and provisional attitudes. [164, p. 117]
¿e malleability of urban life is indicated, ironically perhaps, by the domin-
ance of the principle of the money economy. Simmel notes that the complexities
of bringing together an aggregation of so many heterogenous people with so
many dierentiated interests calls for the strongest application of “the pecuniary
principle”:
Here the multiplicity and concentration of economic exchange
gives an importance to the means of exchange which the scantiness
of rural commerce would not have allowed. Money economy and
the dominance of the intellect are intrinsically connected. ¿ey
share a matter of fact attitude in dealing with men and things. [201,
p. 411]
Money is blasé. It reduces the shocks of the use-value, the sensuous particularity
of things, to their exchange value. It is only interested in “what is common
to all”. ¿e tension between this universalizing and abstracting force and the
irreducible specicities of urban, and indeed modern life, makes for a new
combinatory potential:
¿e isolated and unrepeatable event – Baudelaire’s apparitions that
break the ow of time – lose their pre-eminence which is, instead,
taken over by those events which, while in themselves repeatable
and predictable, by combining together always end up breeding
something unusual. [164, 117]
With the increased number of variables, there is an increase in the possibility
of surprises. ¿is correlation is not linear, and is perhaps not even merely
exponential: as complexity theory shows, beyond a certain tipping-point the
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combinatory potential of variables brings about a dierent order of entities.1
Citing Balzac, Moretti claims that the modern mode of narration has moved
away from the uni-directional and fateful template of tragedy. While tragic irony
hangs upon suspense, upon waiting for the moments of reversal and revelation
of destiny (peripeteia and anagnorisis), with Balzac and his contemporaries, the
suspenses and surprises are serial and provisional:
In Balzac. . . the novel brings about a conclusion through a continu-
ous and highly unpredictable series of ups and downs. In this way,
suspense and surprise encourage city dwellers to believe that only
rarely is ‘everything lost’. Even in the middle of catastrophe they are
induced to perceive, and hence rejoice in, all surviving potentiality.
¿ere is no need to illustrate how pleasant this sensation is. [164,
118]
Of a piece with this rhetorical shi is the novel’s handling of time. In tragedy,
time is diacritical, only has meaning relationally within the temporal scheme of
the drama. It is closer to the time of a game of chess, where time is measured
fundamentally not in minutes and seconds, but in the number of moves. It does
not matter, Moretti notes, when Burnam wood comes, only that it does at the
right point in the drama. In Balzac, it matters: “it makes an enormous dierence
that a certain promissory note expires today and not next week”. ¿us, the main
aim of suspense is to foreground time passing: “time always appears as either
too fast or too slow: in both cases, however, timemoves, and forces us to come
to terms with this fact”. Put dierently, where before history and plot, time and
its representation, are separate with the one signifying the other, now the two
are entangled.
¿e city is an abrasive space, where dierent types rub up against each other.
Before, in feudal times, the close proximity of “luxury and penury” was express-
ive of the “immutability of social relationships”. In modernity, the abrasion is
brought about by mobility: “spatial contiguity is accepted because it is automat-
ically ‘translated’ into and legitimated by, a chronological contiguity, the idea
1. See Ian Stewart’s Does God Play Dice? ¿e New Mathematics of Chaos [211].
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of an unexpected and sudden reversal of fate” [164, p. 120]. Moretti contends
that these kinds of reversals are dierent from previously. Where they dier
is in the emphasis on resurgence, on the possibility of reversing the reverse,
of re-doubling, one might say in the parlance of betting. ¿is, he claims, has
nothing to do with shock, or if it does, it is with the kind of shock that is merely
an “Augenblick” – a moment that happens in the blink of an eye – since a kind
of recovery is always possible.
It is here that the spirits of gambling and of urban life converge, along with
the temporal characteristics of both. In the narratives of Balzac, Moretti notes,
gambling is o en a response in compensation for some other disaster [p. 121]. It
is roulette that exemplies this best of all. Roulette is a game of almost pure alea;
if there is a competitive aspect to it, it is far closer to paidia than ludus. Like
kite-ying, there is a kind of engagement with natural laws, but this struggle is
impersonal, “red wins because it has ‘beaten’ black”. If the players do engage
with each other, this is always mediated by the croupier, and more importantly
by the complex combinatoire of possibilities of alliances and enmities:
For instance, whoever plays red is implicitly the enemy of all those
who have played black and, conversely, the ally of all those who
have played single red numbers. . .¿us an extremely complicated
parallelogram of forces emerges, a combination of ‘friends’ and
‘enemies’ and ‘accomplices’ graded into a thousand nuances. ¿ere
is even a sort of universal brotherhood. . . against zero. [164, p. 122]
In Moretti’s account, destiny is associated with a uni-directional linear plot,
whose ‘moments’ are, in the pure forms of such narratives (tragedies), produced
through shock. ¿e other kind of narrative, the modern one which produces a
more pliable kind of a story with ups and downs, prospects and reverses, has
anities with the modern urban experience and with certain kinds of gambling.
It is also possible to nd in this form some similarity with the idea of luck in
the interview fragment discussed in section 5.1 (page 131). ¿ere too, luck is a
more uid and more everyday experience than destiny. Luck is a matter of days,
“taking each day as it comes”, while destiny operates on the scale of a lifetime.
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¿ere is some association between the qualities of the Lottery and this kind of
separation: some of its aspects, thinking about winning the jackpot for example,
are more ‘storied’ in the classical sense that they involve the invocation of a
freakishly improbable, and perhaps therefore impossible, event. ¿e counter-
story to this would be that there is some aspect of the lottery that corresponds
more closely to the kind of narrative experience described by Moretti. ¿ere is
some indication of this in the casual “shock-free” ways in which people play
the Lottery. Almost all aspects of the the lottery are displaced into other more
mundane activities. Players buy their tickets with the weekly shop, or when they
pick up a newspaper. With recent innovations such as direct-debit arrangements
and text-message notication of any winnings, it is even possible to play without
it touching one’s life at all. Many of the interviewees also declared a sort of
indierence about checking the numbers:
Karen B And before now I’ve actually, I always, well usually ring
my dad on a regular on a regular basis, and on a Sunday sometimes
if I’ve rung him and I haven’t even bothered even to tape it I just
say, Oh what were the lottery numbers?
interviewer: So sometimes you don’t bother to. . .
No.
interviewer: . . . and you might check them not on Saturday. . .
Not until maybe. . . and sometimes I’ve actually got them run them
through the machine on a Monday, because they can check your
tickets on a Monday see if you’ve got a winner amongst them.
interviewer: ¿at seems very peculiar to me, because that means,
say, especially if you check them on Monday, then you’ve le two
days time. . .
. . .Before I go and check it.
interviewer: And you could have won.
Yeah, I could. . . I mean I’ve very o en sat in the garden and said,
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doing this garden, and said, Oh you know, I could getting a gardener
in now, I might have won a million. [laughs]
¿is sort of casualness, and the almost deliberate ‘time-shi ing’ of checking the
numbers appears very frequently in the interview data. ¿e chief characteristic,
perhaps, of gambling is its generation of a series of tiny moments:
Over and above the specic nature of time in each game played can
be discerned a general experience of time; a set of characteristics
that come to light through the frequent playing of many games.
¿is perception of time, common to all gamblers in all games, is of
a constant repetition of a eeting present. [181, p. 140]1
¿e Lottery, on the other hand, seems to allow a dierent experience of time
that is more related to the everyday routines of life, and a kind of story-time that,
while it has a freedom from “shocks” that Moretti characterizes as distinctly
modern, is only connected to the classical form of narrativizing through the
players’ imaginations. ¿is capability endows it with the capacity to act as a
bridge between the two forms of story-telling.
It also gives playing the Lottery some resonance with those problems of
narrative that Richard Sennett diagnoses as distinctive of post-Fordism in his
book ¿e Corrosion of Character: ¿e Personal Consequences of Work in the
New Capitalism [198]. ¿e decline of careers and the rise of exible labour
bring about, he argues, a disruption of the principal narrative by which one
denes one’s life. In place of a realist-novel like trajectory of appointment,
promotion and retirement, all within a single career, workers are faced with
the demands of exibility, and the prospect that they may need to change their
work, that their work has become a series of discrete jobs. ¿is leads, he argues,
to the sort of narrativizing – or, more precisely, chronicling – whose organizing
principle I characterized earlier as regression to the mean. ¿is causes problems
for workers in the post-Fordist era. Rose, one of the informants in his research,
says: “you’re always starting over, you have to prove yourself every day”. ¿is,
Sennett goes on to say, can
1. Emphasis in original.
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. . . eat away at your sense of character. ¿ere is no narrative which
can overcome regression to the mean, you are always “starting
over”. [198, p. 84]
For Rose, the symptoms of this “corrosion” of narrative and character are not
some kind of depression, but a lower-level anxiety, a “dull, continual worry”.
And it is not only one’s character that is aected. Another of his informants,
Rico, suers from the absence of a “long term” in its eects on his family and
community:
[Rico’s] deepest worry is that he cannot oer the substance of his
work life as an example to his children of how they should conduct
themselves ethically. ¿equalities of goodwork are not the qualities
of good character. [198, p. 21]
¿is highly personalized form of the risk society thesis is, in my view, more
satisfying and, indeed, interesting than Ulrich Beck’s in Risk Society: Towards a
NewModernity [11]. For it is not derived, as Beck’s seems to be, from amisplaced
critique of scientic reason in the tradition of the Frankfurt School’s critique of
positivism.1 But it does suer from a similar drawback, which does not seem to
have been observed elsewhere. Namely, that a part of what Gigerenzer, in¿e
Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life calls the
“probabilistic revolution” is the appearance of a probabilistic ‘style of reasoning’2
that is not burdened with a sense of loss of certainty because of the unavailability
or intractably great volume of information.3 For reasons indicated above, the
lotterymentality has strong anities with this style of reasoning, and notmerely
as a source of escape from the pressures of a chance-dominated life. In the
next chapter of this thesis I develop my account of these anities in relation
charitable giving.
1. Dingwall advances this criticism of Beck convincingly in ‘Risk Society’: ¿e Cult of ¿eory
and the Millenium? [64].
2. A notion from Iain Hacking [112].
3. ¿is idea is the basis of some work that I have done on intelligence-gathering for terrorism:
Betting on Terrorism: Decision Markets and Total Information Awareness [171].
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Chapter 6
The Lottery and Charity
I am using the story of betting at a racetrack because
it is traditional to make the necessary distinction
[between objective and subjective probability] by con-
trasting a roulette wheel with a horse race. But one
could equally well discuss the director of a major char-
ity trying to guess which of several potential famines
is likely to prove most devastating.
—Kenneth Binmore, Playing Fair [22, p. 265, n. 9]
It is remarkable how o en the phrase ‘winners and losers’ appears in discus-
sions of gambling. Within the cost-benet scheme implied by this expression,
‘winning’ tends to refer primarily to the economic gains from gambling revenue,
taxation, and economic development, while ‘losing’ refers broadly to something
usually construed as the social costs of gambling for its players. ¿is lends a
particular disposition to the analysis of gambling: to look to general large-scale
economic considerations along the axis of gain, and to particular eects upon
the individual – economic, psychological, and moral – along the axis of loss.
¿e Rothschild Commission’s analysis bears something of this structure even
while it concludes that a national lottery would be desirable. It recommends a
national lottery because lotteries are, in its view, by nature and when compared
with other forms of gambling largely “harmless” in terms of their possible social
evils. Furthermore, it believes that it is possible to establish an institutional
buer that protects the lottery’s charitable intentions from both the residual
problems that inhere in all gambling – the dangers of gambling to the individual,
the possibility of fraud and of the involvement of organized crime – and the
144
tendency for governments to act for political expediency rather than economic
prudence or philanthropic good will. ¿e lottery, it noted, could take on the
rôle of the philanthroper, a character whose heyday was long gone.
¿is philanthropic tradition carries an obvious tension between the prot-
seeking purpose of a business and the sense of obligation of an individual
to contribute something to society. Prochaska has suggested that the degree
to which actors take on this strain is an indication of the strength of civil
society [179], and also that it is a source of civic virtue [180].
Prochaska notes that there has been a subtle change in the style of philan-
thropy over the course of this century:
Today’s philanthropists. . . reveal attitudes long customary. ¿ey
have shed the narrow religious doctrine and the language of social
hierarchy o en associated with the nineteenth century, but they
are direct descendants of their Victorian forebears in their indi-
vidualism, with its emphasis on self-help, their moral sensibility,
and social activism, their belief in progress, and the localism which
makes them chary of centralised authority.¿ey are the successors
of Mill in their political economy, of Wilberforce in their crusading
zeal. [179, p. 86] (my emphasis)
¿is change shadows the secularizing of moral opposition to lotteries that I
discussed in chapter 2. As well as the similarity of the narrative, the sense of
privatization and particularism is very close to the local concerns of lottery
funding: rather than the money being absorbed into the national exchequer,
the principle of additionality and the practice of hypothecation opens up spaces
set apart from the everyday life, so to speak, of the treasury, as play does in
the routinized world for Goman. In a parallel sense, this has been the role
of philanthropy also. One of my interviewees made this connexion explicit in
a discussion of where he would like to see the money raised from the Lottery
spent:
Norman S Yeah generally. Yeah, generally. Now [laughs] now
there. . . see I’m applying splurge money on a national scale. See,
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I’m delighted to see money going into what many people have said
is wasteful money. I am not a fan of the opera, I’ve never seen an
opera in my life, I’ve never been to a ballet in my life, I’ve no desire
to go to either, but I’m delighted to see money going into those sort
of things which I regard as a national institutions shall we say. I am
very resentful of lottery money being ltered o under whatever
guise you want to put it under, being ltered o into the national
health service or ltered o into education, or ltered o into any
of those places. For me, the lottery is splurge money on a national
scale. And if it goes to build a memorial hall, that’s great.
“Splurge money” was initially his expression for the £6,000 that he won as part
of a syndicate.1
In their very strongly polemical textMaking a Lottery of Good Causes: the
National Lottery and the Politicisation of Charity [53], Cummins and Whelan
develop this point into an argument that charity has been a force in the opening
up of the public sphere. Philanthropy is an “expression of the moral sense of a
free people and a vital part of civil society” [p.12]. ¿eWelfare state is a threat
to this healthy open space since it introduces politically motivated agendas into
the distribution of funding. More damagingly, they claim, the bureaucratization
of the erstwhile philanthropic domain, whether it is by way of the Welfare State
or the growth of large charitable institutions, has reduced the immediacy of
philanthropy, has replaced face-to-face care with the impersonal. No longer
can care be given and received, to use the expression that Goman applied to
the focused gathering, in ‘the same breath of experience’. ¿ere is, then, a kind
of homology between the kind of space-making that gambling enables and that
of philanthropy.
¿e contemporary form of philanthropy is, perhaps, corporate social respons-
ibility; in this incarnation, the donors become generalized to organizations and
institutions, and the beneciaries to specied ’stakeholders’. Corporate social
responsibility has enhanced the ambivalence of the economic actor’s acting for
1. Discussed earlier in chapter 3, on page 3.2.
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the public good.1¿e tension between the economic ethic of a business – max-
imization of return for shareholders – and the ethic of beneting society as a
whole has, in sharpening the contrasting pulls of these two ethics, generated an
ambiguous third term into the ethical nexus: stakeholdership. For individuals
as economic actors, rather than business organizations as economic actors, it
would seem that the problem of charitable giving – understood as correspond-
ing to philanthropy for the business – is less sharp, for the value of economic
eciency is not explicitly upheld by law, but merely by values.
Devereux explained gambling in terms of its ability to release the strain
between the two imperatives of prudence and risk-taking. We might also seek
to nd in charitable giving a similar “safety-valve” that frees the actor from the
tension between charitable giving and economic gain. ¿e association between
gambling and charitable giving brought about by the National Lottery suggests
that it might be possible to nd in it some kind of an anity2 between the two,
and one that allows the release aorded to be all the more eective because it
yokes together, in a deeper sense than merely receiving “permission”3, a happy
sense of satisfaction through charitable giving with relief from the value strains
of capitalism.
At rst glance, it would seem, however, that there is nothing more dissimilar
to gambling than charitable giving, the one founded upon acquisitiveness or
compulsiveness, the other upon altruism or duty. If one follows a path of
generality to their most fundamental forms – luck for gambling and ethics for
charitable giving – so does the conceptual distance between the two appear
to increase. It is prima facie an absurdity that one’s moral status is subject to
luck [210, p. 1], for morality must, if it is to be meaningfully moral, involve
the contingency of agency and not the contingency of chance. To paraphrase
Goman’s formulation, one might say that wherever charity is to be found,
1. See, for example, ¿e Ethics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Philanthropic Ven-
tures [237] and¿e Development of Corporate Charitable Contributions in the UK: A Stakeholder
Analysis [24].
2. In his book on the history of the introduction of theUKNational Lottery, AndrewDouglas
uses the word “synergy” for this relation [67, p. 97–98].
3. See the National Audit Oces report on its evaluation of tenders for the Lottery [154],
and also marketing literature [49] for uses of this expression.
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there is sure to be action.1 Indeed, one of my interviewees spoke felicitously of
charitable acts – in this case donations to amilk bank for premature children – as
supplying “a pleasing and surprising sense of agency” [interview: Siobhán O].
One might even propose the charitable act as a kind of ‘adventure’: while
gambling seems more readily susceptible to this interpretation, charitable can,
itself, be a eeting moment that provides a “warm glow” [167, p. 12] from the
sense of having the utility of others in one’s own utility function” [167, p. 1].
Where one interviewee described playing the Lottery as “getting your happy
hormones going” [interview: Carol W], another spoke of a similar pleasure he
derived from giving money to people on the streets:
Roy J You see people. . . all the time, asking for money on the streets.
Usually I’ll just walk past. ¿ere’s only so much you can. . . I mean
you see so many each day.
interviewer: Are you talking about people begging, or people asking
for money for charity?
[laughs] Well, both really.
interviewer: Do you ever give some money?
Well, sometimes. If I’m feeling. . . I don’t know. . . Sometimes it just
makes me feel good. I’ll give someone a few coins. . .
interviewer: When do you do this?
I suppose it’s either when I am feeling down myself, or when I am
feeling happy and I think, well I’ll make that person happy too. It’s
just a passing thing. [laughs] It’s like a scratchcard I suppose, you
know.
interviewer: And who do you give most to, charity collectors or
people begging?
¿e beggars really. I mean. . . they’re the ones that you’re going to
help most, aren’t they. So you sort of get more out of it as well. As
1. Mentioned on page 107 of this thesis.
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I say, though, it’s only a passing thing. I’ll not. . . it won’t make me
feel good for more than. . .Oh. . . a few minutes.
¿e Lottery is, then, a curious amalgam of dierent aspects whose ingredi-
ents never quite merge into a single substance: charitable aspects, business
aspects, a taxation aspect, and an entertainment aspect. According to the Roth-
schild Commission, the charitable aspect was the sole rationale for the lottery’s
existence. It was, indeed, intended to re-introduce the spirit of philanthropy
remoulded for a society where “there will be no new Nueld Foundations”.1
But those concerns played no part in determining who would run the Lottery
or how it would be run. ¿e choice of a prot-making organization – Camelot –
over Richard Branson’s not-for-prot bid, a choice made not once but twice,
has been one of the most controversial aspects of the National Lottery, and one
which was the principal concern of my interviewees when asked about charity
and the Lottery. ¿e National Audit’s decision was made exclusively on the
grounds of how much money would be raised for charity; questions of how
much the business itself wouldmakewere not considered relevant [154]. Richard
Branson’s bid was judged to be likely to have lower returns than Camelot’s
because it proposed a not-for-prot business model. As it turned out, Camelot
made so much money, and ran into so much adverse publicity about its ‘fat
cat’ directors, that it eventually set up its own charitable body: the Camelot
Foundation.2
6.1 The Spirits of Gambling and Charity
¿ere are some interesting conuences of the gambling ethos and the charit-
able ethos both in history and in the interviews for this thesis. ¿e eighteenth
century may have been an age of speculative projects, but it was also the period
when the dispensation of charity through collective organizations became insti-
tutionalized, to some degree alongside individual charitable acts, and to some
1. See page 57 of this thesis.
2. It is also involved in other fund-raising bodies, amongst which are ¿e Childline Founda-
tion and GamCare (problem gambling support) [33].
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degree in place of them. Owen, in his English Philanthropy 1660–1960, nds in
this time a change in the outlook of middle and upper class society. ¿e com-
bined advances of the economy and territory of the UK, and of philosophical
and scientic enquiry fostered a spirit of pragmatic compromise and tolerance
from which was derived a new charitable sensibility:
Whatever uneasiness eighteenth-century Englishmen may have
felt as they contemplated their society, thoughtful critics among
them could discover at least one conspicuous merit. ¿eir age, they
liked to point out, was exhibiting a new sensitivenss to human need
and was developing fresh instruments for dealing with it. ‘Charity’,
observed Henry Fielding ‘is the very characteristic virtue at this
time’. [172, p. 11]
¿e growth of individual charitable was deeply-rooted in the emergence of
the Protestant ethic, with its emphasis on an ethos of individual this-worldly
conduct and diligent prudence, and its resistance to Catholic forms of charity:
One of [Protestantism’s] most formidable aspects was the earn-
est denunciation and repudiation of the whole Catholic apparatus
of alms, of social inaction dominated by clerical policy, and of a
generally conservative attitude towards broad areas of social re-
sponsibility. [126, p. 151]
By the eighteenth century, however, charity had become modulated into a more
generalized notion of the progressive improvement of society as a whole. ¿is
route would eventually lead to a return to puritanism in the nineteenth century,
but this time with an emphasis on the moral state of the recipient rather than
of the donor [179, p. 42]. In the eighteenth century, however, the charitable
impulse was characterized by a sense of benevolence and humanitarianism that,
Owen suggests, was itself a kind of escapism:
. . . an escape from some of the unpleasant realities of the eighteenth-
century world – its poverty, insecurity, and suering. ¿e practice
of benevolence assured one of the surpassingly agreeable sensations,
‘the most lasting, valuable and exquisite Pleasure’. [172, p. 13]
150
At the same time that the instabilities of the economy and the possibility of
suering devastating nancial reverses were evoking a benevolence, perhaps
compensatory and empathetic, towards the suering of others, they were also
providing a model for its remedy. For, as Owen shows, an important factor in
realizing this new charitable ethos was, remarkably enough, the lessons learnt
from the growth of nancial speculation from the late-seventeenth-century
joint-stock boom to the period of the South Sea Bubble:
If commercial activity could be nanced by drawing small amounts
from numbers of individuals, perhaps a similar plan could be use-
fully employed in good works. [172, p. 12]
¿ere appears to be no evidence to establish a similar connexion with the lotter-
ies of the time, but their entanglement with other kinds of nancial speculation
at the time, and their popularity with the State for raising large amounts of
money in good time, is suggestive of a such a link.
In her work on life insurance Viviana Zelizer argues that the expansion of
nancial exchange led to the substitution of markets for morals.
[¿is change removed] a powerful normative pattern: the division
between the marketable and the nonmarketable, or the sacred and
the profane. [239, p. 43]
I have already discussed in chapter 3 the connexions between this change and
changes in moral attitudes towards lotteries .1 I have also discussed the 1774
Life Assurance Act in chapter 22, which established the distinction between
legitimate insurance of lives. ¿is second discussion suggests something of a
criticism of the view expressed in the quotation from Zelizer above. ¿e legal
specication of what counted as a legitimate insurance contract was motivated
by those freakish policies that are exemplied by the Chevalier D’Éon case.
It was, that is, a move to ensure the dignity of the contract, a reminder of
Durkheim’s observation in¿e Division of Labour in Society that contracts are
not reducible to the paper upon which they are written:
1. Page 67, note 1.
2. Section 2.3 on page 39.
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Everything in the contract is not contractual. . .Wherever a contract
exists, it is submitted to regulation which is the work of society and
not that of individuals. [72, p. 211]
¿ere is another face to this moral dimension in the 1774 Life Assurance Act:
what made a policy legitimate rather than “a mischievous kind of gaming” was
that the policy-holder had to have an interest in the event against which the
policy-holder was taking insurance: the holder should stand to lose, nancially
or otherwise, if the event were to happen. In this respect, the Act was referring
back to the principle of the aleatory contract, while cleansing life-insurance of
the taint of gambling.
Today’s National Lottery has posed similar questions in the mind of at least
one of my interviewees:
Peter J
interviewer: Right, so what are your feelings about, do you think
more should go to charity?
Yes, I do. I would have preferred to have seen the Richard Branson
no-prot style of lottery. . .Patently, even Branson was going to have
to make something out of it because I don’t believe anybody does
anything for nothing very much, but there’s a world of dierence
between that and, as I’ve said earlier this almost obscene level of
prot being made out of a business that just couldn’t fail. ¿ere
was no risk element in setting up a lottery, there is no risk in that.
¿is view concerns the institution of the Lottery rather than its players, but
there is something of this attitude that comes across in other areas of Lottery
play.
6.2 Luck, Moral and Otherwise
May one’s moral standing be subject to luck? ¿is question reprises the apparent
contradiction inhering in the notion of charitable gambling. And it is no
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accident that these two problematic couplets, charity and gambling on the one
hand and morality and luck on the other, evoke similar phenomenological
trajectories: at a rst glance they seem at best contradictory, 1 at a second glance
they reveal some interesting anities, and on the third they open out into some
very deep and interesting challenges to conceptions of morality.
¿e conjunction of morality and luck seems wrong because the separation
of the two seems natural. In philosophy, there is a long-standing view of mor-
ality that sees virtue as something that either grants immunity from luck or
something that is characterized by such an immunity. ¿is view, exemplied by
Kant, holds that “the disposition to correct moral judgement, and the objects
of such judgement, are. . . free from external contingency, for both are, in their
related ways, the product of the unconditioned will.” [231, p. 20]. ¿is belief
in the immunity of morality to luck is attractive because it “has an ultimate
form of justice at its heart. . . it oers an inducement, a solace to a sense of the
world’s unfairness” [231, p. 21]. Immunity to luck allows a moral environment
of equality, in much the same way that, as I discussed in chapter 4, immunity to
consequence allows play to oer the promise of equality: “If morality is immune
to luck then the option of being moral is open to everybody everywhere and
furthermore, it is open to everybody equally” [210, p. 2]. Immunity to luck also
sits well with questions of just desert: a just justice would not judge people on
the basis of a ‘natural lottery’ of factors that are beyond their control.
But immunity from luck proves to be a problematic ground upon which to
build a moral philosophy: luck is a “curious and treacherous concept” [120,
p. 79], not least because one’s individual capacity to make judgements free from
contingency is a matter of luck itself. Luck-free morality is an attractive notion,
but it is also bound, as Bernard Williams notes [231, p. 22], to be a disappointed
aspiration. Hurley suggests that a “thick” conception of luck – one which may
be applied to judgements about what one is responsible for – should be replaced
with a “thin” conception:
¿in luck is simply the inverse correlate of responsibility, in the
1. Margaret Coyne Walker: “¿e very idea of ‘moral luck’ cannot fail to engage our interest,
if only because some of us are astonished at the very idea” [48, p. 319].
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full-blooded sense that licenses and is implied by praise, blame,
moral assessment, moral accountability, and resentment and other
reactive attitudes. What is a matter of thin luck for agent is just
what he is not responsible for, and what he is responsible for is
not a matter of thin luck for him. ¿in luck is just the absence or
negation of whatever it is that makes for responsibility. [120, p. 80]
I have already discussed the potential that the Lottery holds for thinking
about questions of luck in chapter 5. ¿e question of deserving luck appears
frequently also when jackpot winners are discussed. An example, from the
USA:
On Wednesday morning in Lincoln, Neb., a er four days of specu-
lation about who had won the biggest jackpot in Powerball history,
eight employees of a ConAgra ham processing plant came forward
and identied themselves as the winners of the $365 million purse.
As lottery stories go, this is about as heartwarming as it gets. Two
of the winners are immigrants from Vietnam and one is a political
refugee from the Republic of Congo – and all worked the second
and third shi s, some clocking asmany as 70 hours a week. ¿ere is
probably no jobsite as gruesome as a meatpacking house. If anyone
deserves an express ticket to a new life, it’s these folks. [39]
Winners who seem to have no need of the money tend to be treated with a
sort of amusement. A celebrated case at the end of 1998 was when an aunt
of the then leader of the Conservative Party, William Hague, won a share of
the jackpot worth £856,648. Under the headline Hague’s Aunt Fleeces National
Lottery, the bbc reported:
¿e aunt of Conservative leader William Hague is celebrating her
£856,648 National Lottery win - and plans to buy a prize ram for
her Yorkshire farm.
[inset: Mike McKay hears Tony Blair wish it was HIS auntie]
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Marjorie Longdin, 73, only realised she had hit the jackpot when
she was reading ¿e Yorkshire Post on ¿ursday morning, a er
Wednesday night’s draw.
A er nding she had four numbers, she was looking forward to
putting her winnings towards the cost of Christmas.
[image: William Hague: Delighted for his aunt]
When she matched all six, she could only utter: "Oh my god, I’ve
got the lot."
"I just went all shaky," she told BBC Radio 5 Live.
Her nephew William congratulated her good fortune. "It’s very
good, very funny," he said.
Asked if he would benet too, he laughed: “We are a good Yorkshire
family so I don’t expect to see any of this money from Auntie
Marjorie.” [9]
¿is subject appeared o en in my interviews, with a similar humorous tone:
Karen BWell she won, what was it? a million or something? and
I think good luck to her. ¿ere’s others who could do with the
money more, and what. . . she’s pretty old, so she won’t get so much
enjoyment as someone else. Like me for instance. [laughs]
On the other hand, some characters who have won the jackpot have become
folk models of someone who does not deserve the good luck they have received.
¿ese are typically winners with a criminal past, who continue to behave badly,
but on a grander scale, a er their win. One in particular, Michael Carroll, self
proclaimed “King of the Chavs” [54] appears frequently in news items since
winning £9.7 million in 1002.
Another group who attract attention for their Lottery play are the unem-
ployed. ¿ere is much evidence that unemployed people are one of the groups
that is most at risk of suering from gambling-related problems [92, §17.35].
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And I came across many stories of this kind, both in interviews, and in casual
conversations about the Lottery:
Beth W It’s a big council estate on the outskirts of Poole, and a
lot of people there are unemployed and single parents, living on
benets and that sort of thing. . . Sort of every other house has a
social worker visiting. . .
And they were saying they were in the post oce on Turlin Moor
on a¿ursday or whatever it is when they all get their cheques from
the social-security and they were saying the number of people that
were cashing the benet and just spending that money on lottery
tickets.
And I thought, I thought that’s terrible. Because I’ve worked with
families there and know, you know, half the time the children don’t
get fed and everything. . . and, you know, I just thought that was
terrible.
And as I say, if it was. . .hopefully for me. . . that I had a choice
between buying a lottery ticket and food for my children, I would
buy food for my children.
Rather like the “lotto louts”, these accounts seem to be a kind of shared Lottery
folk-form. ¿e story usually has the same basic structure. ¿ere is always the
reection upon “if it were me”, and this seems to be the basic point of the story:
it is a sort of inverse form of the jackpot fantasy.
6.3 The Gift Economy
¿e obverse of “I would buy food for my children” is what I would buy for them
if I were lucky enough to win the jackpot. ¿e extensive fantasies that people
have about this constitute a sort of charity in itself, an imaginary act of care
towards others for whom one has a particular bond.
¿e gi – the basis of charitability – has been understood in the canons
of anthropology and sociology as one of the fundamental aspects of human
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societies. It is one of the conceptual mainstays, in particular, of structural
anthropology and anthropology. ForMauss, a study of the gi requires “a return
to the old and elemental” [153, p. 67], and Lévi-Strauss elevated this elemental
conception to the dignity of a universal structural principle of reciprocity. Gi 
giving as a means of social reproduction was, for him, characteristic not only
of simple societies but also of contemporary advanced capitalist societies. Gi 
giving at Christmas in North America nds its analogue in that of Native
Americans’ potlatch ritual. ¿e function of the gi is social control: the apparent
generosity of the potlatch giver is rewarded by the obligation engendered in the
recipient.
¿e disposition to return to the elemental – elementarism in the coinage of
Ekeh – goes hand in hand with the assumption that there are universal and
invariant laws permeating all levels of generality and degrees of complexity of
human life [76, p. 128]. To understand these laws requires the examination of
“reduced models” of society in order to separate out what is essential from those
cultural layers of the non-essential that build up during the development of
a society. Because of the principle of universality, the data reduction method
used by the structuralist involves examining in all of its detail the simplest
forms of society, where laws may be found in their purest form. ¿is move is
methodological, but it also carries a normative load as well: Mauss says of the
gi , that returning to the elemental
. . .we shall discover those motives of action still remembered by
many societies and classes: they joy of giving in public, the delight
in generous artistic expenditure, the pleasure of hospitality in the
public or private feast. Social Insurance, solicitude in mutuality or
co-operation, in the professional group and all those moral persons
called Friendly Societies, are better than the mere personal security
guaranteed by the nobleman to his tenant, better than the mean
life aorded by the daily wage handed out by managements, and
better even than the uncertainty of capitalist savings. [153, p. 67]
Aside from methodological critiques of structuralism, it is dicult to have it
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save the appearances of some aspects of contemporary society. It is questionable
whether the gi ’s ability to foster social ties is as appropriate in complex societies
as it is in simple ones. As Cheal remarks “achieving control over others by
overwhelming them with gi s is likely to be found on a large scale only where
more eective forms of domination do not exist” [40, p. 3]. Furthermore, the
more complex the society, themore dicult it is to sustain the universality – and
indeed the elementality – of the gi , and the more compelling it becomes to
maintain the specicity of particular forms and contents of gi -giving.
In¿e Social Psychology of the Gi [194], Schwartz suggests that gi -giving
may be seen as a kind of play. ¿e rules of irrelevance that are central to play,
that “the content of the game, as that of sociability must be ‘self-sucient’ or ir-
relevant to the relationship between players in non-game encounters.” [p. 1]. ¿e
maintenance of this rule, he says, is particularly important for gi -giving, since
“an excessive display of pleasure or displeasure would aront the giver, violate
the Rule of Irrelevance, and take the entire encounter out of the sphere of ‘pure’
sociability. He also speaks of gi -giving as a means of “free-associating about
the recipient in his presence, and sometimes in the presence of others” [p. 2].
Cheal suggests a way of reformulating the concept of the gi is to look at
it from the perspective of the social reproduction of intimacy [40, p. 151]; and
to consider it in the context of a “moral economy”, rather than an a purely
economic one. In his view, as with Schwartz, gi s are playful, and they are also
small-scale and intimate:
Gi transactions do not have as their principal purpose the re-
distribution of resources. ¿ey are, for the most part, redundant
transactions that are used in the ritual construction of small social
worlds. [40, p. 11]
¿e subjunctive quality of the Lottery – that it is more about imaginary situ-
ations than it is about concrete ones – allows it much scope for these kinds of
transaction. It can be found in the fantasies that people have about what they
would do with the jackpot money, most of which centre around their family,
friends and colleagues. Much of the work done in these kinds of thoughts seems
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to be a kind of classication of nearer and closer groups:
Elaine D
interviewer: Why do you have syndicates?
Well just because you’d win within that group, it’s just a fun thing
to do as a group.
interviewer: So it’s something to do with. . .
With the groupness. Yeah, it’d be nice if you win, if all your col-
leagues win.
interviewer: So what if you win with your individual. . .
Oh if I win with my individual. . .Yeah, because that group is, sort
of the family group benets from that.
interviewer: Oh I see, so there’s always a group, but it could be a
dierent group.
It could be a dierent group. Yeah.
interviewer: You’ve got three syndicates and your family group, if
one wins then the others kind of lose in some sense. . .
No, no, as I say, my individual ticket is. . .my family group will win.
Deep and meaningful, you’ve got me thinking now. But that’s it,
yeah. But then if they win in the oce group then it would still be
by my family that would benet.
¿e choosing of numbers is well-known to be very important for many
Lottery players. While many profess that it is not a superstition, but a mere
mnemonic, birthdays of family members appear very frequently amongst the
choices of numbers, and they carry some signicance. ¿is is illustrated by
one of my interviewees [interview: Mandy W], who, having separated from her
husband, was desperate to remove his birthday from her Lottery numbers. She
was troubled by this for nearly two years. It was not until the death of her grand-
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mother that she felt able to replace his birthday with hers, as a commemoration
of her life.
6.4 Something for Nothing
¿e “synergistic” relationship that Douglas divines between casual charitable
giving and long-odds, small-stake gambling, is in part due to demographic cor-
relations between the two activities, and in part due to psychological correlates
between them [67, p. 69, 82].
But beyond the fact that there is some similarity between the size and style of
the spend in both cases, there is a cluster of aspects of playing the Lottery that
encompass gambling, charity and work. ¿ey may be gathered together under
the expression “something for nothing”, which captures something fundamental
about the Lottery. In its pure form gambling involves gain without work –
something for nothing – and charity involves giving (or receiving) with no
work expected by the actors. ¿ese pure forms of the two are tempered by
aspects that make something out of the ‘nothing’. Some forms of gambling
involve work: the studying of form, card-counting, the face-work of poker, for
example. Likewise, charity is most o en not quite pure: the giver may gain
something: absence of guilt, satisfaction of the demands of sense that it involves
a reciprocal arrangement of somethings for duty, even tax relief. An analysis of
altruism from the standpoint of utility shows that it could just as easily be called
self-interest. Gary Becker, for example, in his Treatise on the Family, argues
that altruism is generally considered important within the family, but that that
altruism of parents towards their children is a calculative economic act. Parents,
he claims, invest in their children to improve their own prospects on retirement.
Since they cannot legally enforce future nancial assistance from their children,
they act altruistically towards them to secure an emotional debt [12, p. 277-].
Charity seems to dier from gambling in the nothing: giving something for
nothing and receiving something for nothing. But even here, a similarity may
be found if one considers the loser as well as the winner, for the gambling loser,
whether an individual, a group of individuals (those who do not win lottery
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prizes, for example) or an organization (such as a casino), does indeed give
away something for nothing as well.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
What speaks to us, seemingly, is always the big event,
the untoward, the extra-ordinary: the front-page
splash, the banner headlines. . .What’s really going on,
what we’re experiencing, the rest, all the rest, where
is it? How should we take account of. . .what happens
every day: the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the
common, the ordinary, the infra-ordinary, the back-
ground noise, the habitual?
—George Perec, Approaches to What? [173, p. 204–205]
¿e contribution of this thesis is to the sociology of gambling. It uncovers new
facts in the form of empirical data and historical evidence, to which it applies
and extends existing theories of gambling and play. It advances a synoptic
understanding of the subject matter that encompasses not only social aspects
gambling, but also economic rationality and charitable giving. It addresses
these issues with a distinctively sociological style of reasoning.
It is impossible to avoid playing the Lottery; one might refuse to play, but
there is always the chance that others may buy one tickets as gi s. On two
occasions since I began this research, I have been given two lottery tickets and
one a scratchcard as gi s. I have been lucky: I have won £15.00. And I have,
in my view, been lucky that I have not won the jackpot. Even had I not been
bought these tickets, I would still not nd it possible to avoid being touched
by the Lottery. Rather like the system of fashion, there is no escape from the
Lottery, for there is always the possibility that someone close to me who does
play will win a large amount. And I must confess that I have occasionally
enjoyed such a fantasy. One might say that the lottery is a memento of one’s
162
inescapable membership of society. It is, of course, not unique in this respect.
But the real interest in the Lottery is that, for all the apparent brashness of its
marketing, the tawdriness of the kinds of fantasies that it seems to evoke, and
its apparent exploitation of base desires for material gain at little cost, there
is something extraordinarily and compellingly resonant about it. It is also a
surprisingly subtle phenomenon. As I have noted many times in this thesis,
most of the play of the Lottery happens somewhere other than in the game
itself. ¿e Lottery seems to disappear into the general content of everyday
life. It makes its appearances, but those appearances are only fragmentary and
eeting. Furthermore, it only seems to make its presence known in the context
of something else. On the face of it, this assertion may seem strange. But, as I
have shown in dierent parts of this thesis the actual play of the Lottery is, for
its ordinary players, only incidental.
Naturally, this raises the question of whether one ought to study such an
evanescent object. Evanescence itself may be interesting, as Freud’s theory of
neurosis and Marxian theories of ideology show. But to apply the one or the
other of these theories to the Lottery, as some have indeed done, would be to
suggest that the truth of the Lottery is behind those few handles it gives us to
grasp it: the Lottery would be a signier for something else, something latent
and repressed.
But it is possible to look at the Lottery from another perspective. One could
nd in the Lottery something that the novelist Georges Perec calls the “infra-
ordinary”: it passes through the mundane and back out into the extraordinary,
through the smallest scale of individual life to the largest scale of historical
social processes. It is what Simmel called a “microscopic-molecular process”,
for the practices of the Lottery are able “more readily to give us access to how
we experience society in our everyday existence than will the study of ‘major
organizational systems’ ” [90, p. 11].
It was not always like this. One of the most striking dierence between
the lotteries of the eighteenth century and those of today is the stage upon
which they are set. ¿ere are public aspects to the lotteries of both periods,
but they are very dierent kinds of public-ness. ¿e extraordinary ferment
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of the draws of the 1700s has been replaced by managed television spectacle.
When one attends the lottery draw show in the BBC television studio, as with
all such programmes, the entire experience is choreographed, the audience is
warmed up, and instructed when to cheer.1¿e potential that the draws of the
eighteenth century had to become an arena for dissent, or indeed mere aray,
has all but disappeared. Recently, the fathers’ activist group Fathers 4 Justice
staged a protest on the Saturday National Lottery: Jet Set programme [10]; a
spokesman for the organization said, “¿e lottery is a metaphor for what can
happen to any parent, mother or father, and their children, at the hands of the
secret family courts”. But it was a small-scale, rather desultory aair.
In terms of playing, the Lottery has, rather, become privatized: while it has its
public aspect in the capital projects that it funds, the essence of the Lottery for
its players is to do with their own lives. In all of the dierent aspects covered in
this thesis, we might say, following Abt and McGurrin that gambling is a social
structure which sits between the individual and chance, and which, while it has
no ability to manage the randomness of life, “it does change the individual’s
interpretation of that outcome” [1, p. 414]. Perhaps more so than ever, if we
concur with Ulrich Beck [11], individuals are confronted with new, unbounded
risks. Gambling, Abt and McGurrin suggest is able to supply a cultural means
of adding a bound to those risks:
¿e cultural values of a society inuence our decisions to dene
the uncertain outcomes of life situations as either games or real, as
dangerous or exciting, as rational or foolish. [1, p. 414]
In this respect, it is no surprise that the predominant attitudes to the Lottery
are individualized and privatized, for, in the same way that, as the Rothschild
Report noted, there will be no more philanthropers in quite the same way as
those of the late-Victorian period, the time between the two great periods of
state lotteries in the UK has also witnessed what Richard Sennett described as a
“fall of public man” [197]: a decline in the living of one’s life on the public stage.
1. For some accounts of attending the draw, see Atherton’s Gambling: A Story of Triumph
and Disaster [5, p. 1–6], and http://www.myledbury.co.uk/lottery/default.asp (last
visited: 25th July, 2006).
164
¿eessence of play is that it draws upon the real world and creates a temporary
‘world within a world’ for a moment. Gambling adds something to this, the
bricolage of play – its reworking of the world into another one untrammeled
by consequences outside of the game itself – is intensied by the prospects of
winning and loss. It is possible to make almost anything – anything that has an
element of chance, that is – has a betting potential. In 1754, the Connoisseur
newspaper said that “there is nothing, however trivial or ridiculous, that is
not capable of producing a bet” [5, p. 75]. Atherton lists some of the more
extraordinary bets from the eighteenth century:
In 1735, Count de Buckeburgh laid a large wager on riding to Ed-
inburgh whilst sitting backwards on the horse. . .Lord March bet
a thousand guineas that a four-wheeled carriage could be drawn
at a minimum of nineteen miles an hour. ¿e event took place
over a mile in Newmarket and Lord March won his bet with seven
minutes to spare. In 1770 two earls struck a bet that one could ride
from London to Edinburgh and back in less time that it took the
other to draw a million dots. . . [A] northern baron. . . laid a con-
siderable wager that he would go to Lapland and bring back two
native females and two reindeer within an allotted time. He did so,
and the Laplanders lived with the Baron for about a year until they
asked to go home. [5, p. 75]
Gambling has a tremendous capacity for nding objects for itself, and this is
no less true of today’s spread-betting and betting exchanges than it was in the
eighteenth century.
One extraordinary kind of gambling market that warrants further invest-
igation is the use of gambling as a device for information-gathering. In July
2003, as part of its programme to develop new intelligence procedures a er
11 September 2001, the US defence research agency darpa introduced an
initiative, called a pam, where gamblers could bet upon terrorism. ¿is pro-
gramme, named FutureMap, was never fully realized, but extensive policy
documents were produced, and a mock-up web-page was posted on the darpa
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web-site. Amongst others, this mock-up oered gambling odds on the level of
regional security threats across the world, on a North Korean missile attack,
on the assassination of Yasser Arafat, and on terrorists attacking Israel with
biological weapons. Unsurprisingly, the web-site attracted much notice: many
commentators were strongly critical, few were enthusiastic, and some were
scandalized by the proposal. As a result of this reception, the web-site was soon
removed, the programme was abandoned, and the deputy Director – Admiral
John Poindexter – was forced to resign his post [171]. ¿is kind of “decision
market” relies upon the ecient markets hypothesis: that markets will optimize
the information available about fundamentals because it is in the interests of all
players to do so, since they have a stake in the price of the commodity.
But one could argue, as I have in this thesis, that the ordinariness of the
Lottery player who plays regularly but wins little is even more extraordinary. It
seems, by its form and by its usage, to have a tremendous capacity not merely
to create a separate world within a world, but to allow extra- and infra-ordinary
worlds to co-exist at the same time.
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Appendix A
interview data
A.1 Interview Topic Guide
Basic details:
* First of all, I’d just like to ask you a few basic details about
playing the Lottery.
How often do you play the Lottery?
Do you play regularly?
Ever miss a week...(Saturday/Wednesday)
Scratchcards.
Syndicates.
(Syndicates and playing individually...)
Do you ever buy tickets on impulse?
How much money do you spend each week?
Have you won any money?
When did you start playing?
Do you do other things like the Lottery?
What about other forms of gambling?
Before the Lottery?
When do you check your tickets?
(watch the programme ?), with whom?
Do you use the same numbers each time? (why/why not?)
How do you choose your numbers?
***************************
General Lottery Play.
* Now I want you to tell me more about more general feelings and
attitudes you hold about the Lottery.
Can you describe your feelings when checking numbers?
(When you won some money?)
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What about when you choose numbers
Do you feel that you are going to win?
Do you talk about winning with others
describe the kinds of conversations you might have.
Do you imagine what you would do...describe fantasies
Are there times when you feel especially likely to win?
Do you feel lucky in general? (examples)
Would you say you are superstitious?
Are some people luckier than others?
Do people earn luck (e.g. through doing good?)
Do some people deserve to win more than others? Are there people who
should not win (who have)?
Do you deserve to win?
Do you believe in fate?
Probability of winning: Do you know what the odds of winning are?
(Lottery, Thunderball, scratchcards)
Do you really believe that you are going to win sometime, given the
odds?
***************************
Charity:
* An important aspect of the Lottery is that it is used to fund Good
Causes. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about this.
Ask how much money goes to charitable causes
Reactions to actual figure: more/less
Where the money goes...do you know where the money goes?
What do you think about this...
Can you think of examples...good and bad.
How would you change the way that the Lottery funds Good Causes?
Do you give money to charities?
How often, spontaneous/planned
Do you know anything about the company that runs the Lottery?
What do you think about C’s profit-making status?
Would you play if it was not charitable?
Would you prefer it if it was run on a not-for-profit basis?
Why (or why does it not matter)?
***************************
Gambling:
Is the Lottery gambling? (compare with horse-race betting, bingo,
casinos, premium bonds).
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Some people believe that gambling is immoral...what do you think?
***************************
Risk:
* Playing the Lottery is all about chance; I’d like to ask you about
other ways in which chance touches our lives in the form of risk.
Can you tell me some of the risks you face in your everyday life?
What about things like BSE...?
How do you deal with risk?
A.2 Sample Interview
number: 7
name: Helen S
location: Pippins
age: 40
gender: f
marital: s
children: 1
occupation: NVQ co-ordinator. managerial.
income: 23,000
education: diploma health and community studies
emic-class: middle by profession. working culturally. background
"denitely" working
religion: practising Christian (CE). Sunday school teacher.
initial impressions: Loads of good stu about budgeting, charity.
Being a Christian. Risk in relation to horse riding.
Can you tell me just the basic details about how you play the lottery?
Right. I play regularly in two syndicates both through work, both through here. So the
Saturday one and the Wednesday one and the Saturday one started, you know obviously early
on and we all paid I think  y pence a week each and I usually pay mine monthly in advance.
And then once the Wednesday one started we all said No No No, we’re not going to do the
Wednesday one because it becomes ridiculous and then we said what if any of our Saturday
numbers came up on a Wednesday? we’d be sorry. So somebody else then organized a
syndicate on a Wednesday.
Who is it, because I talked to Jayne who organizes the Wednesday –
– Jayne organizes the Wednesday one and Beryl organizes the Saturday one. So, I pay  y
pence into each of them a week, so that’s. . . a pound a week and originally we had an alternative
to the lottery, we bought premium bonds between us for those people who, you know, because
in, in principle originally I’m quite, I’m opposed to the lottery principle because I think, you
know, government should use money in a dierent way and health and education shouldn’t be
reliant on you know lottery applications and grants etc. but I also recognize the reality is that it
does extract vast sums of money from people some of which is used to good, and if its an
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alternative taxation. . . and I got to the point where more of my colleagues were in the lottery
syndicate than were out and you know a few things would come up in the paper you know
groups of nurses have won. . . and I thought I would be so sick if my colleagues won and you
know they share and they had ten thousand each and I didn’t. So I thought blow the principles
I’ll join the syndicate so I did really.
So. . . if they won you’d be. . . sick, you wouldn’t be pleased for them.
No I don’t think I would be, I’d be sick that I wasn’t involved.
You don’t think that they’d share the money with you?
No I’m sure they wouldn’t. So I thought, right I must join in and be part of this. So I did I
recognized, I thought if yeah if they had a big win and they were all in Monday morning, you
know and I was one of the ones who said on principle. . . you know. . . so I thought no.
Do you think, do they share these sorts of principles? I mean, are they similarly compromised?
No. not at all. they just thought it was a useful way to spend 50 pence I think. And there was
one other colleague who was similarly principled and still *doesn’t* play the lottery I have to
say. She doesn’t work here now. And so I think i was in sort of isolation really I was probably
one of the last ones who wasn’t actually doing it. I think most of us are in. . .
I’m interested in its social role, I mean, does it work as a way of, as part of a sort of group thing. . .
. . . In terms of our own group? In terms of something that we share?
yeah, sort of, a culture. . .
Ummm. . . I think it does, I mean it is just one more thing that we come together for and
regardless of principle there is certainly a sense of isolation if you’re not involved. I mean, you
know, absolutely. . . you know, so I think it is one of those things about being in and and. . .
But it’s quite low key isn’t it, there aren’t posters about it.
No, no, it’s very subtle and if new members of sta start you know they get to hear about ’cause
somebody is saying “Have you paid your lottery money?” and a new member of sta will go
“Oh, do you run a lottery syndicate?”
How long have you been here?
Four years.
So that’s almost all of the time that the syndicate has been running.
Yeah
So people who come here, someone doesn’t say “Oh we’ve got this syndicate, would you like to
join?”
No
Why do you think that is?
I don’t think they see it as of any great relevance you know so people tend to pick up on it
rather than. . .
Are there other things like that?
Umm. . .no probably not, because our organization has this sort of structure where you know i
guess we have an ethos of caring and sharing so we tend to make sure people know you know
the sort of non-said things like bring your coee mug and you pay your coee money and you
know this is where we o en go for lunch and we do some social things and. . .
¿ese things are spoken about?
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Yeah.
So when someone arrives. . .
Yeah, they would be told. And they are picked up in meetings you see. Whereas the lottery is
all a bit more “did you know we won 10 pound?”
It’s interesting that it is so understated.
Yeah, yeah, and yet it’s not really, because it’s you know everyone is paying weekly there is no
requirement that any of us pay, you know, so long as you paid, you could just pay a week ahead,
so long as you’d paid your 50 pence on Wednesday and 50 pence on Saturday. I mean most of
us pay 4 or ve or 6 weeks: “Oh look, here’s, knock 2 pound o my lottery and they tick the
little boxes and say where does that take me to? Oh up until. . . ” So you know there’s quite
o en. . . and because both of the people who organize the Wednesday and Saturday lotteries are
in the main oce there’s quite o en people. . .
Are they both. . .
. . .¿ey’re both admin sta. And they both keep you know little envelopes with all our names
on and little boxes. And we also, when it rst started, we were all issued with the numbers, and
we used the same numbers. So however many lines that we buy we all know –
– you actually get to choose two of the numbers each week?
Yeah
So how do you choose them?
Oh I chose mine are birthdays.
Do you think most of them are birthdays? Lots of people say that.
I think most are birthdays or house numbers. I think people use signicant dates for them:
their anniversaries and birthdays and that.
Right. . .what about this premium bond thing? I thought you said that wasn’t running any more?
Yes that is running, but it’s not open to any new members, we closed it o. . . and then we had to
have a vote about whether we carried on, whether people wanted to re- because you can’t
legally run a premium bond syndicate. So what we do is on trust we each buy a hundred
pounds worth, at the end of the period, and we agree that if it wins in that time we share it but
if it’s, but at the end of that time it’s our own. It’s already in our own name. So I’ve got 300
pounds worth of premium bonds that I wouldn’t have. . . I wouldn’t have taken 100 pounds out
of my salary one month and gone o and bought a premium bond.
Without that. . .
Not at all without that. . .
So it’s very trusting isn’t it?
It is. [I don’t know what was going on here!]
So, can you imagine if your premium bond did win would you –
– be quite happy
– to share the money?
Yeah
You wouldn’t be tempted to. . .
¿e other things is that we record the numbers of the premium bonds that have been bought
and at the end of the period when the numbers become ours, those numbers are destroyed. But
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you might like to check if, you know, I’m quite sure if I won everyone would know anyway.
I’m trying to remember, I asked you about whether you play apart from in the syndicate.
Yeah I do occasionally, but it is only occasionally.
When would you buy them?
Usually when I had read something about, you know when William Hague’s auntie won, I
thought Pah if she can win it, anyone can, you know, it’s that sort of trigger. And if I happen to
be in Sainsbury’s at about ve o’clock on Saturday. And it is a sense about feeling lucky, I mean
I’ve never won, even won 10 pound.
You haven’t won at all?
Not outside of the syndicate.
How much have you won in the syndicate then?
I don’t know, but I would sense that we fairly regularly get 10 pound. You know I quite o en
hear “Oh we had 10 pound on Saturday”, or “Oh we haven’t had a win for a few months”.
So this William Hague’s Aunt, was that a particular instance when you went out and bought a
ticket?
Yes. And there was another one another famous somebody’s sister. Somebody from
Coronation Street.
Is it something to do with them being famous?
No I think it was something to do with the prole of. . . and it was just about walking into
Sainsbury’s and thinking, Good lord William Hague’s auntie is eighty-thousand richer today
just cause she risked a pound.
Does that seem a bit odd to you, the logic behind that?
No I think it makes. . .because most of the time, you don’t go through your daily life, *I* don’t
go through my daily life, planning or wishing or dreaming of large sums of money you know I
pay my syndicate money so that if they win I’m not behind. It’s not a major feature. I never
check the numbers, the syndicate numbers, ever. I’d no more put the Saturday night television
on to look at the lottery than. . . I mean I just don’t and I wouldn’t. So I think it’s about it being
bought very much. . . I mean when William Hague’s auntie won, I mean it was like front page
news. And when I think it was someone’s daughter from Coronation Street, someone like Pat
Phoenix’s daughter. . . again, so it was very front page. . .
¿ese people who are. . . the two you mentioned, they almost don’t need to win. . .
Yeah. I don’t think. . . it’s not about need or deserve. . . I mean I think the. . .Oh what did I read
somewhere about the odds of winning the lottery? ¿ey compared it to something, and it was
something about the odds. . . I can’t remember what it was now.
People usually say something like being struck by lightning.
Yes. It was something quite, you know, your chances of being so-and-so are more likely. And
something really obscure like you know your chances of giving birth to live triplets or
quadruplets is more likely than winning. . . that sort of thing. So I think it is absolutely a lottery
it is down. . . I mean, to pure luck, you know.
So, you haven’t won any money personally and you’ve won a bit of money with the syndicate. Can
you tell me if you do other things like the lottery?
Umm. I occasionally. No. I mean I do the premium bond thing which is, you know. And I, I
never buy scratchcards. Never have done, never would do, and one of the reasons for that is
that I think I probably have a mildly addictive personality and I’d probably become of those
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people that become totally. . . you know, I have some friends who when they do their groceries
they treat themselves to two scratchcards, two one pound scratchcards, but I know that if I
once scratched o 5 pound or 10 pound I’d think “Whoah”, you know, the temptation of easy
money, it’d be a bit like cigarette addiction and all those other things.
Hmm, It’s interesting though, that you know. . . I’m interested in this idea of an addictive
personality because several people have said that to me. . . but you sort of know that you are being
sucked into something but it isn’t something like addiction to nicotine, something which is
physical, is it?
I think it could be, I think the thrill of that is you know. . . it would be quite a. . . [While talking,
she mimes scratching scratchcards] . . .one more. . . I think it would, you know, I occasionally,
not so much now, but I occasionally go horse-racing and the thrill of winning, you know and I
gamble so I mean I keep money to gamble at the races because that’s about a fun day out, you
know. But I realize that it would have to be very controlled because I could very easily become
a, oh you know. . .
What’s the evidence for this, why do you think that. . .
. . . I think it would be about the easy winning, you know it’s all part of that work ethic, you
know, you only get what you deserve if you work for it and anything that came a bit too easily,
the temptation to just keep trying to repeat that type of. . .
But are there other things outside of gambling which you think you might become addicted to in a
similar sort of way?
No, I mean I smoked for a long time and then gave it up so no, I think gambling would
probably. . . there is a real thrill, I mean things like horse racing.
So how o en do you go to the horses?
Less now because I’ve got a little one, but certainly when I was, when I didn’t have. . .when I had
more money, more time to you know take whole days out. I usually go to Salisbury, go couple
of times a season to Salisbury, go to Wincanton, go to local races. I like the point-to-points.
Sounds like you go quite o en.
No, it’s not. I mean it sounds. . . I go point-to-pointing so we probably go three or four times
during the season to the point-to-points only because. . . I mean if I had to travel. . . they happen
to be here at Badbury. And its a lovely day out, there’s people and dogs and the gambling and
the horse-racing are all part of it.
Do you have an interest in horse-racing itself?
I do have in interest in horses and I have friends who have horses.
You said that you don’t go so much now because you have the little one.
Yeah, because they’re a bit of a liability at those sorts of things. When he was tiny it was ne
because you could put them in a push-chair and they’re strapped in.
How old is he?
He’s four. So they’re just at that age where, you know, if you are going racing and you stand on
the stand then you want to watch the race and you might have your binoculars and you might
be screaming and shouting “Go on!”
You do all the screaming and shouting.
Oh absolutely. But if you’ve got, if you look down and your four-year-old will be disappeared
you know and you can’t. . . it’s not a good environment at that age. When he’s seven or eight and
you can say “well its ne, you go over there and have your face painted and I’ll still be here by
the rail and –
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– so he’s just at a dicult age.
For some of those things, yes. And things like we used to go racing on Boxing Day, go to
Wincanton on Boxing Day, but you know when you’ve got a four-year old they want to spend
their Boxing Day with their aunts and uncles playing with their yesterday’s presents.
When you go to horse-racing, you bet on horses cold you give me a rough idea of how much.
Um, yeah, what I do is I have a change bottle you know where you just throw your loose
change into the change bottle and so what I will do is I’ll just empty that and see what I’ve got
in there. And because if you gamble very little there’s always the perception that you come out
on top because you very o en break even on the day and particularly at local races, at a local
race, something like Salisbury or Wincanton it’s much easier to predict a horse that will win.
So you actually go into the business of looking for horses.
Oh yes, I don’t go “Oh look, Lucky Harry” no I look and think. . .
I spoke to someone else who goes to horse-racing and she said she bets on horses she feels sorry
for. . . it’s a sort of sympathy thing. If there was a three-legged horse she would bet on it.
You see I wouldn’t bet if the odds were really, you know if the only horse I liked in the
collecting ring was say. . . something like at Salisbury you might have only four or ve horses in
a race because three or four have been scratched, if I looked and I thought “Oh that’s the only
thing that’s going to romp home today” and I went and the odds were you know odds on or
even, I wouldn’t even bother to bet. You know I wouldn’t think “Oh well, I’ll just get my return
back for that”, but then I might say “Well that’s about the second best horse and that’s twenty to
one. Yeah that’s sounds better, I’ll have a ver on that”.
So, you have all this change in a bottle.
Yeah, in a bottle and I count it up. . . It’s like spending money.
Is it your gambling or your horse-racing money or would you spend it on something else?
No, its my nothing money really. It’s sort of you know if I take the children to the carnival I’ll
raid the bottle. But it doesn’t seem like real money because I’ve not missed it. For that sort of
thing.
How long does it take you to ll up the bottle up with money?
I don’t know it’s never been lled right to the very neck, but usually any time I go. . . I suppose I
dig into it about every three or four months or something. And there’s usually between
thirty-ve and seventy pounds depending on how many twenty-pence pieces there are in there.
So you save quite big amounts.
I save up to twenty-pence pieces and that reects on. . . I don’t put pound coins in because you
see if I’m quite hard up then the twenty-pence pieces never get there and the coppers all stay in
my purse and I’m counting out one-pound twenty-seven, you know. But if my purse gets a bit
heavy I think “Oh I’ll get rid of some of these coppers” and throw them in the bottle. And I’m
not sure that I would be able to happily justify, you know, taking ten pound, you know
*proper* ten pound from my purse and just thinking. . .on a horse.
It’s funny though, because –
– It’s not the same
What makes it dierent?
I don’t know. I think it’s about the way you psychologically manage your money. I mean my
money is fairly tight and therefore it’s all accounted for and I would class a bet on a horse or a
scratchcard or something as a waste.
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What about the syndicates then?
No I don’t because I have quite a dierent view about that; A. because it is a much smaller
amount because it’s *only*  y-pence, it’s *only* a pound a week, and I think, well I could lose
that in a Safeway’s trolley. You know, you put the money and it doesn’t come back out again.
Do you know what I mean?
It’s almost like a sort of gambling then isn’t it, putting money in the trolley?
So, I see it as an insignicant amount.
And so, outside of gambling, do you carefully budget your money?
No, I notionally budget in my head.
Notionally budget in your head?
I think, you know, well I need, out of my salary I need this for this and I need that for that and
a er the mortgage has gone out and a er. . . you know.
But is it all accounted for, there isn’t a. . . you don’t have a chunk of money. . .
When I have a chunk of money le there’s always something I need to do with it. You know,
Oh look I’m a bit better o this month, that’s good I can. . . get. . .
Do you have a sort of luxury budget
No, No, No. I don’t put pleasure rst.
Like I think I *must* go to the cinema once a week. . .
I do go to the cinema regularly, but I see that as almost essential. So, yeah I keep sort of I
think. . . you know I would be horried if I thought that in a month I couldn’t go out at least
once eat with friends and once to the cinema which usually involves having something to eat
rst.
But the money in this bottle is. . . just. . .
It’s change, it’s loose change. It’s money that has fallen into the bottom of my. . .
But it’s for a dierent kind of thing.
Yeah, yeah. Quite dierent. Because it doesn’t occur to me to go to it, you see. If I’m a bit hard
up and I think Oh, if I had a. . . I’d could go to the pictures twice this week, it wouldn’t occur to
me to go and count out four-pound eighty from the bottle and say well that’s alright I can use
that. I mean it just stands there.
I was just wondering, when. . . I’m sorry to keep focusing on this bottle of money, but it’s very
interesting. . . but, when you –
I’ve done it since when I was a student, that’s 22 years that I have had this bottle.
¿e same bottle?
It’s not the same one, no. ¿e rst one broke; it wore out.
You wore it out ?
Well I think I must have done. It got glass fragile, it was a big Bells Whisky thing.
When you take the money, when you raid the bottle as you put it, do you put in little plastic bags
and take it to the bank?
Yeah, that’s *exactly* what I do. ¿at’s *exactly* what I do. Why?
So when you go to the bank
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So then I say would you change, you know, I’ve got a lot of change could you put this into notes
for me.
And when it becomes notes –
No, it’s still bottle money.
¿at’s what I want to know –
It’s still bottle money, it’s not real money.
So when you have say –
– Is this a bit peculiar?
No, no, no, I think it’s quite normal actually. When you have a. . . you maybe have a wallet or
something, do you keep it separately?
Umm, yes, but I usually only do it as I’m going to spend it.
I’m just wondering whether you actually spend those particular bank-notes.
Yes, I do spend those particular bank-notes. Yes, I do.
And that’s important?
I’ve never thought about it in this much depth really. I’ll be quite neurotic now. I’m going to go
out and think I’m going to get rid of that bottle, I’m not doing that. . .But that’s exactly what I
do. I raid the bottle for some special money that I think I can aord to waste and I have
absolutely no guilt, compulsion or anything else about it if I lose it. I tend not to, so if I tend
not to lose it, I tend to spend it anyway, so we stopped at the Chinese in Salisbury on the way
back. You know and I’m a bit ush for the rest of the week and I think oh that’s special money.
I don’t change it back into money.
Do you actually think “¿is is bottle money”, do you use that phrase?
I do, I do, I think this is bottle money.
I think maybe we should go back to the lottery.
Yes, let’s go back to the lottery.
So you don’t. . .what about checking numbers, you don’t really do that at all.
I don’t no, only on those occasional Saturdays when I buy an odd ticket.
You do check then.
¿en I check in the Sunday morning paper.
You check the day a er then.
Yeah.
So it’s always on a Saturday then. You don’t play on a Wednesday then.
No.
You don’t watch the programme then.
No.
Why. . . you don’t get excited and think I might just have won like William Hague’s auntie.
No. But once I’ve done it it doesn’t remotely interest me. It’s just. . .
Which bit does interest you?
I think it’s just buying the ticket and just thinking Oh, you know. . . that might be a lucky ticket.
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But it wouldn’t interest me to think; and therefore tonight at six o’clock, whatever time it’s on,
seven o’clock, I don’t know what time it’s on, eight o’clock. Whenever it’s on Saturday evening.
But then on a Sunday morning I would think Oh yeah I bought one yesterday, I’ll see if any of
my. . .Oh look none of them match there’s something. . . you know.
You look in the papers do you?
Yes. In the Sunday paper on the second page in there just. . .
You don’t get very excited about it?
No absolutely not.
And you don’t think you are going to win?
No. I think I’m too realistic for that.
So what’s the attraction of doing it?
I just thinks its a momentary thing when you buy it really.
¿e scratchcards are a bit like that aren’t they? and you know straight away that you can throw it
away. . .
No, scratchcards wouldn’t suit me at all. I think I would be so disappointed you see whereas
with the lottery ticket. . .
Right, so it’s something to do with the time is it?
Yeah, I suppose. I mean, I’m not conscious that I think. . .on the occasions when I buy a lottery
ticket I’m not conscious that I spend Saturday night thinking. . .what can I buy?
But do you think about it at all?
No, I don’t think I do until the next day really.
¿is is really interesting, but I don’t quite understand what’s going on inside your head. ¿ere’s
something to do with disappointment that there is with the scratchcard, you’d be disappointed
straight away, but the lottery. . .
I do see them quite dierently, because I suppose. . . I mean the odds are much better with the
scratchcards because its a much less amount that you would win and I think that’s why it
doesn’t attract me really, I just sort of think oh well, there’s not enough excitement in it to win
 y or a hundred pounds. I only like to buy a lottery ticket when I hear about someone
winning a *huge* sum of money and I think, oh wouldn’t it be nice.
But you don’t seem especially excited though, a er you’ve bought the ticket.
No, because I think the excitement is before. It’s sort of more casual than that really. I think,
lottery, oh yeah, I think I’ll get a lottery ticket tonight. Write my numbers out when I get a
ticket, but then something can easily distract me an hour later and I’ll forget about it.
Do you actually ever imagine winning lots of money? or talk about it to friends?
Yes, I think, because again, because I think the big winners are so high prole and most of us
can name one or two if we thought about it hard enough.
What by name?
Oh I don’t know. . . there was somebody who moved to Bournemouth. . .had a very sad life
since [this is a joke] I think but. . . yes I think because it’s at us all the time, you know
everywhere you look there’s the little thumb sign
¿e little thumb sign?
You know the little “It could be you” sign, particularly if you are a regular Safeway customer
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because all the numbers are up there. So if you go to Safeway to buy a sandwich at lunchtime
or go into Safeway a er work, the National Lottery is just there all the time.
Actually I just went in there to look while I was waiting for you to arrive because people keep
describing this to me, just to see what it looks like. So do you actually imagine. . . do you think, I’d
do this, buy this?
Yes, but usually if I’m talking to somebody else. You know somebody will say, oh I thought, you
know “I thought I was”, you know. My colleague Barbara, her husband had four numbers at
one time and she said, “Oh,” she said “you think, four numbers” and I, I mean he didn’t get
very much, ninety-something or whatever it was, it wasn’t a great deal of money, and she said
“just think” and I do think then I think, oh that’d be lovely.
But you don’t have elaborate ideas.
Oh yes. Not being at work on Monday and you know. . .
So, you wouldn’t come back to work?
And we’ve already said things like, “Well you know, you know, if I’m not at work on Monday
that I’ve bought a lucky lottery ticket on Saturday”. And things like. . . it’s those sorts of
imaginings that you have with friends. You think, wouldn’t it be nice. I have a friend currently
who is trying to buy a horse box and she is trying to raise some cash. So if we talk about it you
say, you know, “Oh, I’ll buy you a horse box if I win the lottery.” It’s that. . .but I never think
deeply of all the good deeds I might do I think two things: I wouldn’t come to work again, and
I wouldn’t want any publicity.
I was just wondering, if this syndicate at work won the jackpot, it would be quite empty here
wouldn’t it.
But if you think about it, there are a lot of us in the syndicate, let’s say there’s twenty of us, it
would have to be a phenomenally large. . . if you think of 8.5 million between twenty people,
that’s still only what,  y-ve. . . I don’t know how much it is. . . but I mean I worked it out. . . it’s
not huge. It would probably be enough for some of the older people to retire on and invest.
You could insure against it. Because I read about how companies can insure against their sta
having a major lottery win.
I didn’t know about this, I must nd out about it.
I don’t know which insurance company, but they were oering small premium cover. . . you
know you take a small industrial unit on a industrial estate with seventeen workers. . .big win,
they could have no work force on. . . Sorry, I digress
No, that’s ne. What about luck then in a more general sense than winning the lottery, do
you. . . feel lucky?
Ummm [pause] It’s quite dicult really. I don’t particularly feel lucky, because I don’t believe
things happen by chance, I think there are things where the odds are so low, like the lottery
absolutely that, a lottery. I think that’s just, you know, about chance, rather than luck. But I
think most things in life are not about luck. I think they are about design and about behaviours
and attitudes and. . .
Is that human design?
Umm. . .
Because you are a Christian. . .
I think the way, yes I think it is. Because I think how we choose to live is how we you know
make if you like, make your own luck in a sense.
What about fate?
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No, I have to say, I don’t believe in fate. I think its, you know, for me, its god-given. You know,
there is an all-powerful god that has far greater designs than we will ever know about. I think
we have human choice within this great design and I think there things that man. . .
Do you believe that there is a sort of blueprint or a map that is mapped out by god.
Not in a fatalistic way no. I believe the bigger design is about love and I think god is about that,
and I think that’s how it all ts together. So I don’t think things like when your time’s up you go,
you know, I think people get killed in road trac accidents. . .
And do think there is any sort of moral dimension to this. . . I mean. . . this trac accident,
somebody might be hit by a car because they had just done something wicked.
No. None whatsoever. I don’t think god is responsible for man’s actions or suering at all. And
I don’t think that’s luck, I don’t think that’s unlucky to get hit in a road trac accident, I think
it’s the fault of one or more drivers. You know, and I think air crashes are the fault of one or
more. . . and I think some of it might be quite nite [?] to actually measure but I think most of it
is about human responsibility.
I have to ask you about this Christianity because the Christian church is traditionally very
opposed to gambling isn’t it –
– Yep.
And very suspicious, so how does that t?
Well it ts like all the other things. I mean I’m a single parent, unmarried single parent and a
Sunday school teacher.
So how does that work?
[?] church meets people where they’re at, and I think a modern church works within that. I
think human nature, I think it’s far more realistic for me to be in with my colleagues and doing
something and if we’re talking about god as an omnipresent person looking down on me, I
think he’d be much more delighted with me doing the thing that’s right with my colleagues and
for my own day-to-day well-being and being part of a bigger picture than he would be if I went
round, you know, being opposed to gambling.
You go to. . . is it a Church of England church. . .
And it’s quite high church surprisingly enough, it’s fairly anglo-catholic really, it’s not. . .
So, other people, the congregation, do they play the lottery?
I don’t know. It’s not something I discuss with them really. I suspect that a huge number of
them do because, we, you know, I think in terms of Christian faith, we’ve moved on. I mean we
raise funds by having a. . .we have a lottery in church, you know, a number lottery. We call it
the 100 club where so many numbers are sold and then at the end of the month there’s three
nancial winners. Half the money is used for paying out the nancial winners and half of the
money goes to church funds. We actively encourage people to buy numbers for that and that’s
a lottery and that’s gambling. So I think its just moved a long way and I think that a lot of the
gambling now is about social gambling and leisure, it has. . . I think there’s been a big cultural
shi in the last 50 years, the days of the puritan. . .posters of no drinking, no gambling. . .
Do you think there are things that have the same position as gambling might have done before.
I think probably. . . I think recreational drugs have taken, you know. . . the place somewhere
now. ¿ey’re higher prole, they’re more easily available, they’re. . .
What do you think about other. . . I don’t know what to call them. . . other branches of Christianity
who do take a strong moral stance on gambling say the methodists or the baptists?
Well I tend to believe they’re entitled to their principles and if they live by them, that that’s
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good for them.
You don’t think that they are being too strict?
No, not at all, because there are other areas where I could be quite principled and I think if you
look around there are churches that are not averse to applying to the millennium fund for
money to build extensions and book libraries and run coee shops and things. So I think
you’ve got to look at the bigger. . .
Do you think they have to, to get money?
No, I think it’s one of the options and it’s possible to bend your principles when the options suit.
I’m asking everyone what the probabilities of winning the lottery are, do you have any idea what
the odds are?
No. No. I know they are pretty remote, but I couldn’t actually say.
You don’t have a rough idea?
No I don’t.
Does it not matter to you?
No. Because I think that the only probability for me is that I stand as much chance as the next
person.
What about with the syndicate, that makes you more likely to win?
No, because I don’t think it does. I still think only one of those lines is as likely as any others.
Does that make sense?
Yes.
I don’t think we increase our chance by twenty times, we have twenty lines with a
similar. . . chance. . . I don’t think we have twenty times the chances. . . and it doesn’t work. . . I
don’t think the statistics show that the more, in the lottery, that if you, if you buy more
premium bonds you can actually, the bigger your holding the higher your chance of winning.
And they’ve shown that people who’ve had maximum holdings regularly get  y pounds back,
and you know.
You say “they have shown this” and “statistics show” where. . .have you looked?
I did with premium bonds because we had the information that said with these holdings, the
average winnings. . . I haven’t seen anything for the lottery.
Oh, because I thought you said that the statistics showed that –
– No. Only on the premium bonds.
Ok, I’d like to go on to the topic of charity now. I’m asking people a similar numerical question
about the money that goes to good causes in the lottery, so do you know how much out of every
pound ticket goes to good causes?
Nope.
You don’t feel you’d like to know?
No, I don’t make the connexion really between me playing and what people get, because I think
I play, or I do the syndicate, for me to win. It doesn’t occur to me when I play that, oh look
there’s my contribution towards a new village hall in Bransgore if they get some money from
the lottery.
So if it was just purely a commercial enterprise, do you think you would still play?
Yes. I don’t see it as charity giving *at all*. I don’t make that connexion.
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I talked to the person who organizes the premium bonds earlier and he said that whole thing arose
because of a debate about charity and the purpose of charity. . . and. . .
. . . and partly because with the person who has now le who [?] the principle. . .
So were you involved in that debate?
Yes, because I wasn’t a lottery. . . I only joined the lottery syndicate probably about eighteen
months ago.
Yes. I don’t really remember, I know it was debated greatly and the people on principle wanted
an alternative. But I don’t think that I ever thought deeply about it really. I see charity, you
know, I’d done some work for charity and I see that totally separate
It’s a bit like your money isn’t it?
Yes. I’m just that sort of person who has the ability to do that. I see what I give to charity as
quite separate. To me, giving  y pence a week into the lottery syndicate. . .
Can I ask about giving money to charity, what you give and how you do it?
I give regularly to Samaritans and I give regularly to Cafaid and the Children’s Society.
What’s Cafaid?
It’s a Christian aid foundation for. . . it tends to be for war-torn areas wherever they might be, it
was very third-world focused and has more recently be become much more european.
And do you have some sort of bank arrangement?
Yes. And I also give to my church regularly by bank.
Do you see that as a kind of charity?
Oh very much so, yeah, because the church, I give to our church which goes to our PC [Parish
Council] but it has a much broader remit than buying kneelers [?] for our church. Our church
gives as a church to. . . and there are appeals from the diocese where individual churches are
asked to donate.
And this money comes from the money that you give them.
Yeah, because that’s the church’s main income from gi s.
¿e church, you give to because you are a member of the congregation, what about the other ones,
is there any reason why you chose these ones?
I think there was originally, I think part of it. . .¿e only one that has changed really is the
Cafaid one. I used to quite a lot of work for Amnesty, the bits that I could do, so I used to do
door-collecting, so I got too depressed. . .
Why?
Oh, it’s terribly depressing to do door-to-door collecting for charity. It’s ne going out giving
the envelopes out but going back and saying I le an envelope ve days and they say “Never
seen them love”, you know. . .
Did you do that on a voluntary basis?
Yes, if you’re a member of Amnesty, and I’m still a member, then they buy in a group [?] that
rings around all the members and says are you prepared to do three roads in your street, you
did it last year, and they give you a bookmark.
¿ey give you a bookmark
Yes, to say thank you for collecting.
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So these other ones
¿e Children’s Society is a Christian, it’s through the church, so we do the all the candle
activities. . . I mean there are quite a few charities that I. . . those are the regular ones. . .
¿ere are other ones that you. . .
Yeah. . . the. . . I don’t know how I got on to this one, but there’s a college for visually impaired
children and I regularly get their newsletter and regularly. . . if they’re doing anything I’ll. . .
So this is regular, but it’s not. . .
. . . It’s not. . . .
..automated, by bank. . .
No, no, it’s by, you know, whatever their appeal. . .
What about people on the street collecting?
No. I tend not to, I tend not to. . . I think I tend not to because I think well I’ve chosen the
charities that I give to. You see that would depend because if I had my little one with me and
they’ve got a sticker. . . you know. . .
But you don’t feel inclined to.
I don’t, because I think we’re so exposed to it all the time, it’s not rare now, everybody, every
charity has their patch outside Sainsbury’s for however many days over whatever period.
You said that you have chosen the ones that you want to give to, do you feel that you –
– I think it’s the one’s that I feel involved in, because with the Children’s Society and Cafaid I
get direct feedback on the work of those organisations through the church, so. . . in the
Samaritans, I still have friends who are Samaritans, I was involved with them for a lot of
years. . . So I think it’s about the charities that you actually, that you know fundamentally
that. . . .whereas I think that so-and-so society, I don’t know what they do or I don’t. . . you know.
What about things like the Big Issue do you buy it?
I have done, but I don’t regularly think oh I haven’t had my Big Issue this week, you know.
And what about people just begging. . . or busking?
Well, yeah. . . I’m just casual about it really. You know, if I’ve just been into Marks and Spencer’s
and bought a two pound forty sandwich and the ten pence is still in my pocket I’ll. . . I tend not
to give to beggars, just. . .
Why is that?
I don’t know, I haven’t really thought about it deeply enough. . .Well there’s a sense in which
buskers are at least trying to do something for it you know, they’re giving something back and
there’s an expectation, you know, it’s a give and take thing whereas. . .but I don’t know.
Well that’s enough about charity, and the last topic is risk. We’ve talked about gambling and luck
and I’ve asked you about fate and another aspect of chance is risk and I’m trying to nd out how
people go about dealing with risk in their lives, how aware they are of risks and such like. I’ve
given people a few examples just to get things going which is things like BSE, this current thing
with Belgian food. . . and things like genetically modied food.
Umm I actively avoid buying anything that I’m aware has genetically modied materials in it
and that is purely because doing a diploma in community studies I studied genetics for
eighteen months and lots of what we were looking at was, this was ve years ago, and we were
looking at genetically modied. . . and I think the risk to the population as a whole is too great
in terms of. . . you know, I mean they don’t know what the eects are of GM in crops, they don’t
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know what cross-pollination, they don’t know any of those things. . .Umm, I only. . .don’t eat
beef at all, don’t give beef to my son. So if we go to McDonald’s we have sh ngers. Since the
BSE scare I buy organic meat, I buy less of it and I buy it from a very good organic butchers
near us in Ringwood, and so I buy less meat.
So these are all risk-based decisions?
Yeah. Because like. . . and like and part of it is I just don’t what to eat an animal that’s been
eating sawdust and another animal’s brains. I don’t think it’s a natural. . . I don’t think that’s the
best. . . I think it’s ne to eat animals and risk eating an animal in the natural order of things if
they’ve been slaughtered humanely and raised humanely.
So with this BSE thing, the risk is quite small, isn’t it?
Well I actually believe in years to come we’ll nd that the risk, you know, there will be
increasing evidence that the risk is greater than we’ve been led to believe. And so I think I’m
avoiding that and avoiding it for my child at this time.
What about other things. . . people talk about driving.
I mean I’m aware of the risks from driving, you know, because I do high mileage. And in the
past I’ve done a lot of high mileage driving. I’m aware that I must have an increase risk of a
road trac accident by. . .
..But do you actually *take* risks?
No. No. No I don’t. No, I’m a careful driver. . . I don’t take many risks, I live a pretty safe life
really.
Can you think of any aspects of your life which are risky?
No. No. I don’t. . . .And there again, I think being a parent changes that. You know, and
particularly physically because I’m fortunate enough I’ve got my own horse and since I’ve had
Patrick she’s sort of retired now. Someone else had her for a couple of years.
Patrick is your son.
Yes. Before that, I would take risks with my horse. I’d take a risk jumping over a fence knowing
that it’s a risky sport. And I’ve had one or two falls, had one or two broken bones. And I know
people who’ve had fairly serious injuries from riding, but I, you know, I don’t think Oh this is
very risky, but I know, logically I know that it is, I know people who’ve had crushed kidneys
and all sorts of. . . but it doesn’t prevent me. . . and it doesn’t prevent me from taking on some
horse and thinking, yeah we can do that.
So, being a mother means that you are less liable to take. . .
. . . I think it does, I think it does.
When you were talking, you reminded me of that mountaineer woman, do remember her, several
years ago?
Who died on a mountain?
And there was lots of debate a erwards about whether a woman should climb mountains if she’s
got children.
I think, for me it was more almost intrinsic than that. Because what I found is that a er I had a
child I actually lost my nerve with the horse and that wasn’t a deliberate thing, I didn’t have a
fall, but it suddenly seemed an awfully long way up and the horse seemed much. . . it seemed
much more dicult. . . you know. . . it felt. . .
So when you say “more intrinsic” you mean more. . . instinctive?
It was more instinctive, I had much more awareness of my own personal safety once I had a
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child.
But you weren’t actually thinking. . .
. . . I wasn’t *logically* thinking, Oh I mustn’t fall o my horse because Patrick’s. . . and I’m a
single parent and if he didn’t have me, what would he do if I was in Odstock [local hospital].
Before that when you road horses did you actually take risks?
Yeah I think so because the whole sport is risky. Riding a horse that’s fairly. . .my horse is very
t, so she was quite, a bit sort of jumpy and I would ride along the road and be very conscious
of. . . you know. . . there’s quite an element of risk; a bird ies up, your horse jumps up and you’re
splattered. And I would ride horses that I didn’t which is very risky really. You don’t know the
horse, you don’t know how they’re going to respond, so you put yourself in a certain amount of
risk.
But can you minimize these risks?
You can minimize them by being t and being a fairly good rider, but there’s still, because it’s
the unknown. . .
Do you think it’s part of the pleasure of doing it?
Oh yes, absolutely. Because it’s the exhilaration of jumping something high. . . it depends what
you ride for, because I’ve ridden most of my life to ride fast, to get the horse t, to have a
challenge, and I don’t ride as much as I did, but those were the things that I rode for. I didn’t
ride because I was a bit higher up to see the countryside.
Do you think people do that?
I think people do. People hack out, go to the New Forest ride twice a year, they hold onto the
saddle and they just do it because it’s a way to see the New Forest.
So you actually rode fast. . . for speed.
Yes, yes, for speed and challenge and excitement. And on a very t horse that’s a handful it’s an
exciting thing to be doing.
But do did conne that to riding a horse, you didn’t. . .
Yes. I didn’t drive my car particularly fast, no I’ve never driven my car fast.
Well I think that’s the end of the interview.
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